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
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6 July 1983

# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2161



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6 July 1983

EAST EUROPE REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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## CONTENTS

## BULGARIA

- General Kosev Ardently Defends Purity of Bulgarian  
Language  
(Kiril Kosev; POGLED, 23 May 83)..... 1

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Minister Answers Charges of Educational Discrimination  
(Juraj Busa Interview; SMENA, 3 May 83)..... 7
- Indra Comments on Dogmatism, Formalism  
(Alois Indra; ZIVOT STRANY, Apr 83)..... 17
- Pezlar on Psychological War Waged Against Bloc  
(Ludovit Pezlar; TVORBA, 30 Mar, 6 Apr 83)..... 24
- Return of Czechoslovak Gold Discussed  
(Jan Krejci; FINANCE A UVER, No 2, 1983)..... 41

## HUNGARY

- Nation's Place in Europe, East or West  
(Ivan Berend; VALOSAG, No 12, 1983)..... 55
- Pecs Bishop Calls for Church-State Cooperation, Dialogue  
(UJ EMBER, 15 May 83)..... 83
- 'Peripheral' Journal Discusses Cultural Reform Role of  
Media  
(Pal Beke; ALFOLD, May 83)..... 87
- Debate of Early 1900's Considered Timely  
(Gyorgy Litvan; MAGYAR HIRLAP, 23 Apr 83)..... 101



Customs Regulations of Neighboring Countries Noted (MAGYAR NEMZET, 4 May 83).....	105
Employment Opportunities for Graduates Discussed (NEPSZABADSAG, 26 Apr 83).....	107
Social, Economic Inequalities Discussed (Zsuzsa Ferge Interview; KOZNEVELES, 1 Apr 83).....	109
Alcoholism Rate as Indicator of Major Social Ills (Pal Avar Interview; ELET ES IRODALOM, 6 May 83).....	112

#### POLAND

Provincial Party Developments Noted (Various sources, 3, 25, 26, 27, 29 Mar, 1, 6 Apr 83)...	115
Party Members Looking for Objectives, by Krystyna Majda	
Party Errors Under Discussion, by Zygmunt Rola	
Current Differences in the Party, by Helena Pilipiuk	
Improvement of Party Tasks	
Party Problems Among the Workforce	
Post-Martial Law Prospects for Political Forces Viewed (Christoph Royen; AUSSEN POLITIK, No 2, 1983).....	128
Kalisz Governor Buczma Interviewed on Local Situation (Kazimierz Buczma Interview; ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, 25 May 83).....	144
Lublin PZPR First Secretary Discusses New Party Tasks (Wieslaw Skrzydla Interview; ZYCIE PARTII, 30 Mar 83).....	150
Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Aid Conducted (ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 12 May 83).....	159
Ministry Spokesman Explains Wajda Dismissal (Andrzej Unger; TRYBUNA LUDU, 12 May 83).....	161
Provincial Trade Union Movement Developments Noted (Various sources, 26-28 Apr 83).....	163
Workers' Competence in Union Activities	
Problems Among Suwalki Union Members	
Union Membership Open to Everyone	
Creation of Supra-Plant Union Structure	
Work Release Assignments to Union Activists, by Kazimierz Iwaniec	

ROMANIA

Continuity Theory, Claims to Transylvania Examined (Dionisie Ghermani; SUEDEST EUROPA, No 2, 1983).....	170
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## BULGARIA

### GENERAL KOSEV ARDENTLY DEFENDS PURITY OF BULGARIAN LANGUAGE

Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian 23 May 83 p 4

[Article by Col Gen Kiril Kosev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the People's Army, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Thoughts on the Native Language"]

[Text] The celebration of 24 May -- the day of Bulgarian culture and Slav-Bulgarian literacy -- is a lofty occasion for expressing thoughts on the great successes achieved by our culture under the guidance of the BCP during the period of building socialism, particularly after the April 1956 BCP Central Committee Plenum. However, this bright holiday is also the reason for some concern caused by some adverse developments in the Bulgarian language, its purity in particular. My concern can only increase as I note that the situation is worsening rather than improving. Is this because a number of people have spoken out in defense of the native tongue? Why are we embarrassed to speak out even more openly and loudly in this sacred struggle for our language and against the dangerous interference in the development of our language through the implantation of foreign words which hinder its further enrichment? It is true that the indiscriminate flood of foreign words in our language is not the only trouble in its development, but for the time being it is what concerns us most.

By polluting the language I do not mean borrowing foreign words for which we have no equivalent and which, having become part of the Bulgarian language, indeed enrich it. I have in mind foreign words which are increasingly flooding us like a muddy stream. From the national point of view they depersonalize our language by replacing beautiful, sonorous and vital words. Why is it necessary to use the foreign word quarter for the word trimester, security for safety, conflict for clash, majority for preponderance, order for system, aid for help, instrument for tool (we even use instrument making instead of tool making), direct for straight, exposition for exhibition, monument for memorial, preventive for deterring, press for publications (used by none other than our own publications), level for plane, economy and economizing for saving ciao for goodbye, and many others. We are being told that they are shorter and more expressive. What makes the sentence "the accumulated water in the reservoir" more expressive than "the collected water in the reservoir?" Does the term Rituals Hall sound better than Hall of Ceremonies? Is it clearer to say "selecting the team" instead of "choosing the team," which also includes the selection of the players? Do we realize

the harm which foreign words cause to our language when one foreign word is used instead of several melodious Bulgarian words. Examples: argumentation instead of proof and substantiation; concrete instead of clear, precise and definite; liquidation instead of destruction, removal and setting aside; contact instead of tie, communication, touch or interface; inform instead of notify, communicate and report; criterion instead of measure, requirement, indicator; dictated instead of caused, triggered, impressed, etc., etc. What a tremendous variety and vivid expressiveness we find in these words which are threatened with disappearance from our vocabulary! And how impoverished our language becomes when such Bulgarian words are replaced by the foreign words we mentioned! Here is another example: the foreign word "surely" is used ubiquitously. Sometimes it means conviction and security; sometimes it indicates likelihood. Does this not impoverish and increase the monotony of the language? Are these the only foreign words threatening our language? And are the Bulgarian words we cited the only ones which threaten to become obsolete first and deleted not only from our speech but also from our vocabulary subsequently?

It is particularly unpleasant when names of things sacred to our people are described with foreign words, when Bulgarian words for them exist. What makes the foreign word patriotism better than love of country? Does this Bulgarian term which consists of the words country and love not express more fully our most sacred feelings for the homeland? Why were the expressive and sonorous Bulgarian words people's creativity replaced by the word folklore? Do we have to use a foreign word to describe the entire wealth created and left to us by our fathers and grandfathers throughout the age-old history of our people?

Arbitrarily, foreign adjectives are beginning to be used instead of Bulgarian ones: neocrusaders instead of new crusaders, neodiscoverers instead of new discoverers, etc.

As though it were not enough that we take the liberty to discard from our language expressive and sonorous words, we are now encroaching on those which are left by tacking to them foreign prefixes and suffixes, such as anti instead of counter, added to words such as legal, state, war, human, etc.

The superlative is being increasingly replaced by the words maximal and minimal, which are foreign. We say maximal rather than highest tension, minimal rather than lowest losses, etc. If we continue to do so, the superlative will become an obsolete rarity in our language.

But linguistic pollution leads to another exceptionally grave trouble. The use of foreign words makes us think in foreign words. This impoverishes both speech and thought. There are those who cannot conceive of substituting the constantly used foreign word realization with implementation, execution, resolution, achievement, reaching and obtaining. Or else replace conducting with making, implementing, achieving, calling (a meeting), accomplishing, carrying out, holding (a meeting) and course (of a conference). All of this would make the speech pure, varied, rich and expressive. Bulgarians should use Bulgarian words in their speech and thinking, which some people find rather difficult. Whether as a result of imitating or for other reasons the people are gradually becoming subconsciously used to foreign words, thereby

alienating themselves from their own language in their speech and thoughts. Prince Boris I was apparently well aware of this fact, for which reason he sought to remove the Greek language from church liturgy and rejected the use of Latin. This he accomplished by introducing the use of Kiril and Metodiy's alphabet, in order to avoid using Greek letters, and Church-Slavonik in state and church use, to avoid thinking and speaking with the help of Greek words. He wanted to consolidate and perpetuate Bulgaria through the language. Unfortunately, 1,100 years after this grandiose event, there are those who are unable to understand this.

Some theories have already been prepared in order to justify the rush of foreign words into our language. According to some it means an enrichment of our allegedly poor language; others claim that they make the language more expressive, while others again insist that this makes it more suitable for international communication. It is only those who neither know nor respect our language who can think so, as confirmed by the examples I cited.

Our language is neither poor nor inexpressive. Was the language created by the Bulgarian Slavs and the Pre-Bulgarians far more developed and richer? It was not! However, the perspicacious Bulgarian statesmen and men of letters did everything they could to establish, disseminate and improve it, for it had already become the Bulgarian language. We love our homeland not because it is large or small but because it is ours; we love our people not because they are great and not because others may or may not think so, but because we are its sons and daughters. We love our language even though it is not the language of Shakespeare, Pushkin or Goethe, but because it is ours, it is that of Kliment Okhridski, Patriach Evtimiy, Father Paisiy, the brothers Miladinov, Khristo Botev, Ivan Vazov, Peyo Yavorov, Khristo Smirnenski and Nikola Vaptsarov.

Equally puzzling are the claims of those who say that "That is how it is, foreign words are rushing into our language, but nothing can be done, for the language brooks no interference in its development." Yet the close study of the development of our language would show that it has experienced positive interferences which have helped it in its development, and has also tolerated negative interferences which have hindered it. Could our language be developing today without interference? No, for today as well there are interferences in it. They are frequently beneficial, the result of the wish and aspiration to preserve its purity and to create better conditions for its development. In most cases, unfortunately, this interference, conscious or not, is negative. It is encouraged extensively and persistently and has a powerful adverse effect. It takes place mainly through the introduction of foreign words which pollute it strongly and block its further enrichment and progress.

It is already at school that we begin cramming the children's heads with foreign words, such as situation (condition, circumstances), eventual (possible), expressive ((meaningful), lack (void, absence), distance (length), information (knowledge), constructive (helpful), argumentation (substantiation, proof), etc., all foreign words which can be found even in textbooks on the grammar level, words which replace and condemn to oblivion expressive and sonorous Bulgarian words. The child takes his first steps in his acquaintance with the world with foreign words and begins to use them in his

thoughts. I leave aside the question of Bulgarian grammar, which a number of people insist that it should be taught essentially through foreign methods. Is this not interference? The Ministry of Public Education, which passes on the textbooks bears particular responsibility for this. Yet is it not the sacred duty of that ministry and the schools and institutions of learning under its management to preserve and defend the purity of the Bulgarian language and to toil for its development and enrichment?

It is as though both the radio and the television are competing in the use of foreign words. When they report that an APK (Agroindustrial Complex) has realized 3,200 liters of milk, the audience begins to accept as more accurate that milk is being realized per cow rather than milked (produced). Or else, it is reported that rescue operations are being pursued rather than carried out in Peru or that Ryumin is conducting rather than performing biological experiments. It is thus that most ordinary people begin to think of the danger of war on a global scale, describe their area as a region, assess their accomplishments in terms of scale, forgetting that a scale can be large or small, and so on. Is this too not interference? Is it so difficult for the radio and television managements to apply the necessary order and to instruct editors and announcers at the least not to use foreign words or distort their speech and to watch over their own language?

This more or less also applies to the other cultural institutions and the press. If we listen to the dialog on screen and stage we would realize how often it is not Bulgarian. If we read newspapers and periodicals carefully we would note how frequent is the use of foreign words. Is this not interference? The blame extends even to newspapers such as NARODNA KULTURA and LITERATUREN FRONT, which also share in the responsibility of watching over the purity of our language and contributing to its advancement. They too sprinkle their pages quite frequently with foreign words. Some of authors seem to feel that it impoverishes their style if they use tastelessness rather than kitch, conversation rather than dialog, or entertaining, amusing and noisy rather than showy. One of the basic obligations of editors in cultural institutions and the press is to supervise the proper use of the Bulgarian language.

I have mentioned only the institutions, services and organs in which people are being paid for speaking and writing in Bulgarian.

Some comrades have shared with me their concern that some managers seem to fear that if a foreign word is replaced by a Bulgarian one the foreign word may feel hurt, for which reason, even after using the Bulgarian word they immediately backtrack to the foreign word. Some even dare to claim that words such as realization, information, patriotism, folklore, etc. have been accepted as party and state terminology and should not be replaced with Bulgarian words, even though the latter may be more expressive. We ask who, when and how have these words become party and state terms? To say the least, this is the rudest of interferences. Could we not streamline procedures in drafting documents, so that everyone could learn how to protect the Bulgarian language?

The creative unions and workers bear equally great responsibility. This, however, becomes a matter of attitude, understanding and conscience. Yet they

are the ones who could make an exceptionally great contribution to the advancement of our native tongue.

Interference has a number of sources. Industry, trade and consumer services are competing in their efforts to press foreign words on us, such as oiler (lubricator), sucriere (sugar bowl), saltiere (salt shaker) and many others. Why not say fast cleaning instead of express cleaning? Walk along the streets, read foreign words and you begin to think that this is the right way. Read also industry and trade ads in the newspapers and you begin to think that these words are correct. Is this not interference too? Is it impossible for these industrial and commercial enterprises to block the use of foreign words?

Unfortunately, there are linguists who forget that the language must be protected. Read some of their writings and you will realize that abbreviation is preferable to contraction, applied to related, as a result of to therefore, and many others. This kind of interference is very harmful, for foreign words are being used by linguists who should act as the law makers in the struggle for the preservation of our language, as most of them do indeed.

Today anyone in our country, who has studied or worked abroad or has heard foreign words and who enjoys some power or influence in an enterprise or establishment, assumes the right to introduce and implant in our language as many foreign words of all kinds as he wishes. This opportunity is ardently used by many of them. This too is an interference with our language. The use of foreign words and instilling them in our language by scientists and non-scientists is due to a variety of reasons. Some do it in order to appear to be more erudite; others do it to emulate the first; others again, involved in their daily concerns, do not choose their vocabulary. The most harmful are those who zealously introduce foreign words given the opportunity to do so.

We educate our people, our youth, through the language. What kind of patriotic example do we set for them if we fail to protect our language or struggle for its purity and national preservation?

The question of the flooding and implantation of foreign words into the Bulgarian language is of exceptional ideological and political importance. Any violation of our language is also a violation of our spiritual culture, and the pollution of our language is precisely such a violation. In the same way that we must struggle against bourgeois penetration in literature, music and the graphic arts and observe the requirements of socialist realism in art, spiritual creativity and culture, we must struggle against the pollution of our language. We must persistently protect its development, advancement and enrichment. Under circumstances in which the most obscurantist imperialist forces, headed by Reagan, are unleashing an indiscriminate crusade against socialism, any tolerance and acceptance in the ideological warfare waged against us in any area of our spiritual culture is inadmissible. On the contrary, we must engage in a merciless struggle against any penetration of bourgeois influence. Our language is one of the main weapons in this merciless struggle, and we must protect it well.

However, the preservation, development and enrichment of the language cannot be left exclusively to the efforts of the guardians of linguistic purity.

This important problems in terms of our national self-awareness must be taken up by the state and social organs, by the entire society. Particularly important in this respect are the activities of schools, higher educational institutions, cultural institutes, the press, the creative associations and others. However, the steps taken by the proper state authorities would be decisive, for it is they who must give a green light in the struggle for the purity of our language and to all those who are willing to make their contribution to this struggle. Only they can set up the necessary legal system for the protection of the language and erect the barrier which will prevent the muddy flood of foreign words and create the necessary opportunities for its protection from pollution and its further development and advancement.

This will create truly favorable conditions for the fullest possible use of the people's linguistic wealth of local idioms. Without trying to turn such idioms into literary language we can enrich our language with their richest sounding and most expressive words. Foreign words can be used when no Bulgarian equivalents exist. The creation and wealth of folk words must become the main source of enrichment of the Bulgarian literary language. Let us see to it that our speech become even more expressive and proud, even more beautiful and captivating.

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MINISTER ANSWERS CHARGES OF EDUCATIONAL DISCRIMINATION

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 3 May 83 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Prof Eng Juraj Busa, CSc, SSR Education Minister, by SMENA editor Eduard Krajc; date and place not given]

[Text] Acceptance of applicants for admission to secondary schools and institutions of higher learning is the object of justified interest of students, parents and of our entire society. It is given particular attention by our highest party and state organs, starting with professional orientation of children and youth, through formulation and approval of principles for continued admission throughout its course, its control and assessment. However, we still often encounter among parents a failure to understand the system of admission tests and continued admission as a whole, often leading them to doubting the objectivity of admission tests, even suspecting teachers and officials of institutions of higher learning and of secondary schools of circumventing the applicable regulations.

[Question] Comrade minister, allow first a basic question: Is there actually a need for admission tests and determination of the number of students admitted for study of individual disciplines in high schools and institutions of higher learning?

[Answer] That is a question often asked by many parents of growing children and youth. Determination of the number of students to be admitted to individual study disciplines is inseparably linked to the needs and requirements of our planned national economy for training of a certain number of specialists. It follows that there inevitably must also be planning of the output of schools, so that their graduates find corresponding application in practice. Contrary to capitalist society, we are not indifferent to whether graduates of our secondary schools and institutions of higher learning find employment and how they will apply their knowledge. Thus, limiting the number of admissions is inevitable not only from the viewpoint of social needs, but also from the viewpoint of self-fulfillment of young people in the work and life of the society. A factor which

particularly influences the number of students in institutions of higher learning is also the capacity of educational facilities and of student dormitories; more than half of all school faculties already offer instruction in two shifts. After all, when we do accept an applicant for study, we want to offer him also adequate working and living conditions.

Admission tests themselves, which in followup on the results attained by the applicant at the preceding level of education, are a certain form of competitive progression, and are inevitable for several reasons.

First of all, they offer an objective documentation of the applicants' knowledge, as identical requirements on and identical assessment of applicants for a specific field of study at, e.g., an institution of higher learning, makes it possible to judge their knowledge more objectively than in secondary schools where the "yardstick" for requirements is not at the same level in all secondary schools. In this manner, the results of admission tests, together with other criteria, make it possible to comprehensively assess the prerequisites of the applicant for the chosen field of study and select from the total number of applicants those who have the best prerequisites.

[Question] However, parents often point out specifically that their son or daughters--who was achieving better results than his or her fellow student in the same secondary school--is prevented from continuing his or her studies while the fellow student with inferior results is allowed to continue his studies.

[Answer] That is possible. First of all, the results of their admission tests can be different. But regardless of the attained results, it must be stated that a secondary school graduate with relatively poorer results achieved at that level who applies for a field of study with a smaller number of applicants, meaning, where there is less "competition," can be accepted and, on the other hand, an applicant with good study results who applies for a field of study with many applicants who achieved equal or better results, need not be accepted. In continued admissions to institutions of higher learning for the coming school year we will be accepting, e.g., at the School of Law and Philosophy of the UK [Comenius University] on the average each sixth applicant, at the same school of UPJS [University of Pavol Jozef Safarik] each fifth, and at the schools of medicine each third to fourth applicant. In some of the so-called attractive fields oriented toward humanities only each tenth applicant will find acceptance. On the other hand, schools of the SVST [Slovak Institute of Technology] in Bratislava, the VST [Institute of Technology] in Kosice and the VSDS [School of Transportation and Communications] in Zilina will accept more than every second applicant. The situation in acceptance to secondary schools was similar. While, e.g., the SES [College of Economy] in Bratislava could accept only each second or third applicant, the situation was different in mechanical engineering and chemical fields of study. Much higher interest was shown in the College of Hotel Administration in Piešťany, the SPS [Industrial College] of the garment industry in Trenčín, health-oriented colleges, etc. And it is specifically the imbalance in interest that constitutes the second significant reason for administration of admission tests.

[Question] You stated that acceptance of applicants is based on the results of admission tests and other criteria. Could you be more specific?

[Answer] Certainly, I consider it necessary myself. In this context it ought to be pointed out that the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee approved the principles for acceptance to secondary schools and institutions of higher learning as early as 1971. As they were not systematically adhered to by all schools, the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee on 11 March and the Presidium of the CSSR Government on 31 March 1977 approved a set of measures for further improvements in the quality of acceptance for studies at secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. Their contents became reflected in the new law regulating institutions of higher learning and in the corresponding implementing regulations.

The basic condition for acceptance to studies at secondary schools and institutions of higher learning is successful passing of admission tests. However, the measures of party and state organs make it obligatory at the same time to systematically comply in selection of applicants with criteria for comprehensive assessment and to give closer consideration to the prerequisites for applicants have for their selected field, the results of the admission tests and the results achieved at the preceding level of the educational system. Continued admission is to ensure that the social class structure of accepted students basically correspond to the social class structure of our society and that the most capable applicants be selected for further studies in this competitive manner. Thus, in addition to the results of the admission test, consideration is given in selection of applicants also to the results attained at a lower educational level and to a comprehensive evaluation in which the homeroom teacher of an elementary school or high school assesses the results of studies, capabilities and talents, moral traits, activity and involvement of the student in school, or in the SZM [Union of Slovak Youth] and PO [Pioneer Organization]. Educational, citizenship and moral prerequisites as well as specialized prerequisites of the applicant himself for his chosen field of study are considered to be the decisive criteria for selection. These can be supplemented by a recommendation, or its absence, by the school for continued studies, the applicant's state of health, etc.

The mentioned measures of party and state organs as well as those of our ministry also pay close attention to providing for systematic anonymity of written admission and aptitude tests; supervision of their progress as well as ensuring that their thematic contents correspond to high school curricula or, in acceptance to high school, to the curricula in the highest grades of elementary school.

[Question] Applicants and their parents sometimes felt that one of the criteria is also the parents' party membership.

[Answer] That is a basically incorrect opinion. What counts are the criteria I was just talking about. The sociopolitical involvement of parents--which we do not narrow down to party membership--is taken into consideration in cases when a decision must be made between two or more applicants whose other results and assessment are approximately equal.

[Question] What about the criteria for acceptance to institutions of higher learning without admission tests?

[Answer] They are stipulated in applicable decrees. In principle, they are formulated so as to allow us to use lower criteria for dispensing with tests for admission to fields of study or school in which there is less interest and, conversely, use stricter criteria wherever there is great interest. Admission tests to schools of medicine and of law, as well as aptitude tests, cannot be dispensed with.

For that reason, the possibility for acceptance to institutions of higher learning without admission tests is specified every year for individual schools and fields of study according to the number of potential applicants. This form of acceptance to institutions of higher learning and to secondary schools was adopted in the interest of simplifying the continued admission process, but also to reward and appreciate the effort of students in elementary and high schools and their simultaneous mobilization toward achieving increasingly better results. In this manner we accept in the continuous admission process into the first year of secondary schools an average of 7-8 percent of students and into the first year at institutions of higher learning approximately 12.5 percent of students, primarily in technical fields.

[Question] How well did the mentioned measures toward improving the quality of acceptance to secondary schools and institutions of higher learning fare in practice?

[Answer] Measures of party and state organs indubitably contributed to improved quality of the continued admission process, even though their effectiveness has not become equally manifested in all fields and in a manner we could be reasonably satisfied with.

Improved counseling in career selection became manifested in the increasing interest of applicants in technical orientations of advanced studies. This interest kept growing till 1982 when there occurred a drop in applicants by approximately 400. It is therefore, also imperative to keep motivating the professional interests of applicants by means of preferential scholarships at institutions of higher learning and on the whole improve the quality of effort and effectiveness of professional orientation. Even though we realize that the career or study that a young person will decide to pursue is significantly affected by his or her parents, an equally significant role should be played in this process by educational counselors. Therefore, to provide an incentive for their increased efforts we intend to ensure that their remuneration be tied to specific results of their activities.

A share in the increased number of applicants for technical and scientific disciplines at institutions of higher learning accrues also to conduct of admission tests temporarily in two stages. The possibility for transferring one's application, after failure to be accepted for study at an institution of higher learning in the first stage, to schools and fields of study

(mainly technical) where admission tests were held in the second stage, was utilized each year by some 1,500 applicants. An adequate number of applicants for all schools enabled us in the current year to cancel the second stage. The public was informed of this step and of the possibility of transferring applications to specified schools by 15 April of the current year by mass information and propaganda media.

Since adoption of the mentioned measures, there has also been a favorable development in the social class structure of students of secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. For example, over the past several years an average of 64-65 percent of applicants accepted for studies at institutions of higher learning come from worker and farmer families, which corresponds to their share in the number of applicants. There has been a significant increase in the number of students from these families at art schools. We shall keep monitoring these indicators. For the sake of comparison, I should mention in this context that prior to liberation the children from worker and farmer families entering institutions of higher learning represented but 7 percent. It is also not without interest to note that applicants from these families show the greater interest in schools of an agricultural, technical or economic orientation while those from other families go primarily for humanities.

Overall satisfactory results were achieved also in the national minority composition of pupils of high schools and students at institutions of higher learning. The share of students of Ukrainian nationality in high schools and at institutions of higher learning is proportionate. So is the average share of pupils of Hungarian nationality in high schools but even grew in secondary vocational schools. The lower interest of students of Hungarian nationality in studies at institutions of higher learning remains an unresolved problem, particularly in technical studies, as they represent only 5.5 percent of the total number of applicants, which corresponds to only about one-half of their share in high schools. There is no way to compensate for such a low level of interest within the framework of the continuing admission process.

The reasons for this state of affairs are diverse and the measures we have so far adopted to improve the situation have not proved to be sufficiently effective. We shall, therefore, continue to analyze this problem in closer detail and endeavor to increase the number of applicants of Hungarian nationality studying at institutions of higher learning, primarily by providing for improved career guidance in schools where instruction is offered in the Hungarian language.

In high schools we can also be satisfied with the composition of pupils according to sex--53 percent of girls, but at institutions of higher learning coeds represent only 45.7 percent and in technical disciplines only 28.6 percent. More significant is also their share in the number of applicants and their share in the number of accepted. We see the reason primarily in the conservative approach of female applicants and of their parents to technical fields of study, but also in the conservative approach of

enterprises to their employment, which in turn leads some schools to incorrect and unjustified assignment of quotas on acceptance of girls. While we did order deans to do away with this practice, a lot remains to be done in this respect in the efforts of officials of secondary and high schools to channel girls toward technical and exact science studies.

[Question] Measures designed to improve the quality of the admission process put particular emphasis on the anonymity and objectivity of admission tests. How well has it been possible to meet these important requirements?

[Answer] We improve their effectiveness every single year. By disseminating the questions for admission tests to high schools by radio broadcasts we have for all practical purposes eliminated any possibility for their compromising. This form proved successful and was also welcomed by parents. Objectivity is also significantly promoted by uniform evaluation criteria stipulated by directives. At institutions of higher learning, in view of the variety of the fields of study and the number of tests involving various key disciplines, the form of radio broadcasting cannot be used.

Nevertheless, we are also providing for anonymity and objectivity of admission tests with equally systematic efforts at institutions of higher learning. Questions for written and oral admission tests for study at institutions of higher learning are prepared by a small number of teachers, specifically in keeping with the thematic contents of instruction at high schools and with systematic enforcement of their secrecy.

Groups of questions for the written part of admission tests are prepared in such a manner and in such numbers as to permit a different set to be available for every day, whereby the set is selected at random from a sealed envelope. Written tests, which are of decisive importance, are systematically anonymous. The papers for written tests are numbered and separated from names. Thus, teachers correct and grade written tests without knowing the names of their authors. The name and number is combined only after the written tests has been graded. In the oral part of admission tests, the applicants pull out their questions at random. In addition to responsibility for keeping questions secret, deans of schools also determine the criteria for grading the results of tests for every subject included in the admission test and are responsible for excluding any influences that could affect oral admission tests, evaluation of written tests and decisions regarding the acceptance or nonacceptance of applicants.

Despite these measures and active participation of SZM representatives in testing and admission committees, in recent years educational organs have been devoting extraordinary attention to control of continuous admissions at secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. At the latter, the current practice is such that deliberations of almost

all admission committees are attended by members of the central educational inspectorate, with the objective of controlling the progress of admission tests and with the obligation of bringing to the attention of senior officials any cases that were improperly handled. Such controls are provided also in appellate proceedings. Similar control is to be provided for high schools by the regional national committees.

[Question] One of the forms of improving objectivity is the use of computer technology. How well is it doing in the area of admission to institutions of higher learning?

[Answer] Admission to secondary schools and institutions of higher learning is an extraordinarily sensitive and complicated task. Primarily because it concerns a large number of children and youth and their parents. For example, there are more than 23,000 high school graduates applying for study at institutions of higher learning in the school year 1983/84 of whom we are to accept 12,000. The situation was similar at secondary schools--double the number of applicants sought admission to secondary vocational schools.

We have already discussed what and how many criteria must be applied in deciding about acceptance or nonacceptance for study. You will no doubt agree if I tell you that it is no simple proposition. For example, at the UK Law School, where 110 are to be selected from 605 applicants. In this respect computer technology can be of substantial help when it is used as an auxiliary method in the selection of students.

Use of computer technology in this area has up to now been experimentally verified for several years by the SVST in Bratislava. The findings and experience show that it is a viable method which promotes further objectivization as well as acceleration of the continuous admission process, contributes to comprehensive application and assessment of criteria and in no small measure creates the prerequisites for simplification of administrative chores--automated dissemination of announcements of applicants, documentation for scholarships, recording of tests, processing of statistical data. At the same time, it provides feedback to regional national committees, or to high schools, or enables them to improve the quality of their management by offering information, and to specify and channel career orientation.

Since computer technology has proven itself, it is being introduced by directive to all schools except universities, schools of pedagogy and art-oriented institutions of higher learning. It is being introduced on an experimental basis at the Schools of Law and Medicine at UK. Nevertheless, I emphasize once more that this involves only an auxiliary method, because everything cannot be put into a computer. For instance, such circumstances as protracted illness, death of parent prior to testing, having been reared in an incomplete family and similar factors prior to testing, having been reared in an incomplete family and similar factors affecting educational results. These circumstances must be taken into consideration by the admissions committee.

[Question] Two practical questions: What about applicants who for valid reasons are unable to participate in admission tests in the prescribed term? Can applicants who are not admitted for full-time study hold out any hope for being allowed to study while employed?

[Answer] Faculties must respect serious and confirmed reasons for absence from admission tests, such as health reasons, and the dean, on the basis of a request by the applicant, will appoint a makeup term. On the other hand, faculty heads are obliged to responsibly and systematically assess any failure to participate. Last year there occurred several instances where the applicant failed to show up for testing, because at that particular time he was undergoing admission testing at another faculty. I am, therefore, availing myself of this opportunity to warn that applicants who take a chance by applying at two or more schools are exposing themselves to the danger that they may not be accepted by any of them even though they may have successfully passed the admission tests. The relevant decree is being supplemented in this respect so that if the dean determines that the applicant applied at several schools, which is inadmissible, he can cancel a decision regarding his acceptance.

I must disappoint those who hope to be accepted for studies while working in case they are not admitted for full-time study. We have done away with such practices. No admissions will be made for study while employed for any applicants who do not already hold a job and have no previous experience--the extent of which is decided by the dean of the faculty.

[Question] However, cases are fairly often discussed in public involving intervention and bribes in admissions for study. What is real state of affairs in this regard?

[Answer] I have been expecting this question and that is why I did not bring it up earlier on purpose. In the mentioned measures from 1977 consideration was already given to ways of eliminating the possibility for occurrence of such procedures that are so antithetic to socialist relations. I hope that what we have done and accomplished so far in this direction will be at least partially discernible from our conversation. But allow me to point out some additional, the very latest, measures. Heads of schools, faculties, teachers at institutions of higher learning and the personnel of our ministry have the obligation to refuse any type of intervention and are not allowed to deal with letters or parties trying to reach them with such an intent. These measures apply to admission to high schools as well. The main reason for implementing the ban on accepting letters or parties was due to the fact that some personnel, just to shake off the parents or correspondence, did agree to intervene, even though they did not actually follow up on it. And in doing so they think they did not trespass against any valid legal norms. What they are forgetting is that by their mere agreement to intervene, particularly if an applicant is actually accepted for study, they promote among the public a belief in the effectiveness of intervention in acceptance to high schools or institutions of higher learning.



The resolutions of party and state organs directed toward precluding unjustified enrichment at the expense of others provided for us an impetus for implementing additional measures which substantially curb the possibility for an intervention to even arise and eliminate any possibility for fraudulent operators to use the existence of the continuous admission process toward their own enrichment.

I said that only those who successfully pass admission tests can be accepted to a high school or institution of higher learning. We stipulated that an applicant for admission to an institution of higher learning who in both test subjects failed to pass the written test cannot be considered for acceptance. At the same time we authorized rectors to establish stricter criteria for admission to faculties for which there is a relatively large number of applicants. We are of the opinion that for these faculties the principle ought to apply that those applicants who failed in one test, be it written or oral, should not be considered for admission.

[Question] And the problem of bribes....

[Answer] Do not worry, I am not trying to avoid it. First of all, it ought to be pointed out that some people try to transfer their experience gained in other areas, such as in locating commodities or service in short supply, to the area of the continued admission process. Parents, because it involves the future of their children, are willing to make the highest sacrifices in this respect. Other people with a crooked bend of character are not only aware of that fact, but try to take advantage of it.

We are aware of the opinion of some of the public which talks about the spreading of bribery in connection with admission tests to high schools and institutions of higher learning. Thus, I deem it imperative to point out that from the several criminal acts in this respect that were detected, verified and prosecuted in courts over the past several years, only two cases involved school personnel. However, what was really involved was not bribery, but fraudulent acts, because neither one used any money as a bribe for acceptance of applicants and did not even provide for their acceptance himself. We must also admit the possibility that in addition to the detected fraudulent operators there are others whose "clients" were admitted to a school, but not because there was a bribe involved, but simply because they met the required criteria. However, in such cases the parents may gain the impression that their child was admitted for further study through a bribe and not because of the objectivity of the continuous admission process.

It appears that these swindlers operate basically in such a manner as that after accepting the bribe they were able to talk the parents into, they keep checking whether their "client" has been accepted for study, and if that is not the case, they right away act like "honest people" and return the bribe, saying they did not succeed in accomplishing what they promised. However, at the very least it is naive to believe that

a single person could influence the whole admission process. Moreover, I am convinced that school personnel that have something to do with admissions would never stoop to taking bribes. In spite of all this, some parents distrustful of the continuous admission process do become "willing suckers" and, in addition to the utter uselessness of their efforts and sustenance of a financial loss, they expose themselves to prosecution in court. To illustrate the point, let me bring up at least the case of T.R. From Nova Dubnica, who for a promise to arrange acceptance to an institution of higher learning--while he had no contacts with any one of them--obtained from parents sums on the order of Kcs 5,000-70,000. From the ascertained cases of his clients, not a single one was accepted for admission to the promised school.

Together with sums wheedled out under other pretexts, he obtained in this manner Kcs 22,000. After he was uncovered he was, of course, prosecuted and sentenced in court.

In an effort to limit such enterprises as much as possible, we obligated deans of faculties to prevent any leaks of information regarding the results of admission tests and final decisions. The same applies to corresponding personnel in the ministry.

The first information about the result will be a written notification of the dean's decision addressed to the applicant. We would, therefore, recommend to all parents that instead of seeking ways for intervention, they should devote time and attention to their children's studies, providing the correct motivation for study and providing room and possibility for their sociopolitical involvement as well as developing their capabilities and talents.

8204

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INDRA COMMENTS ON DOGMATISM, FORMALISM

Prague ZIVOT STRANY in Czech No 9, Apr 83 pp 3-5

[Article by Alois Indra, member of the CPCZ Presidium and chairman of the Federal National Assembly: "Karl Marx, Revolutionary and Theoretician of the Workers Class"]; Portion within slantlines in boldface]

[Text] This year's anniversary connected with the name Karl Marx--165 years since his birth, 100 years since his death and 135 years since the Manifesto of the Communist Party--has prompted many scientific conferences. Much has been written on this subject of which most attention was rightly drawn to the authoritative article by Yuri Andropov in No 3 of the Soviet KOMUNIST magazine. I would be immodest to claim that I can add to all this anything essentially new, much less previously unreported. However, one thing is certain--the world is not forgetting Karl Marx. He is proudly espoused by those who are developing his teachings in implementing his heritage, by the builders of socialism and communism, members of the revolutionary vanguard of the workers class throughout the world, people of the countries which had shed the yoke of colonialism, as well as nations which are still struggling for their liberty. It would, therefore, be surprising if Marx's work were not slandered on this occasion by enemies of progress, socialism, democracy and peace, defenders of a social order which, as demonstrated by Marx, is doomed by history to extinction.

How often and by how many "self-annointed experts" has Karl Marx's achievement been spat on and denigrated! How frequently has it been "corrected," "crushed" and called "obsolete!" How many times have they tried to do battle "with Marx against Marx," "with Marx against Lenin" and "with Marx against real socialism and the Soviet Union" There are those in the ranks of Marxism's enemies who do not know it at all. Others twist its principles, tear individual thoughts out of context in their attempts to disorient the readers and listeners. They do their best--and it is

Sisyphean labor--to prove that Marxist teaching is obsolete that it has nothing to offer the 20th century, that capitalism has changed, almost becoming the "benefactor of mankind," that historical development has stopped forever at its present stage. We should mention here as an aside that the church, one of the fiercest opponents of Marxism, is not at all disturbed by the fact that it itself is guided by dogmas of the Old and New Testaments. We are often confronted with devious attacks, incited and organized by sizeable staffs of scientists (philosophers, economists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, "Marxologists" and "Kremlinologists"), yet they do not bring the desired results. It would, however, be dangerous to close our eyes to the fact that they do succeed in deforming the thinking of many people and do lead a portion of the workers movement into the morass of reformism.

Why do the apologists of capitalism exert so much effort to refute what they claim to be "obsolete theory?" What is it that irritated them during Marx's lifetime and what in his work still bothers them more than a hundred years after his death? It is precisely because his is not merely one of the many philosophical trends which, limiting themselves to "academic" theorizing, appear and disappear without leaving any tangible traces. /The strength of Marx's work lies in that it answers all the basic questions which interest humankind. It is complete revolutionary teaching, a guide for action by all the class, socially and nationally oppressed masses./ It is said that paper must bear all "arguments" and cannot, therefore, reject even the wishful thinking of Marx's slanderers many of whom had awarded themselves too early a laurel wreath of "victory." /The supreme test of any theory is its practical application and in this respect life has fully vindicated the teachings of K. Marx, B. Engels and V.I. Lenin./ Would anyone deny that capitalism, and its final stage, imperialism, have developed precisely according to the objective laws discovered by the founders of Marxism-Leninism? The capitalist society is in a stage of disintegration, has long since abandoned the values of its birth, and the scope of its economic, financial and moral crises is growing with time. We do not indulge in illusions by expecting its collapse today or tomorrow; however, from the vantage point of history, this changes nothing in the prognosis. Imperialism is still strong and has at its disposal vast material and military resources, it brazenly intervenes in the internal affairs of independent countries, provokes escalation of international tension by using violence as a precondition of its existence, while being unable to resolve its own internal conflicts. Consequently, even futurologists in its own service paint the future in pessimistic tones from the capitalist point of view!

/The bourgeoisie and its lackeys and apologists are most terrified by the fact that the viability of Marxist-Leninist theory has been confirmed in revolutionary practice./ The Great October Revolution unseated in one-sixth of the world an order which the capitalist had considered eternal and untouchable. Many imperialist representatives, instinctively recognizing that this could be the death knell heralding the end of their

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unlimited rule over the world, wanted to throttle the proletarian revolution and its fruits right in the cradle. However, not even an extensive military intervention, economic and diplomatic isolation and discrimination, the Nazi military aggression, the "cold war" of the Western powers, nor the attempts to blackmail the Soviet Union through a senseless armaments race, have brought the Soviet people to their knees. Despite all obstacles, they have built a socialist society and entered on the road to communism.

For the history of mankind, the Great October Revolution was the beginning of a new era, civilization gained a new scope and incomparably more perfect content. The world today is different from what it was in 1917, its political map has changed beyond recognition. There emerged a community of socialist countries and socialism has its outposts in Asia and America. The reign of the colonial powers has literally fallen apart and many of the former colonies opted for the socialist road. The international revolutionary workers movement grew numerically and improved qualitatively. All the genuine peace and democratic forces have an anti-imperialist character. /To summarize, regardless of all the complexities, in defiance of all obstacles and partial defeats, the truth of Marxism-Leninism is winning./

What is left for the spokesmen and apologists of imperialism but to seek an "explanation" of defeats sustained to date and thus attempt to erect a barrier against the continued spreading of the revolutionary "infection." Consequently, the worn-out assertion that "revolution in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism is unacceptable for the industrially developed countries," is being supplemented by "erudite" arguments, such as that real socialism is a historical "error," or something of a historical "deviation." To the gentlemen this sounds attractive, for an "error" must be rectified and historical deviation is only a passing episode which will be overcome, even if it takes a nuclear war. All this might remind us of a poor comedy if the very existence of the human race were not at stake.

/The strength of the Marxist revolutionary teaching lies in that its principles have a general international validity which unites the international revolutionary workers movement in a joint approach toward accession to political power, for the achievement of real human rights, for class and national freedom, for social equality and just peace. /It is for this reason that all enemies of social progress, the imperialists, as well as revisionists and reformists of all shades, have for years tried to weaken the international validity of Marxism-Leninism in an effort to "dilute" this teaching in terms of different nations and geographic areas. They themselves form associations in the most valid antisocialist and anti-Soviet "holy alliances," they create economic and military groupings, while denying the workers movement the right to follow the picture of Marx and Engels for proletarians of all countries to unite. It is for this reason the imperialists so blatantly favor the revisionists and reformists who, more than anyone, disrupt the unity of the revolutionary forces, sail in nationalist waters and are satisfied with "partial gains" for the working people. They act as if they did not know that the imperialists yield nothing voluntarily but that each and every partial success

had to be fought for and directly sparked for nigh seven decades by the existence of the Soviet Union and the example of the socialist countries, which force the capitalists into concessions for fear of the growing revolutionary tendencies.

/Real Marxists are aware that, while in individual countries they are primarily responsible to their own people, the achievement of national goals is directly conditioned on adherence to the higher international revolutionary interests; real Marxists know that national or geographic isolation means abandonment of the revolutionary path and extension of imperialism's existence./ The existence of the Soviet Union with its successful internal development and consistently peaceful foreign policy is of quite extraordinary importance for the international unity of the revolutionary forces. By this we do not mean some sort of "organizational center" of the international communist and workers movement, this is not a question of coercing anyone to follow the so-called "Soviet model" as a perfect and only possible prescription for the building of socialism anywhere in the world, much less is it a question of "exporting revolution." (It is downright embarrassing that these Leninist principles so often publicly stressed in the past must be repeated, and that there are still people who act after 60 years as if they had just been discovered). Yet, it is crystal clear that the emergence of the Soviet Union broke through the monopoly of capitalist reign over the world, that the first socialist country in the world serves as an example and inexhaustible source of knowledge, and that it stands for material support of the workers revolutionary, national liberation and peace movements. This is why we are deeply convinced that the state of relations with the Soviet Union is the criterion of loyalty to Marxist teaching.

/Based on the fundamental conflict between labor and capital, Marx, Engels and Lenin, as a creative follower of their work, drew up the thesis of the historical role of the workers class in the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie./ Nothing can alter this fundamental reality, not the scientific-technological revolution, changes in the makeup of the workers class, nor the general improvement of its education, rather the opposite is true. /Marxist-Leninist teaching sets as a condition for the fulfillment of the historical task of the workers class the establishment of its own political party. This, of course, must be a revolutionary party of a new type which is determined to purposefully lead the workers and their allies in the struggle for political power and is able to create conditions for this goal through, above all, the merging of revolutionary theory with revolutionary practice./ It is no accident that it is precisely this principle which comes under concentrated attack of the enemies and "improvers" of Marxism who assert that because of the changes the world has experienced during the past 100 years, such a leading role belongs to some sort of "elite," rather than to the workers class which is no longer in a decisive position, and that it is obsolete to build the workers party on Leninist principles of intraparty democracy and democratic centralism. The aim of these efforts is to disarm and demobilize the workers class, take away its reliable compass of Marxist-Leninist teaching, allow it to wander aimlessly and deprive the workers of

their revolutionary perspectives. In practical terms, this means abandoning revolutionary principles and their subordination to tenuous, short-term successes. Our rejection of revisionism and reformism is, of course, not inclusive of revolutionary tactics or unavoidable political compromise. /There are those revolutionary principles, however, in which the workers movement must not waver, namely, the goal of stripping the bourgeoisie of its political and economic power, in other words, destruction of the bourgeois power apparatus and creation of a workers state by installing a dictatorship of the proletariat (are we avoiding this precise term too often?), expropriation of socialism and firmly defending the revolutionary gains./ Without adherence to these principles, a socialist revolution has never been victorious anywhere. The class struggle is without mercy.

/Being Marx's and Lenin's pupils and implementers of their heritage, we can hardly be affected when someone (including the so-called "Free Europe" in the service of the infamous CIA) accuses us of "deviating from Marxism" and tries to give us lessons in his teachings!/ We are not forgetting how enthusiastically these circles supported (and not only morally) Czechoslovak rightwingers and anticommunists in the second half of the 1960s. They acted as if nothing were dearer to their hearts than a prosperous socialist society in our country! If it is true that "history is the teacher of nations," it would be unforgivable if we did not learn from the practical experience of our party and from the history of our nations. These show us that none of the class, social, thus also national, goals would have been attainable without the revolutionary party of a new type, without the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In reviewing our experiences we find that the party is fulfilling its mission only as long as it consistently adheres to Marxism-Leninism, as long as it applies it to practical politics, to its strategy and tactics. This has always been true in the past and is equally valid today and for future years.

Suffice it to recall the early period of our party's existence, all the harm caused by the final stages of social democratic reformism, liquidationism and sectarianism. Consistent application of the revolutionary tenets at the fifth CPCZ Congress enhanced the party's authority in the ranks of the workers class and other working people, it placed the party at the head of a sharp class and social struggle, enabling it to fulfill its role as the most loyal, patriotic force in the struggle against facism for the restoration of national freedom and state independence. Only such a party was capable 35 years ago of leading the working people to the assumption of power by the workers class, capable of formulating domestic and foreign policies in full accordance with the interests of a convincing majority of the people. Mistakes and errors, which 15 years ago culminated in a counterrevolutionary threat, began when we gradually started warping and abandoning Marxist-Leninist principles, when we interpreted them willfully and when we failed to defend ourselves with determination against the forays of revisionism.

/Loyalty to Marxist-Leninist principles is not dogmatism./ (Unfortunately, this quite precise term was twisted by the rightwingers when they used it to "brand" communists, Marxists and internationalists who had remained true to the party. Even today it is often hurled at us by anticommunists and reformists). A dogmatist liberally cites from Marx and Lenin, "adapts" them forcibly to current tasks and problems, and stubbornly seeks in them universally valid prescriptions, regardless of when and in what context they were written. This method might at first glance appear easier and offer protection from errors, in reality, however, it rather attests to an unwillingness or inability to think and apply Marxist approaches. In practical politics, this leads to procrastination, delays in the resolution of concrete problems, and focusing of attention on partial tasks torn out of context in dealing with principles of domestic and foreign policy.

Dogmatism is in sharp conflict with Marxist revolutionary teaching and Lenin frequently warned against it. It evokes sectarianism, precludes a realistic assessment of a situation, isolates the workers class and its party, and repels their allies. In our conditions, it can manifest itself in an erroneous application of the leading role of the party, administrative belittling of the role of the National Front, disrespect for the specific mission of the individual social organizations, and inability to attract to our cause nonparty people or those who belong to the political parties. All this is in direct conflict with conclusions of the party congresses and principles anchored in the party statutes.

/Without hesitation, we can call dogmatism the blood brother of formalism/ which, while not typical of contemporary party practices, still requires much to complete its eradication. Formalism is like a weed which thrives on poorly tilled land, on superficially understood and applied party policy in concrete local conditions. It favors form over substance, assesses activities through statistical figures rather than their effectiveness, measures action capability by the numbers, possibly the scope, of adopted resolutions, and neglects organizational work and control. Only a step separates formalism from opportunism in practice against which Comrade Gustav Husak has warned repeatedly (including his closing address of the Fourth Central Committee Plenum). There are those who endorse party congress, Central Committee and high regional party resolutions, while not moving a finger toward their implementation. The only cure for dogmatism and opportunism in theory and practice is revolutionary consistency precisely in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

Marxism-Leninism cannot be understood, interpreted and defended from static positions of a "rifleman crouching in a trench." /Marx's teaching and the Leninist style of work urge us to develop their revolutionary tenets in a creative manner./ (And perhaps it is redundant to emphasize that to develop and to revise are two different things altogether). First of all, it means never underestimating revolutionary theory, applying its principles in the interest of realistic assessment of current and future problems, and setting forth tasks in harmony with existing



conditions. Only a creative approach (making maximum use of social sciences) enables the party to pinpoint conflicts which appear even in a socialist society, interpret these correctly and find the most effective means of resolving them. This applies in all basic tasks in ideology, economy and the perfection of socialist democracy. Only a creative approach, a consistent linkage of theory and practice protects party policy from subjectivism and voluntarism, thus against possible mistakes and errors. The method of creative approach must be mastered by the party as a whole, all the way down to basic organizations, at all levels of state and economic management, naturally in conformance with a clearly delineated share of jurisdiction and responsibility.

It is not merely to celebrate an anniversary, not merely due to our esteem for Marx, Engels and Lenin but, above all, in the interest of the most effective resolution of current tasks, in the interest of the socialist revolution and the preservation of peace, that we are deeply conscious of the fact that /Karl Marx is for us and all future generations a revolutionary and theoretician of the workers class, the principles of whose great work have permanent validity./

9496

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PEZLAR ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR WAGED AGAINST BLOC

Prague TVORBA in Czech No 13, 30 Mar 83 and No 14, 6 Apr 83 Supplement

[Article by Ludovit Pezlar, Presidium member and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee: "The Sharpening of the World Ideological Struggle and the Psychological Warfare of Imperialism Against Real Socialism"; bracketed passages in boldface]

[30 Mar 83, pp 1-8]

[Text] Part I

A characteristic feature of the current international situation is a sharply increased ideological struggle throughout the world. This phenomenon is inseparably connected with changes in the foreign policy of the principle capitalist power, the United States, which has backed off from its policy of detente in favor of an escalation of international tension, and preparations for a military confrontation between imperialism and the world socialist community. The objective of this reorientation is to achieve military superiority for the aggressive NATO pact over the defensive community of countries allied by the Warsaw Pact. The above changes are the most important evidence of the turnaround which is more and more frequently being called "the Reagan phenomenon" in professional literature. In the interest of completeness it must be noted that this change in the foreign policy of the United States had been prepared for as early as the late seventies by the military-industrial complex and other reactionary social groups. In this regard, many scholars in the social sciences are speaking of the rise of "neoconservatism" in the policies and ideology of the largest capitalist power.

World politics are currently the scene for uncommonly sharp conflicts between two opposing strategies, which forms the axis of development of international events:

--The countries of the world socialist community, under the leadership of the Soviet Union, is continuing with its efforts toward the thorough implementation of a peaceful program, which is based on the results of the reductions in international tensions of the past decade. It is now not only a question of successfully preserving all of the positive things which have been achieved recently, but above all of also realizing detente in the military area by formulating and carrying out a program of disarmament. /This has been the focus of initiatives proposed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The policy of the world socialist community fully expresses the desires of all the peace-loving forces in the world. It may be said without exaggeration that this policy corresponds to the interests of humanity. The human race has not had and does not have another sensible alternative/;

--The other strategy is an orientation toward an escalation of international tension which is being carried out by the most reactionary forces of contemporary imperialism, under the leadership of the United States. They are attempting to ruin the results of detente, force the world into a new round of senseless arms building which would not only assure for imperialism military superiority over the world socialist community, but would also make possible its liquidation.

The objective of current American policy was formulated with cynical openness by President Reagan himself. As early as 16 June 1981, he spoke at a press conference about the fact that "communism is not a normal life style for human nature," and predicted its downfall. In a speech before the British Parliament, delivered in the House of Lords on 8 June 1982, he announced before both houses of Parliament that "collectivism stifles all the best human impulses," and called for a crusade against communism which would leave Marxism-Leninism on the dump heap of history. "Let us no longer hesitate," urged Reagan, "let us make use of our strength!" In the traditional State of the Union message which he delivered to Congress on 25 January of this year, the President confirmed again the validity of the objectives formulated in his London address and emphasized that this strategy must be based on both economic and military force. This is not, therefore, a matter of threatening statements which are so common with bourgeois politicians, but of the establishment of long-range goals which introduce significant changes into the strategic approach to foreign policy of the largest capitalist power.

The absurdity of these ideas and objectives is obvious. They embarrassed not only the attending members of the British Parliament, but shocked even many pragmatically inclined bourgeois statesmen and theoreticians as well as a large portion of the public of the Western European countries which is accustomed to the careful camouflaging of the actual goals of their governments. Fears of the adventuristic character and possible dangerous consequences of these objective have not as yet weakened these objectives, even though representatives of the American government, as a gesture to public opinion, are no longer making statements with such cynical openness.

History, after all, unambiguously confirms that the dump heap of history has been the final resting place of precisely those who have threatened to do away with communism. This was the final conviction not only of the interventionists against Soviet Russia, but also of the German fascists during the years of World War II. Winston Churchill urged a crusade against communism in his famous speech in March 1946 in Fulton which began the "cold war." The connection between Reagan's speech and the above speech of Churchill has not been lost on certain Western publicists. The liquidation of communism was also the intent of the ignominious Truman doctrine.

As is well known, by the term "communism," bourgeois statesmen do not have in mind only the countries of real socialism. Their policy is actually directed

against all progressive forces in the world, and, above all, against the national liberation movement. In his election campaign, Reagan himself described every national liberation movement in Latin America as an extension of "Moscow's arm." Such a fantastically simplified view of the revolutionary process of the contemporary world was not acceptable even to many bourgeois statesmen and journalists.

This turnaround in the policy of the ruling circles of the United States has been conditioned by two factors. Among the internal causes is the economic crisis, the deepest since "the great depression" of the thirties as many American economists themselves admit, as well as high unemployment, inflation, and many other problems. All of the economic measures taken by the Reagan government to date, known under the ironic name of "Reaganomics" have not only not contributed to a moderation of the economic crisis, but quite to the contrary have deepened its effects on working people. The immense armaments program has brought unheard of profits to the military-industrial complex, but has had as a consequence an uncommon reduction in resources allocated for social purposes. In the words of the famous American economist, Galbraith, Reagan is proceeding on the theory of "the horse and the sparrow"; when we feed the rich, some seeds will remain for the poor. "Reaganomics" has taken work away from additional millions of people and consigned them to a vegetative existence. This has naturally been reflected in a sharpened political situation not only in the United States, but throughout the capitalist world.

Among the external causes of the turnaround two circumstances stand out, the increased strength and authority of the world socialist system and the spread of the national liberation movement throughout the world. The ruling circles of the United States can in no way come to terms with the fact that imperialism has already lost the historical initiative and that the world socialist system is ever more frequently and significantly influencing the course of world events. The fall of the shah's tyranny in Iran, the spread of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement throughout the world, the socialist orientation of Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and the successes of socialist construction in Cuba, and primarily the victory of progressive revolutionary forces in Nicaragua have literally dismayed them.

All of these and other realities are the result of the objective logic of human social development, in spite of the fact that in the minds of many bourgeois ideologues and politicians it all seems, to the contrary, as accidental, the outcome of "weak" policies by the governments of the imperialist powers. They also attribute it to the consequences of the policy of detente, which they consider to have been disastrous. Politicians of Reagan's type are convinced that it will be sufficient to tighten the screws, demonstrate strength, and maybe crack the whip a time or two over some peoples and the situation will be different. For practical purposes, the current American government has declared war on the inevitable historical development of human society. It is hardly necessary to even speak of the futility of this effort. Reagan's struggle reminds one of Don Quijote's struggle with the windmills. He may have some short-term successes, but in the end the author of the policy will be mercilessly heaved onto the dump heap of history, the fate he threatens others with, by the laws of human social development.

The main thrusts of the policies of the reactionary forces of imperialism, under the leadership of the current American government, are directed against the countries of real socialism, and primarily against the Soviet Union. The reactionary forces of contemporary imperialism are mounting a frontal attack on it in all areas of international life.

Above all, this is a matter of preparations for a military confrontation which has been the implication of many of the new phenomena in the strategic plans of the Pentagon. These include the doctrines of "concentrated retaliation," "realistic threats," "flexible reaction," and many others. Among the most dangerous for humanity is the doctrine of "limited nuclear war" and "prolonged nuclear war," both of which stem from the crazy assumption that it is possible to limit a thermonuclear wartime conflict to a specific part of the planet, and indeed to win it. "In nuclear war, if one were to be unleashed," states the Political Declaration of the Member Countries of the Warsaw Pact, adopted at the session of the Committee for Political Consultation in Prague on 5 January of this year, "there cannot be victories." The Reagan government has negotiated and is now implementing several hundred military programs.

American imperialism is also applying various forms of economic aggression against the countries of the world socialist community. These include an embargo on so-called strategic products, which is supposed to reduce the access of socialist countries to modern techniques and technology. Reagan's administrative apparatus attributes great importance to a credit blockage and the misuse of the debt of certain socialist countries for political blackmail. To this end, he is using international financial institutions which are under the influence of the United States, such as the IMF. The objective of these various forms of American aggression is, among other things, to make impossible the implementation of the development plans for the CEMA countries and, above all, the realization of their basic joint strategic task, namely, the shift from extensive to primarily intensive economic development.

In the political area, the American government is applying the so-called "selective approach" to its relations with the socialist countries, the goal of which is to disrupt their unified approach. It refuses to grant most-favored-nation status to some, by way of penalizing the export of their goods to the American market by levying high duties on them. The granting of this status depends on political considerations. American centers attach top priority importance to the legalization of the antisocialist political opposition within socialist countries.

The plans of the reactionary forces of contemporary imperialism are also doomed to failure. This is becoming more and more apparent to those bourgeois statesmen who are thinking straight. For instance, the attempt to stop the construction of the gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe was a complete fiasco. Likewise, political embargoes will be unsuccessful, because the scientific base of the socialist countries is developed to an extent today that through its joint resources it is able to provide for the successful carrying out of research on any topic, as concrete results have demonstrated. This is clear to others, and even to the authors of these

doctrines. After all, if they were truly convinced that the CEMA countries are moving toward economic catastrophe and that they will not be able to carry out the shift to predominantly intensive economic development, as their propaganda maintains, then these measures would not have any purpose. However, it is impossible not to realize at the same time that even if the imperialist forces do not have sufficient strength to prevent the implementation of the development program of the world socialist community, they will be able to cause it temporary difficulties. For instance, the manipulation of sugar prices on world capitalist markets has caused the Cuban economy significant losses, but has not led to the economic failure of Cuba. Similarly, a credit blockade against Czechoslovakia did not make impossible the fulfillment of the Seventh 5-Year Plan, even though it caused certain difficulties. A recent CIA report to the American Congress stated that it is unrealistic to expect the exhaustion of natural resource supplies or the economic demise of the Soviet Union. The tremendous rise in expenditures for arms has brought unheard of profits to the military-industrial complex, but has weighed heavily on the workers in the richest country of the capitalist world. In this regard, the famous American economist, W. Leontief, recently announced that "there is a danger that 1983 will be horrible from an economic point of view. If nothing changes in the United States, improvement is almost impossible."

The spread of the peace movement and opposition to the stationing of additional American rockets with nuclear warheads in Western European countries surprised even their governments. The population has begun, despite the veil of bourgeois propaganda, to realize that they are to be the sacrifices in the thermonuclear game of chance of the American administration and domestic reactionary forces. The successes of the political detente of the seventies had become so rooted in the consciousness of the people that it will not be so simple to make them forget.

According to Reagan's plans, the uprising of counterrevolutionary elements in the People's Republic of Poland was supposed to be the beginning of the end for communism. These efforts, however, came to grief on the decisive resistance of those forces loyal to socialism. Chaos and regression in the Polish economy, however, caused great economic losses and required sacrifices from other socialist countries.

One may assume that this year we will be witnesses to a further escalation in the efforts of the reactionary forces of imperialism, led by the U.S. Government to disrupt the economic and political development of the socialist world. The anticommunist centers are placing great hopes on the planned trip of the pope to the People's Republic of Poland in June of this year. If we consider that there will be presidential elections in the United States next year and, as public opinion polls are indicating, more of the population will reject the current government under the harsh pressure of reality, then one may assume that the Reagan administration will increase its efforts at achieving some results which could be claimed as successes in terms of its strategic policy.

The ideological struggle is assuming exceptional significance in the frontal assault of reactionary forces against the countries of real socialism and other progressive forces. Just as in other areas, here too there is a

continuous development of further theories, doctrines and conceptions in the battle of ideas with communism. The techniques of the anticommunist forces are improving and the coordination of their activities is intensifying. The American administration and the governments of the other imperialist countries are liberally financing this activity. These facts are, in addition to their other implications, a unique admission of the failure of the bourgeois world in the struggle with communism. The more imperialism threatens to do away with Marxism-Leninism, the more effort it must expend in the ideological struggle against it. This paradox, in fact, is a reflection of the historical logic of human social development. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism are more and more attractive and are winning themselves a place in the world.

The "Reagan phenomenon" is inseparably linked with the current psychological war between imperialism and the socialist countries. As K.V. Rusakov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized during his speech at the all-union scientific conference in Tallinn in October of this past year, it is important to perceive substantial differences between ideological struggle and psychological warfare.

Marxism-Leninism understands the ideological struggle to be an honorable and open confrontation, an inseparable part of the class struggle. For this reason any request by bourgeois statemen that the socialist countries "cease" or "terminate" the ideological struggle are unrealistic and unthinkable. At times similar voices are heard at international forums and attempts also occur to set in opposition to each other the battle of ideas and detente. [The ideological struggle is an objective process which is realized as a result of social struggle in the contemporary world. It is, therefore, not possible either to cease it or terminate it. By the same token, it is not possible to reconcile, merge antithetical ideological principles which are mutually exclusive, such as bourgeois nationalism with proletarian internationalism. For this reason, there is no possible compromise between the bourgeois and the Marxist-Leninist ideology.] Each of the foregoing reflects antithetical class interests and objectives which are diametrically opposed to the objective logic of social development; Marxism-Leninism is the revolutionary ideology of the working class and other progressive forces, while the bourgeois ideology stands for the ideological armor of the exploitative and reactionary social forces. What is not only possible, but even unavoidable in this ideological struggle is adherence to principles such as honor, openness in the defense of ideological positions, viewpoints and opinions. The ideological struggle is not an obstacle to economic, political and other forms of cooperation between countries with differing social orders.

Ideological diversion differs from ideological struggle in the sense that it is based not on the confrontation of ideas, but on the intentional and conscious spreading of lies and fabrications designed to call into question the honorableness of the thoughts and ideological armor of the enemy. This technique is being widely practiced by current bourgeois propaganda. Bourgeois theoreticians differentiate between "white" and "black" propaganda (sometimes "gray"). By the term "white" is understood the tendentious interpretation of official materials and positions. "Black" propaganda means

the spread of lies and fabrications based on unofficial materials and is the main focus of current anticommunist propaganda. The lies attempt to create fear in the people living under capitalism of any social changes at all and when directed at the inhabitants of socialist countries it is focused on disrupting their social consciousness by calling into doubt the values of socialism. Bourgeois theoreticians are continually improving the mechanisms of ideological diversion. From primitive argumentation they have proceeded to bolder techniques. Just as once in the brochure "Red Czechoslovakia," Bishop Skrabik warned of the nationalization of women under socialism, so now the masters of anticommunist propaganda are constructing audacious models of "democratic," "pluralistic," or "positive" socialism, and wrap their diversion in scientific terminology. A basic characteristic of the propaganda of the socialist countries is honesty and they, therefore, do not need ideological diversion and on principle reject it.

Ideological diversions, in conjunction with other forms of diversion (economic, and political sanctions, credit blockades, armed provocations, etc.) are some of the primary instruments of psychological warfare.

Without pretending to completeness, it may be stated that psychological warfare is a system for the influencing at a mass level of the consciousness and psyches of people with the objective of spreading lies in connection with the broad utilization of the findings of modern social psychology. The goal is to affect the dealings of people in such a way that it corresponds to the conceptions of the organizers of this psychological war, those who are preparing for armed conflict. It is a question of manipulating people on a grand scale, including their consciousnesses and psyches with the aid of a system of ideological, political, economic and militarily subversive actions.

Bourgeois theoreticians have devoted considerable attention to the development of the issues of psychological warfare. It is typical that these issues were first researched on contract to the Pentagon. Psychological warfare was a component of the Dropshot Plan in 1948, which assumed a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Various bourgeois authors basically concur with this definition of psychological warfare; the demoralization of a potential enemy, the undermining of belief in his ideology, forcing him to accept your conception of behavior.

Psychological warfare has been a component of the "cold war," with the objective, in President Eisenhower's words, of assuring victory without human losses. In the military publications of the NATO countries, the goals of psychological warfare are defined as the use of any and all nonlethal means acceptable for the achieving of war aims. Its function is, as the authors emphasize, to influence the moral state and behavior not only of an enemy, but of any social group.

Psychological warfare is not a new phenomenon. It was used widely by the German fascists while preparing and carrying out their aggressive plans. Bourgeois theoreticians to this day cite the chief of Nazi propaganda, Goebbels, who stated that a lie must be sufficiently great for people to believe it.



What are the characteristics of contemporary psychological warfare, as it is being waged by the reactionary forces of imperialism against the real socialism?

It is first of all, the unusually broad utilization of the findings of scientific research and the spread of special institutions concerned with ideological diversion. It is also characterized by the participation in waging it of leading statemen, such as President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, by attempts to turn psychological warfare into a global war by the implementation of "large" projects of ideological diversion, and to link this inseparably with preparations for military aggression against the socialist countries.

From the viewpoint of the current scientific-technical revolution, we are witnesses to a certain anomaly: achievements of scientific-technical developments are being used to facilitate the spread of disinformation and lies. This paradox stems from capitalist production relations which are deforming the course of the scientific-technical revolution, and fall within the realm of their misuse by monopoly capital, above all by the military-industrial complex.

At present, we are also bearing witness to a broadly based effort by the reactionary forces of imperialism to shift the ideological struggle to the realm of psychological warfare. Probably the most descriptive example of this "big lie" or perhaps the entire "system of lies" stemming from the objectives of psychological warfare is the current campaign in the bourgeois mass communications and propaganda media concerning the so-called Soviet military threat. Its immediate objective is to prepare the populations of the capitalist countries, through twisted facts and outrageous fabrications, for sacrifices connected with a new round of armaments production, to suppress opposition to this crazy policy and, over the long term, to create the preconditions for the implementation of the fundamental strategic goal of imperialism, the liquidation of the world socialist system. This policy puts humanity on the edge of destruction in the flames of a nuclear war. The myth of a Soviet military threat is intended to incapacitate the orientation of the masses as to the basic relationships of contemporary international development and to confuse the issue as to who is really responsible for nuclear madness.

Another example is the psychological war being waged against Czechoslovakia. The mass media of the capitalist countries began to assert last year that the state organs of our country carried out substantial persecution of believers. The lengths to which the authors of the inflammatory campaigns might go is illustrated by the report published last year by the West German CATHOLIC PRESS AGENCY that, as a form of harassment glass was put in the tooth paste of some believers. Still other eminent individuals pollute the airwaves with horrific fabrications concerning the vigilante murder of priests. In reality, the truth is just the opposite; the Vatican has begun an extensive attack against our state the objective of which is to change ecclesiastical conditions in our country to conform to the "Polish model." What this implies is a secret to no one. The recent campaign by the ideologically diversionary

bourgeois media that tried to picture our country as the jumping off point and armorer for all international terrorists ended in a complete fiasco. That the ideological struggle does not even respect the borders of neutrality is shown by the increasing activity of the "eastern bureau" of Austrian television and radio in the psychological war against Czechoslovakia. Its employees even openly ignore the attempts of their own government to conduct normal, neighborly relations.

The most recent hit of "black" propaganda is the legend of the Bulgarian participation in the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II carried out by the Turkish neofascist Ali Agca. And it would be possible to continue.

Two priorities are clearly evident in current anticommunist propaganda: the discrediting of real socialism, and anti-Sovietism. This orientation flows logically from the lack of popularity of capitalism, which very few, including bourgeois statesmen, are still prepared to defend, and the growing attractiveness of a socialist social system. In view of the fact that the Soviet Union is the economically, politically and militarily strongest of the socialist states, the organizers of this psychological warfare aim their sharp attacks directly in its direction. It is the main obstacle to their plans. /Since the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet people have borne on their shoulders the critical burden of the struggle of peoples against imperialism. The Soviet Union is the main support for the struggle for peace and progress./ In view of this, an inexorable logic prevails in the contemporary world: whoever adheres to an anti-Soviet orientation is an objective ally of imperialism, whatever it may announce about itself. It is no longer at all difficult to imagine what kind of outrages the reaction would stoop to in the world if the imperialist bourgeoisie did not have to take account of the reality represented by the Soviet Union and its allies. /Therefore, a resolute struggle against any manifestations at all of anti-Sovietism is the order of the day, a pressing responsibility for all progressive forces./

[6 Apr 83, Supplement, pp 1-8]

[Text] Part II

In the theoretical arsenal of the authors of the current psychological warfare, greater and greater significance is being played by the so-called theory of pluralism. According to this, there exists some kind of an "iron law" of pluralism which grants the right to existence only to "pluralistic" societies. It dismisses all others as "totalitarian." This propaganda trick makes it possible to toss into one bag both the socialist countries and the military-fascist dictatorships of Latin America, which cling to life mainly thanks to the support of imperialism and primarily the U.S. Government.

The concept of pluralism appeared in the realm of philosophy. It is based on the assertion that there is more than one principle of existence, each one independent and nontransferrable to any other. Bourgeois theoreticians have developed this principle into the theory of ideological, economic and political pluralism. These require that under appropriate conditions in the ideological

field various ideologies exist next to each other, i.e., various political parties in political life, various economic sectors, etc. The highest ideal of the defenders of pluralism is bourgeois democracy.

It is first of all necessary to emphasize that the very theory of pluralism is nonscientific. It places on an equal level a scientific ideology and a nonscientific ideology. Not all ideologies truthfully describe, not all are proper. It is understandable that the defenders of pluralism ignore the objectively existing class division of capitalist society, that they intentionally suppress the fact that even in the most refined bourgeois democracy the reins of power are in the hands of the small group of representatives of monopoly capital. The persecution of progressive forces attests to the fact that the ruling bourgeois circles do not adhere to "pluralism" only at those times when it perceives that the mechanism of bourgeois democracy is not fulfilling its main function, namely the maintenance of their rule, and do not hesitate to intervene even to the point of open dictatorship. Without their support the vast majority of antipopular, military dictatorships on the various continents would not remain in power. The role played by American monopolies and the U.S. Government in the installation of the bloody regime of General Pinochet in Chile is well known. A similar military regime in Turkey depends on the support of the NATO countries.

The theory of pluralism is a favorite instrument of bourgeois policy and propaganda in the struggle against the countries of real socialism. It is the basis of the doctrine proclaiming the inevitability of the so-called "second" or "alternative" economy, ideology, culture, of an alternative union movement, and the like. For instance, the granting of credits to socialist countries is more and more coming to be tied to various conditions (this is called linkage), such as the revival of the private sector, which is supposed to become an alternative social sector in the economy. The masters of psychological warfare then announce with pleasure that all of the problems of economic life of the socialist countries stem from the fact that their economies are not "pluralistic," and see the only way out in the revival of the private sector and in the ever wider application of the market mechanism. At the same time, in the economy of developed capitalist countries monopoly capital rules and the small producers represent no alternative to the mammoth firms and do not function on the same level with them. The tip of the "pluralist" lance is pointed directly at the heart of the socialist economy: against the state sector and central planning.

In the political area, these theoreticians demand the creation of an "alternative" political force, or in other words "alternative political structures," which in actuality means to permit the activities of the anti-socialist counterrevolutionary opposition. This function was at one time supposed to be fulfilled by various "clubs" in Czechoslovakia and in the People's Republic of Poland by the so-called Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR) and the infamous "Solidarity." Within the framework of "ideological and professional pluralism" religion was supposed to become an alternative ideology.

The imperialist centers sees in the activities of isolated small groups of antisocialist-oriented elements acting under the clever name of "dissidents" the promising embryo of a counterrevolutionary political opposition. These groups are generously financed by foreign capitalists and the organizers of psychological warfare immediately trot out into the glare of broad publicity every disenchanted person who is prepared to badmouth his own homeland and kick dirt on the socialist social system. As if by waving a magic wand, it often happens that overnight completely insignificant people become "important" artists, scientists or writers. Because the psychological war must be constantly fed with fabrications, emigres of various backgrounds receive broad support if they are willing to tell stories about how they were politically persecuted.

In this regard, it must be emphasized that imperialist centers have never been concerned with any sort of improvement of the socialist system within the framework of some kind of "pluralism." In fact they are striving to create the kind of opposition that could be the bearer of counterrevolutionary changes. For this reason, the "opposition" which they praise has never had, in any socialist country, any kind of positive development program. None has ever presented any kind of positive viewpoint for the resolution of the current issues of their further development. They have all only led a parasitic existence based on existing problems and difficulties. Their programs have been and continue to be destruction and subversion as the way back to a capitalist social system. For this reason, they do not even represent an opposition in the general sense of the word. This was fully evident in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968-69, in Poland in 1980-81. The relationship of the foreign centers to these groups of people has its own constant rule; once these groups for any reason cease to perform their overthrowing function, they lose interest in them and let them fall into oblivion.

The importance that the creation and functioning of an "opposition" in the socialist countries has for the counterrevolutionary plans of the imperialist centers is demonstrated by the Program for Democracy and Public Diplomacy that was announced recently with great fanfare in Washington. This program is the result of many conferences of representatives of state organs and scientific research institutes concerned with the study of questions of the East. The most famous of these conferences was held at the end of last year under the title Conference on Issues of the Democratization of the Communist Countries. It was announced as secret and the keynote address was given by Secretary of State Schultz. On the grounds of "defending democracy," the authors arrogate to themselves the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries. Specific objectives and techniques for subversive activity were established which are to lead to the creation of the pertinent "democratic infrastructure" throughout the world. This attitude is directed not only against the socialist countries but against all states which the U.S. Government considers to be "undemocratic." In this way the various forms of diversion, including the ideological, take on a global character.

In view of the fact that a subject of particular attention by the ideodiversional centers is the area of culture, it is necessary to comment on the concept of

"cultural pluralism." At a world conference on cultural policy held under UNESCO auspices in late July and early August of last year in Mexico, the chief of the U.S. delegation, Jean Gerard, spoke in favor of this doctrine by asserting that it represents the best guarantee of "cultural" democracy. She made a plea for the greatest possible leeway for "individual initiative" in culture. Most of the delegates present, however, rejected the proposals of the American delegation. Many delegates with full justification pointed out that under this luxurious covering of "pluralism" is hidden the infamous "cultural imperialism." Even the French Minister of Culture himself, J. Lang, pointed out that whoever commands the mass communications media in the world can force his model on other nations. This phenomenon is known as "cultural imperialism." Both of the above-mentioned concepts are justified and express the efforts of imperialism to control the area of human cultural life with a flood of pseudoculture endorsing racism, violence, individualism, egoism, human powerlessness and the like.

In what directions is the psychological war against Czechoslovakia developing?

Experience is fully confirming the truth of the words of the general secretary of the U.S. Communist Party, Gus Hall, "Imperialism has a special plan of action and a special emergency plan for every socialist country." These plans are very amorphous, are being constantly modified in the centers and improved upon according to the concrete conditions of the country in question. They of course are not made public, but an analysis of the situation makes it possible to identify the main aspects of the approach to one or another country.

In relation to Czechoslovakia, the organizers of psychological warfare attribute exceptional importance to the exploitation of the church, above all the Catholic Church. Last year was a time of intense pressure by the Vatican on the Catholic hierarchy to enter into conflict with the state. The "Reagan phenomenon" is inseparably connected with the "Wotyla phenomenon." In this regard, the periodical U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT not by accident referred to the current pope as Reagan's man.

As we have already noted, a propaganda campaign against the Czechoslovak state was a phenomenon accompanying this project as a kind of ideological cover. This attack was also directed against the peaceful congregation of Catholic clergy, Pacem in Terris, which is a thorn in the side of the organizers of psychological warfare because of its peaceful activity and positive attitude toward socialism. The Vatican strategists were inspired by "the Polish model" of the position and role of the church in a socialist state. They began to announce that there was no reason for the relationships between church and state in Czechoslovakia to be structured in any way differently from those in Poland. For the church to be able to become an antisocialist opposition force, it would be and is necessary to suppress at any cost any kind of display of loyalty by priests in relation to the socialist state. The reasons for the attack on Pacem in Terris are therefore political, not religious. Concurrently, efforts were mounted to activate the illegal clerical underground, the so-called secret church, which brings together antisocialist clerical elements ranging from lay religious fanatics to illegally consecrated priests and bishops. At present, the Vatican "experts" in Czechoslovakia, such as a

Father Rabas, are fanatically denying its existence, because the vast majority of believers do not feel any need for an illegal organization and do not want to have anything to do with "secret" societies.

This entire broadly based attack was unsuccessful, because its organizers failed to consider several important facts:

--in contrast to the Polish village the Czechoslovak village is characterized by the cooperative sector. The principal person in a village under these conditions cannot be a priest. In fact, clerics have no interest in a conflict with the leadership of Unified Agricultural Cooperatives [JZD] nor with local organs of the people's power. The JZD has rooted itself firmly in the consciousness of the rural population as an advantage of socialism, as an ongoing value. It is noteworthy that in our rural environment no one even attempted to spread the papal words in defense of private land ownership which he delivered during his visit in Poland;

--in contrast to the Polish People's Republic [PLR], in Slovakia during World War II political clericalism was in power, discrediting itself thereby by its collaboration with the German fascists and participation in their atrocities. The working people definitively rejected the clergy in the Slovak National Uprising;

--The Vatican has once before in the "cold war" forced Czechoslovak Catholics into a conflict with the state. Cardinal Beran gave in to pressure from Pope Pius XII, who excommunicated everyone who "collaborated" with communists. Even the bourgeois press wrote at the time that he had actually thrown most of the believers out of the church. This conflict could not stop the building of socialism in our country and led, in the end, to the isolation of the reactionary members of the hierarchy from the believers. Most Czechoslovak bishops and priests are fully aware of the deleterious consequences that would come of a similar conflict under today's conditions. Nor does our state have any interest in this, and a similar conflict can bring nothing positive to the church either. Other churches and their officials are also rejecting such a course. Only the imperialist centers, the foreign clerical emigration and illegal church underground retain an interest in it.

Clericalism continues to be a significant factor in the plans of the imperialist centers. It is no accident that Vatican propaganda expends such effort on the advertising of "martyrdom," specifically in the interest of the church. There are other interests in the background, however, that are links to the "Reagan phenomenon."

The relationship between the socialist state and believers was concisely defined by the words spoken at the CPSL Congress in 1981 by the First Secretary of the CPSL Central Committee, Jozef Lenart: "The centuries-old religious intolerance and discrimination now belong to the irretrievable past. Our socialist state guarantees equality of rights to our citizens regardless of their attitude toward religion. We respect active participation by believers in the building of our country and see in this proof of interests held in common with our people...We are witnesses to the efforts of foreign clerical anticommunist centers to misuse religious sentiments for unfriendly

activities against our socialist homeland. Relying on the experiences of our people, on their social awareness, their patriotic feelings, their solidarity and progressive peaceful efforts, we are prepared to resist decisively such old, yet new, diversions in whatever form they may take."

In this psychological warfare, great significance is being attributed the activization of the remnants of defeated rightist opportunist and anti-socialist forces acting under the false name of "dissidents." Their main function currently is to supply anti-Czechoslovak propaganda through various derogatory writings. The fact that the authors of these angry pamphlets are people living in our country is supposed to lend veracity to their slander, the so-called seal of authenticity. Bourgeois propaganda carefully hides, for instance, the fact that the derogatory pamphlet Charter 77 was signed in Slovakia by only four people which clearly is not many. The organizers of psychological warfare describes the small group clustered around this counterrevolutionary pamphlet as "a huge opposition movement."

It is typical that from basically these same sources completely antithetical fabrications are supported, financed and propagated. For example, the self-named Committee for the Defense of Hungarian National Rights feeds the bourgeois mass communications media with fabrications concerning the alleged persecution of Hungarians in Slovakia, while reactionary Slovak emigre organizations submit anticommunist propaganda concerning the completely opposite "Hungarization" of Slovakia.

Moreover, the imperialist centers are placing great significance on the disruption of the unity between the Czech and Slovak people, as one of the basic social pillars of our state. Thus, they circulate the most outrageous fabrications concerning which nation actually holds power in our country and who takes what out on whom, even though such questions are, in terms of Czechoslovak reality, nonsense because both nations, the Czech and the Slovak, have become socialist, are continuing to develop, and their unity is deepening on the basis of socialist internationalism and joint developmental efforts. This means that the single purpose of such anti-Czechoslovak propaganda must be to revive by all possible means of the remnants of nationalism, to resurrect that which once divided our nations and nationalities and that which was overcome by a joint struggle against capitalism and fascism by the joint building of socialism.

It would not be accurate to underestimate the activity of antisocialist-oriented individuals or small groups simply because of their lack of numbers or isolation. They develop psychological pressure on those who are selflessly engaged in the implementation of the policy of the party and of the socialist state. The favorite technique of such groups is to discredit by means of circulating anonymous writings. It is an important task for both party and state organs to effectively shield their personnel from such treacherous methods.

Among the great lies about Czechoslovakia which are being spread by the organizers of psychological warfare is the thesis concerning the "internal emigration" of our population. This theory contends that in the process of consolidation, people in our country became divided into those who actually

emigrated and those who emigrated "internally," i.e., who made a silent pact with party and state leadership, with a high standard of living being the compensation for their passivity. There is nothing perhaps as nonsensical as this assertion. After all, the successes of our country over the past 13 years would not have been achievable without selfless work, without literally daily labor heroism, and the commitment socially and as citizens of the broad working masses. Is it not sufficient to mention the devoted work of our miners who frequently sacrifice their free time so as to provide the coal needed for factories and households. The self-sacrifice of our farmers in overcoming the effects of poor weather conditions is well known. This is of no interest, however, to those organizing the anti-Czechoslovak campaign. The only activity they consider proper is the destructive.

The uncommonly primitive character of anti-Czechoslovak propaganda is indicated by, for instance, the fact that in the cultural area it considers a worthy work of art to be only one which is created in conflict with the cultural policy of the party and the state. Any pamphlet at all is immediately proclaimed as a great work. For instance, the former member of the People's Party, Kirschbaum, who has now emigrated, has written in the English-language book "Slovak Language and Literature" that valuable literary works appear only abroad. Any short story at all written by an emigrant he considers to be a great "work." The fantasies of reactionary emigrants truly know no bounds. This is shown by the announcement that the main flow of development of our literary production is today represented by the creations, and most of all the hateful pamphlets, of emigrants and "dissidents."

Among bourgeois ideologues, there is no lack even of those who specialize on Czechoslovakia. As an example, one may cite the work of the Canadian professor, Gordon Skilling. He devotes much attention in his books to an analysis of the crisis period of 1968-69, which he considers to be not counterrevolutionary, but as a "revolution." He explores the possibilities through which it would have been possible, with the support of the imperialist centers to again create in our country "parallel structures," which could have broken the stability of the socialist social system and assured a new "revolution." In common with other anticommunist theoreticians, he idealizes the political situation in bourgeois Czechoslovakia, on which he places a high value for its "pluralism." By the way, these falsifiers verify the actual class character of the bourgeois state from the lies and memoirs of the former chief of Czechoslovak military intelligence for the bourgeois republic, General Moravec, which were published abroad. He openly admits that the members of the Communist Party were under surveillance by police stations even prior to entering military service and could not serve in artillery or tank corps; they likewise could not attain officer rank. After their period of military service they were under the surveillance of counterintelligence organs. Then he says that he did not know of a single instance when a communist would have acted in conflict with the interests of his homeland.

It would be improper to think that the thousands of words and hundreds of books that have been published in the West concerning Czechoslovakia after the crisis period are meant to fill an exclusively propaganda function. For instance, many authors of these works have come to the opinion that in view of the success of antisocialist forces it is not proper to focus attention solely to members of the intelligentsia, but that it is essential to get into



the factories, amongst the working class. An analysis of the experiences of the recent events in Poland undoubtedly played a role in this.

What are the most important conclusions to be gained from this brief analysis of the current psychological warfare by imperialism against the countries of real socialism for the ideological and politically educational work of the party, state organs and mass organizations?

There can be no doubt of the fact that this psychological warfare, like the orientation of reactionary imperialist forces toward military confrontation, cannot last forever. Sooner or later the ruling circles of the capitalist countries will acknowledge the realities of the contemporary world and make the inevitable conclusions for their own activities. There is no other sensible alternative. No war, psychological, cold, or nuclear can stop the march of history and return imperialism to its former position. /No one will succeed in undermining the socialist order through disinformation and lies,"/ states the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Member Countries, adopted at the session of the Political Advisory Committee in Prague on 5 January 1983. The anticommunist nuclear madness, however, may lead humanity to destruction. This is understood by ever broader masses of working people throughout the world. On the ideological front, it is an important task to uncover convincingly the real objectives of the organizers of psychological warfare.

The psychological warfare of imperialism against the countries of real socialism does not alter the basic tasks and goals of ideological and political educational work, as these were outlined at the 16th CPCZ Congress. These are components of the program for building a mature socialist society. /A top priority objective on the entire ideological front today is to increase participation in the resolution of the basic strategic task focusing on achieving high effectiveness of production and high quality of all work./ This assumes a substantial increase in the quality and much greater effectiveness of all forms of ideological and political educational work. A great stimulus in this direction was provided by the results of the 15th CPCZ Central Committee Plenum in March 1980, which formulated long-term guidelines. The current international situation requires that this program for the development of ideological and political educational work be implemented with much greater rigor and consistency. /The further building of developed socialism, the positive resolution of qualitatively new objectives connected to the shift to predominantly intensive economic development continues to be the main thrust of the struggle with imperialism./

Psychological warfare requires much greater quality among the entire ideological front. We are aware of the unused capacity that we possess in this area.

The most effective weapon in the struggle against imperialist propaganda is the spread of the truth about real socialism. Age-old human experience has fully confirmed that a lie has short legs. No newly refined techniques of ideological diversion can continually hide the truth that socialism is the social order which, despite all of its problems and difficulties, offers a peaceful future to the working masses of our planet.

The current conditions very urgently require a deepening of our assertiveness, pugnacity and the readiness of our entire propaganda system. We must not lose sight of the fact that in the ideological struggle the winner is often the one who is the more flexible, who is the first to appear with his interpretation of problems and events. To overcome attitudes that are already fixed in people's minds is much more complicated than to make one's own impression at the proper time.

It would be an unforgivable mistake if we were to underestimate the material technical base which contemporary imperialism has at its disposal for this psychological warfare. It is no secret that it is also making big plans for ideodiversional projects, such as the already approved Telsat and Telstar projects which assume television broadcasts from satellites to the populations of socialist countries. This obligates us not to underestimate the national industrial base for our own ideological educational work.

Under contemporary conditions, the systematic analysis of the main thrusts of the psychological warfare of imperialism against real socialism and the immediate formulation of the necessary countermeasures is of exceptional importance. Intensifying the coordination between the ideological and political educational work of the fraternal communist parties is an increasingly important source for increasing the effectiveness of this activity. And in this regard we have many as yet unused possibilities which we must utilize much more broadly.

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RETURN OF CZECHOSLOVAK GOLD DISCUSSED

Prague FINANCE A UVER in Czech No 2, 1983 pp 77-87

[Article by Dr Jan Krejci: "Some Comments on the Return of Czechoslovak Monetary Gold"]

[Text] At the end of February 1982, our press carried a brief report which announced that on 20 February 1982 an agent of the Czechoslovak Government had accepted in Switzerland from representatives of the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France 18.4 tons of Czechoslovak monetary gold which had been stolen from Czechoslovakia during World War II by the Nazis. Until this time, the United States and Great Britain had refused to return this gold to the CSSR under various pretexts. In conjunction with the return of Czechoslovak monetary gold, agreements were also reached on open financial and property rights questions between the CSSR, on the one hand, and the United States and Great Britain, on the other, which had arisen during the war and afterward. The gold was transported to Prague on the same day. This press report, particularly because of its significance, stimulated the interest of our public since it meant that one of the final problems which had arisen in connection with World War II had been resolved, thereby eliminating an obstacle which had caused difficulties in relationships between the participant countries for two generations. The resolution of this problem has been exceptionally difficult for a number of complex political, international legal and economic reasons and also required considerable effort because it was an issue almost 44 years old.

It began with the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938 in which Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France forced Czechoslovakia to give up its border territories to Germany. The annexation by Germany of the occupied Czechoslovak territory meant the destruction of a natural political, geographic and economic entity formed both by natural conditions and very long economic development. The Munich Agreement caused great economic damage to Czechoslovakia in all areas of industry and agriculture. We estimate these damages in the amount of KCs 40 billion. Among these damages were approximately 14.5 tons of monetary gold which, under pressure was carried off to Germany allegedly "to cover bank notes in the border territory." These are damages that were caused to Czechoslovakia even before World War II broke out, though we did not have to wait long for this to happen.

The occupation of this part of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis on 15 March 1939 brought a further pillaging of Czechoslovak wealth. The occupiers attempted to take not only the gold deposited in Czechoslovakia, but even that deposited abroad. The how and the why of the Nazi success in this thievery will be evident from the following.

When the German occupiers seized Prague in March 1939, the Czechoslovak National Bank had 7,011 kg of monetary gold deposited right in Prague and 59,561 kg of monetary gold at central banks abroad. Specifically, the largest amount of gold was in London in an account in the name of the Czechoslovak National Bank at the Bank of England in the amount of 26,763.7466 kg, and in the name of the Bank for International Payments in Basle, in a special sub-account at the Bank of England in the amount of 28,309.3057 kg. Both gold deposits were the property of the Czechoslovak State Bank and were in storage (depositum regulare, gold deposit). The bank held inventories of the numbers and precise weights of each specific bar.

Immediately after the occupation of Czechoslovak territory, a special imperial deputy, Dr Muller, was installed at the National Bank. His role was to carry out the policy of the occupiers and he received orders from the Reichsbank in Berlin. Immediately after his arrival at the National Bank, Dr Muller, under the threat of death by firing squad, forced the bank management to transfer the gold deposited in London to the Reichsbank in Berlin. The Czechoslovak National Bank succeeded in putting off this matter for 3 days. Finally, however, on 18 March 1939, two orders were sent out by certified mail. The first order was addressed to the Bank of England in London and requested the transfer of 26,763.7466 kg of gold to the Bank for International Payments in Basle. The second order directed the Bank for International Payments in Basle, to transferr 23,100 kg of gold to Reichsbank Berlin from the 28,309.3057 kg of gold carried there in account No 3 at the Bank of England in London.

But before the orders for the transfer of the gold were signed, representatives of the Czechoslovak National Bank appealed to several embassies in Prague, among them the British and the French, with the objective of preventing the occupiers from carrying out these forced orders. These appeals were unsuccessful. The Bank for International Payments, in cooperation with the Bank of England, approved what at first glance was an order issued under duress, and therefore legally nonbinding, and transferred to the Reichsbank in Berlin the entire 23,100 kg of gold. In contrast, the other order concerning the transfer of 26,763.7466 kg of gold to the Bank for International Payments in Basle was not approved, because British political life saw some developments at the time when the transfer would be carried out that made the transfer impossible.

The whole affair quickly became public. After the war some of the details were published in Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott's book, "The Appeasers." This book describes not only the cynical climate prevalent prior to signing the Munich Agreement, but also the details related to the Czechoslovak gold. According to this book the occupation of Prague marked the end in Great Britain of the Munich idyll. Those who thought they had preserved peace had only slowly made use of the hoped for spirit of Munich and were now surprised to find out what the spirit really was. Progressive British society had been

aroused and had begun to think about the necessity of opposing German expansion. But the British Government was not capable of abandoning the strategy of appeasement.

The position of the British Government and its reluctance to undertake anything to prevent the Czechoslovak gold being taken by the Nazis is clear from the parliamentary discussions of that time. These discussions also show that the British Government even knew that the Czechoslovak gold was being used to arm Nazi Germany. According to authoritative books by British authors, the events concerning the Czechoslovak gold were on the agenda of the House of Commons on 18 May 1939. An inquiry was raised as to whether it was true that an agreement had been reached related to the Czechoslovak gold. The reality could not remain secret very long. On 19 May 1939 articles appeared in the DAILY TELEGRAPH and the FINANCIAL NEWS about the turning over of Czechoslovak gold to Germany. Lloyd George made a report to the House of Commons. Chamberlin said to him that this was a "hoax." The issue of the Czechoslovak gold was again debated in the House of Commons on 26 May 1939, and only with difficulty did the speakers remain on the side of the government, M.P. Brendan Bracken is reported to have said the following: "At present, we in London are actively assisting German rearmament and our bureaucrats in the Chancellory of the Exchequer are sitting around a table and telling people about stolen goods, and deciding how much of these stolen goods should be returned to Germany in order to make it easier for it to fulfill its armament program. This is truly the dirtiest form of appeasement. Political appeasement, moreover, is not the issue here. The supplementary elections and political developments over the past several months indicate that this policy is in any event dead and ready to be replaced, but there are various forms of appeasement, so it seems, that are dear to the heart of the government, so it is carrying out this financial appeasement. But this is a very dirty form of financial appeasement, because the government is appeasing the Germans with the money of the unfortunate Czechs."

As a result of the incompetence of the representatives of the above-mentioned Western banks and also as a result of the conservative policies of the British ruling circles, on 27 March 1939, the German director of the Bank for International Payments in Basle informed the imperial deputy at the Czechoslovak National Bank, Dr Muller, that the order had not only been promptly approved on 20 March 1939, but that the Reichsbank in Berlin already had the Czechoslovak gold at its disposal. The Bank for International Payments took control of a portion and in exchange gave the Reichsbank other gold that was on the continent, while a portion was at the disposal of the Reichsbank right in London. According to this letter, then, all of our gold remained in London; the Bank for International Payments and someone else in London obtained it, and the Germans took no gold away. The Bank for International Payments confirmed officially by a letter dated 24 March 1939 to the Czechoslovak National Bank the implementation of the order to transfer the Czechoslovak gold to the account of the Reichsbank in Berlin and simultaneously announced that it would send a subsequent list of the 1,845 bars. The Reichsbank in Berlin also confirmed in a letter to the Czechoslovak National Bank dated 12 June 1939 that it had received a total of 23,087.2932 kg of gold, and that it would replace the original 1,845 bars with 1,880 others, but it did not

provide the numbers of these bars. After the fall of Nazi Germany it was learned that on the books of the Reichsbank which had been found at Frankfurt am Main, that the Reichsbank had been carrying the Czechoslovak gold in an account named "Sonderlagerung" [without deposition].

After the war, the Czechoslovak Government put a value on the damage resulting from the monetary gold stolen by the Nazis at a total of 45,488 kilograms of gold.

Even during the war, however, the allies had issued the initial legal opinion related to expropriation (if one neglects the generally applicable principles of international law) in its Joint Declaration On Expropriation in Territories Occupied or Controlled by the Enemy, dated 5 January 1943. The declaration contains statements by the governments of all the Allies to the effect that they are prepared to defeat by all means the expropriation techniques of the states with whom they are at war and which these states have used against the countries and peoples which have been the victims of their ruthless attacks and pillaging. It goes on to state: "The governments making this declaration reserve for themselves hereby the right to proclaim as invalid any and all transfers and dispositions of property, rights and interests of any sort which fall in territories subjected to occupation or lying under the direct or indirect control of enemy states, or which belong or belonged to individuals physically and legally located in these territories. This warning extends not only to transfers and dispositions of property, rights and interests which are carried out by open thievery and imprisonment, but also to those transactions implemented in a form that is seemingly legally binding, even though these transactions are represented as being voluntary."

At the end of the war the Nazis uncovered some as yet unused gold on the territory of the current FRG, where it was confiscated by occupying American units. This included gold that the followers of Hitler had robbed not only from Czechoslovakia, but also from various other parts of occupied Europe. However, only about 55 percent of the total gold that had been stolen was found.

At the end of World War II, 18 countries signed, in Paris, an Agreement On Reparations Applicable Against Germany, An Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Allied Reparations Commission, and An Agreement on the Return of Monetary Gold (the so-called Paris Reparations Agreement). The agreement became valid on 24 January 1946 and the Czechoslovak Republic became a party to it on 17 May 1946. Part III of the agreement contains a single article concerning the restitution of monetary gold. The article first of all stipulates that all of the monetary gold found in Germany by allied soldiers would be pooled to form a joint base for redistribution as returned property among the states, which will share in this base in proportion to their gold losses suffered by robbery or illegal transfer to Germany. Without forfeiting rights to reparations for nonreturned gold, each of the countries participating in the distribution of this base would accept the portion of monetary gold received as full settlement of all its claims on Germany for the return of monetary gold. Every country participating in this agreement would be awarded an amount of gold proportional to that which it owned and which was stolen or

in any way illegally removed to German territory after 12 March 1938. The individual countries who would be participating in the distribution of the base would provide the governments of the United States of America, France, and the United Kingdom, as the pertinent occupying powers, detailed and verifiable data concerning gold losses which they suffered when Germany either stole or otherwise transferred the gold to Germany. The conclusion of this article contains an important provision to the effect that the governments of the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom will take all the appropriate measures in their respective zones of occupation to carry out this distribution. This text implies that the three Western powers were to be responsible for distributing the gold covered by the agreement.

Based on these so-called Paris Reparations Agreements the three Western powers established the so-called Tripartite Commission for the Return of Monetary Gold, which was composed of three commissioners, one from each power. The commissioners elected their chairman in such a way that the representatives from the participating powers alternated in this function. The commission was established to perform the administrative tasks connected with the distribution of the gold. The Czechoslovak Government reported all its claims on monetary gold to this commission, in the amount of 45,488 kg. Following verification, the commission recognized Czechoslovak Republic losses at only 43,999.3638 kg of gold, of which the Czechoslovak side was to be compensated with a proportional amount in the vicinity of 55 percent of this total. In 1948, the Tripartite Commission returned to Czechoslovakia a first installment in the amount of 6,074.1564 kg of gold in the form of coins. The release of the remainder was postponed for various reasons for practical purposes until 20 February 1982, when the remainder of the awarded amount was issued to agents of the Czechoslovak Government and transported to Prague.

It now remains to explain how it took the three Western powers so long to decide that this Czechoslovak gold, which had not ceased to be the property of the Czechoslovak state, should be released by the Tripartite Commission and sent to Prague. A report on the amount of the allotment and the reason for delay was received by the Czechoslovak side from the British side on 13 June 1958. According to this announcement, in the case of Czechoslovakia, the commissioners of the United Kingdom and France on the Tripartite Commission had concluded that Czechoslovakia had lost 43,999.3638 kilograms of gold as a result of German robbery or the illegal transfer into Germany. The necessary affidavit to establish this before the Tripartite Commission was prepared and signed by the commissioners of both the United Kingdom and of France. It was furthermore reported that these commissioners were prepared to sign the required additional documents for the release to the Czechoslovak Government of the amount of gold established by the Paris Reparations Agreements as the relative share of the Czechoslovak Government in additional time payments. This final amount would have been 18,433.4735 kg, if the document signed by the commissioners of the United Kingdom and of France had also been signed by the commissioner from the United States, because the release of the Czechoslovak share of the gold was conditioned on the signatures of all three commissioners. The commissioner from the United States, according to the report, did not agree with the conclusion on the matter of Czechoslovak claims which had been reached by his British and French colleagues. There could, therefore, be no more allocations to Czechoslovakia.

So while most countries had had their share of the gold returned by 1947 or 1948, the return of the Czechoslovak gold was resisted despite the fact that Czechoslovakia, just like the other occupied countries, was exhausted by the war and required resources to renew its national economy. Moreover, the United States and Great Britain had transported the Czechoslovak gold to New York and to London. The Federal Reserve Bank in New York had on deposit 8,002.6 kg in gold bullion and 206.7 kg of gold coins. In London, the Bank of England had on deposit 10,190.5 kg of gold coins. This transportation was carried out within the agreement of the Czechoslovak Government and without authority under the Paris Reparations Agreements.

The announcement of the British side concerning the position of the Tripartite Commission on the issue of releasing the Czechoslovak share of the monetary gold was not complete. As is well known, the objective of the ruling centers of the United States at this time was not to release the Czechoslovak monetary gold to a state which in February 1948 had embarked on the building of socialism; the objective was to hold on to this gold for a future regime which in the eyes of the West would be "free." The fact that in 1982 this gold was finally released to the Czechoslovak Government must lead us to the conclusion that today even certain circles in the West do not really consider the overthrow of the regime in the CSSR a serious possibility. This is one of the political consequences of this event that cannot be underestimated.

When it became clear that the overthrow of the regime in Czechoslovakia was not possible, the United States and, subsequently, Great Britain, despite the above-mentioned announcement, began to tie the release of the gold to agreements concerning financial and property rights adjustments. This was a nonlegal approach which violated the Paris Reparations Agreement, according to which the three Western superpowers were responsible for the release of the Czechoslovak gold with no conditions whatever. A long path of negotiations was embarked upon in which the Czechoslovak side attempted to achieve the return of the Czechoslovak gold, in which it was ultimately successful as a result of its deliberate approach.

In 1948, there remained in force a trade agreement with Great Britain. As a condition for concluding another trade agreement, Great Britain required the resolving of all Czechoslovak financial obligations. Under this situation, on 29 September 1949 the signing took place of a trade and financial agreement, an agreement concerning payments in English pounds, an agreement concerning the adjustment of claims related to nationalization, and an agreement concerning intergovernmental debts. Under the agreement on the adjustment of nationalization claims, the Czechoslovak side agreed to pay Great Britain for the property of British subjects which was nationalized in Czechoslovakia or affected by other nationalization measures, total compensation in the amount of 8 million pounds sterling. The Czechoslovak side paid this amount according to the agreed-upon schedule.

A more complicated situation resulted concerning the agreement on intergovernmental debts of 1949. These debts have their own specific history. This agreement replaced a number of negotiations between the two countries on the basis of which the Czechoslovak Government had contracted for certain



credits from Great Britain during and immediately after World War II. The agreement also covered, among others, two other types of credits, the so-called Munich credit and the so-called war credit.

The history of the so-called Munich credit is as follows: On 3 October 1938, British Prime Minister Chamberlain delivered a report to the House of Commons on the Munich Agreement and also announced that at the same time England would provide Czechoslovakia with financial assistance in the amount of 30 million pounds sterling to overcome the difficulties which it had been a party to causing. In October 1938 a Czechoslovak delegation went to London and submitted to the British Government a memorandum which described in detail the financial requirements of the country, especially in regard to the necessary reconstruction of railways and roads, the modification of the currency and the expenses related to the relocation of some 200,000 families from the occupied territories to internal regions. As a result, the British Government approved, in addition to the above-mentioned financial assistance, an advance in the amount of 10 million pounds sterling, by requesting the Bank of England to put this amount at the disposal of the Czechoslovak National Bank to the credit of the Czechoslovak Government. After discussions between the British and the French governments concerning the final amount of the loan, the Czechoslovak delegation was informed that the financial situation and the domestic and foreign political situations justified the decision that it would not be possible to exceed the sum of 10 million pounds sterling which had already been provided as an advance.

On 27 January 1939, the following agreements were signed:

a) a Czechoslovak-British agreement adjusting the accounting procedures for the advance of 10 million pounds sterling in such a way that the English Government would pay this sum to the Bank of England and would regard it in the future as its own loan to the Czechoslovak Republic. With parliamentary approval, an amount of 4 million pounds sterling would be considered as a gift. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic would return to Great Britain 6 million pounds sterling, along with the interest that the English Government had paid to the Bank of England, and 1 percent interest on the amount of 6 million pounds sterling from the day that the English Government had paid this sum to the Bank of England until the day it was returned;

b) an agreement between the Czechoslovak, English and French governments which stipulated that for the financial assistance of the Czechoslovak Republic the British and French governments pledged that, subject to parliamentary approval they would guarantee jointly capital and interest for the issuing of loans in pounds sterling which might be issued by the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic in London up to an amount of 8 million pounds sterling.

The contents of these agreements were discussed in the House of Commons and proclaimed as the law concerning financial assistance for Czechoslovakia, the so-called Czecho-Slovakia Financial Assistance Act of 1939.

The British Government then paid the Bank of England the advance provided to the Czechoslovak National Bank with interest in the total amount of

10,029,315.14 pounds sterling, of which the amount of 6,029,315.14 pounds sterling became a debt of our state to Great Britain, which was to be paid off with the proceeds of the loan subscribed to in London in the amount of 8 million pounds sterling and guaranteed by the British and French governments. Due to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, however, this loan was never issued. Loans in the amount of 8 million pounds sterling were to be utilized, according to Addendum II to the law concerning financial assistance for the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia, including help to the refugees moving from the border regions to internal Czechoslovak territory, their settlement or the setting up of their households.

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia, on 15 March 1939 all Czechoslovak bank accounts were blocked, a move which received legal justification subsequently, on 27 March 1939, with a law concerning limitations on Czechoslovak bank accounts, the so-called Czecho-Slovakia Restrictions of Banking Accounts etc. Act 1939. This law, with retroactive applicability to 15 March 1939 forbade British banks and individuals living in England to carry out payments, without Treasury approval, from accounts whose owners were living on Czechoslovak territory, or to release to them securities or gold deposited in Great Britain. The Czechoslovak National Bank had, as of 15 March 1939, i.e., on the day of the blocking, on account with the Bank of England a balance from the above-mentioned 6 million pounds sterling of about 3.4 million pounds sterling.

On 31 January 1940, a law was promulgated in Great Britain called the Czecho-Slovakia Financial Claims and Refugees Act of 1940 which established that any balance in accounts with the Bank of England would upon request be transferred to the Treasury and the Bank of England would be absolved of all obligations for these accounts. The Treasury, as soon as it received the above amount would deposit it in a fund which would be called the Czecho-Slovak Financial Claims Fund and would be under Treasury control. The monies deposited in the fund were to be used according to Treasury ordinances for settling the obligations of the Czechoslovak Government or of individuals living or conducting trade on Czechoslovak territory, as long as these obligations arose prior to 15 March 1939. The fund was at the disposal exclusively of the British Treasury, without an Czechoslovak participation.

In January 1940 the Treasury then issued a plan for the use of the Czecho-Slovak Financial Claims Fund, according to which it had been empowered to make payments concerning the following obligations of Czechoslovakia:

- a) interest obligations on bonds and other debt obligations of Czechoslovak State Loans from 1922, the 7.5 percent mortgage loans of the Metropolis of Prague of 1922 and 6 percent obligations of the Skoda factories, on the condition that it be proved to the Treasury that these obligations were owned by British residents or corporations conducting trade in the United Kingdom as of 8 May 1939;
- b) obligations to the creditors of Austrian-guaranteed conversion loans of 1934-1959 with guarantees provided by the Czechoslovak Government for interest on the debt obligations of these loans,

c) announced obligations which were payable on demand or upon submission:

--related to interest payable, payable treasury notes, and debt obligations of the Czechoslovak Government other than interest on Czechoslovak foreign loans of 1922;

--bank balances held at offices or at any Czechoslovak banks or their branches at the close of business hours on 14 March 1939;

--related to other amounts payable or guaranteed by some Czechoslovak bank or its branch if these obligations arose prior to 15 March 1939, and if it was proved to the Treasury that they were under British ownership and had been so owned for the entire period from 14 March 1939 or had been inherited by a British owner on this date. The term British owner meant a person who was a resident of the United Kingdom, or a corporation doing business in the United Kingdom as of 3 September 1939 and who was this same person or corporation at the time when the claim was submitted. Claims were to have been submitted prior to 31 January 1940 at the Bank of England according to an announcement from the bank dated 3 April 1939.

Claims on the interest on the above-mentioned international loans were to be submitted at the pertinent payment locations for these loans. Payments in the amounts of the agreed-upon interest were to be carried out upon presentation and surrender of the appropriate coupons, with initial payments beginning on 1 October 1939.

Interest on the Austrian-guaranteed conversion loans of 1934-1939 which were guaranteed by the Czechoslovak Government was paid to the creditors of the loan through the Bank of England upon written request submitted to the Treasury and against the submission of the appropriate coupons from the debt obligations issued to the creditors by the Czechoslovak Government. Payments began with the 1 December 1939 coupon.

On 7 March 1940 the Treasury issued an ordinance entitled the Czecho-Slovakia Settlement of Financial Claims Order of 1940, according to which the above-mentioned Czechoslovak obligations had been paid. According to this ordinance, a total of about 2 million pounds sterling had been paid. In the 1949 agreement, the total drawn from the amount of 6 million pounds sterling was set at an amount of 4,460,127.34 pounds sterling.

An additional credit was the so-called war credit. This credit was provided to the Czechoslovak Government according to an agreement of 10 December 1940. The credit limit was gradually raised to an amount of 18 million pounds sterling. The credit was drawn upon by having the British Treasury put the monies directly at the disposal of the Czechoslovak Government in London (the Ministry of Finance), which had been authorized to handle this credit. Payments were made to the account of the so-called War Office to cover the costs connected with the arming of Czechoslovak units in Great Britain, to the account of the Air Ministry to cover the costs of the training and arming of Czechoslovak units in Great Britain, and to the account of the Foreign Office to cover the administrative costs of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in London. During the war, about 14,000 Czechoslovak soldiers were registered in the British armed forces. They fought in the Middle East and in the British Air Force. During the negotiations in 1949 the Czechoslovak obligation from the war credit was set at 13,340,033 pounds sterling.

The Agreement Concerning Intergovernmental Debts of 1949 obligated the Czechoslovak side to repay debts plus interest between the years 1954 and 1965. It was necessary, however, for the Czechoslovak side to revise this position very rapidly, as the situation began to develop differently than had been anticipated. Czechoslovakia had to repay its wartime obligations, but could not itself secure payment of its own claims. According to the so-called Paris Reparations Agreements, the monetary gold stolen by the Nazis was to have been returned. The return of this gold was put off at this time because of the refusal to agree of one member of the Tripartite Commission, the United States. According to the so-called Paris Reparation Agreements, Czechoslovakia was also to receive compensation for wartime damages in an acceptable amount (so-called reparations). The issue of reparations also began to develop unsatisfactorily. According to the overall inventory of Czechoslovak war losses, our reparations claim came to the amount of Kcs 309 billion, of which Czechoslovakia received only approximately 0.07 percent as payment, an amount completely out of proportion to the overall damages. Moreover, the Interallied Reparations Office (IARA) in Brussels, set up to distribute the reparations from the Western occupation zones of Germany, completed its activities on 21 November 1959 on the basis of a resolution of a qualified majority of the member states at the session, which was participated in by a Czechoslovak delegation as well. Our delegation in Brussels made an announcement in connection with the termination of the activities of the reparations office to the effect that the Czechoslovak Government reserved for itself the exercise of all rights to the redress of all war-caused damages. Further developments in the reparations issue have been unfavorable for the Czechoslovak side and today there are no prospects that that the CSSR will be compensated for the damages of World War II.

The above realities forced the reopening of negotiations with the British side, which took place in the 1954-1956 period and ended with the suspension of Article 3 of the Agreement Concerning Intergovernmental Debts of 1949. This was the article that had placed a deadline on the payment of Czechoslovak obligations. The suspension was agreed upon first until 30 September 1958, then to 30 September 1960, then to 30 September 1962 and then to 30 September 1963. In December 1964, it was finally decided with the British side that both sides would meet to discuss still open financial questions 6 weeks from the day that Czechoslovakia would obtain its monetary gold from the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold. At the same time the Czechoslovak side agreed that no later than 7 days after receiving its monetary gold it would establish a joint Czechoslovak-British account administered by the Bank of England in the amount of 1 million pounds sterling as the first payment of its financial obligations. The suspension of Article 3 of the Agreement Concerning Intergovernmental Debts continued in force from this moment without any further extensions of payment schedules and was to remain in force until such time as Czechoslovakia received its monetary gold.

In the meantime, in the years 1960-1964 the British side submitted requests for compensation for the property of British subjects who had allegedly been affected after 1949, when the first compensation agreement had been negotiated with Great Britain, by socialization measures and had, therefore, not been compensated under the previous agreement. This was a matter of some 300 pieces of real property, numerous pieces of movable property, bank accounts, internal Czechoslovak debt obligations, claims for goods and various other matters. The Czechoslovak side verified these requests and concluded that for the most part the claims were unjustified. Claims were submitted, for instance, for property that had already been compensated for under the 1949 agreement, for property that had not been affected by any Czechoslovak measures, for open bank accounts, and for movable property that had been "appropriated" during the war by the occupiers, etc.

In 1980, the British side submitted, in violation of the 1964 agreement, a request that the mechanism for settling British claims be agreed upon prior to the release of the Czechoslovak monetary gold to the Czechoslovak side. In this request they pointed to the fact that while the value of the British claims, due to the permanent inflation in the West, was declining, the value of the Czechoslovak gold was continually increasing. The British side stood by its request, which had been issued as an ultimatum, even when it had been explained to them that this was a matter of two issues quite independent of each other.

In the meantime, there was also a change in the position of the United States, which had been tying its agreement to the release of the Czechoslovak monetary gold to the adjustment of outstanding property rights and financial issues. From the beginning, the Czechoslovak side had been willing to resolve this open issue and had done everything that might have led to a normalization of relations between the two countries. In the fifties, the United States had come forward with an exaggeratedly high claim. Only in the sixties was there finally success in formulating a text that was acceptable to the Czechoslovak side as well. A draft of this agreement was signed in 1964, with a component of the agreement being the agreement of the United States to the return of the Czechoslovak monetary gold. Since France and Great Britain had already given their approval to this return of the monetary gold, there now appeared to be nothing in the way of concluding the entire transaction. The Czechoslovak gold was not returned in 1964 however, because the U.S. Congress did not approve the agreement, due to the successful mobilization within it of some reactionary forces.

Hopes for the return of the Czechoslovak gold appeared again only after 10 years, in 1974, when the United States was successful in negotiating a new text of a replacement agreement which likewise included the link between the payment of claims and the return of the Czechoslovak gold. Again, however, reactionary forces in Congress refused to approve the agreement.

It was not until 1981 that property rights negotiations with the United States were again renewed. These negotiations, however, were preceded by an event that substantially affected their entire course. In 1980, a bill was submitted to Congress by its member Moynihan and others, which was strongly

supported by the Czechoslovak emigration, that would have empowered the U.S. Government to sell the Czechoslovak monetary gold, invest the proceeds in securities and use the interest to pay compensation gradually to American claimants. The entire project was to last 15-20 years, which implied that the Czechoslovak side would have received, after the above interval of time, instead of its monetary gold, an amount equal to the purchase price of gold at the current level, and this in inflated dollars. After the November 1980 elections in the United States, the new composition of the U.S. Government and Congress did not rule out the possibility that the proposal to sell the Czechoslovak monetary gold would be approved. So as to prevent this sale and the consequent loss of the monetary gold, the Czechoslovak side proceeded in 1981 with negotiations with the United States on a third proposal of a property rights agreement. These negotiations, in which the Czechoslovak side was at a disadvantage since the American side held the monetary gold, ended with the decision according to which the Czechoslovak side, indicated its willingness, in response to a U.S. request for \$113.6 million, to provide compensation in the amount of \$90 million, on the condition that from this amount would be subtracted the amount of \$8.5 million for a rolling mill that had been sold, making the net compensation \$81.5 million. Regarding the rolling mill, this was property which Czechoslovakia purchased in 1947 in the United States, paying \$16 million for it. In 1952, the United States did not permit the export of the rolling mill to Czechoslovakia and in 1954 sold it to Argentina for \$8.5 million. The text of this agreement with the United States was signed on 6 November 1981 and was also signed on 29 January 1982 by the CSSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. ambassador, in Prague. Despite the opposition of certain circles, the American Congress then approved the agreement. It is not unimportant that in the end the Czechoslovak emigration still attempted to block the release of the gold. The American President signed off on the congressional decision. After approval of the agreement by the Czechoslovak Government, diplomatic notes could then be exchanged between the sides on 2 February 1982, according to which on that day the agreement would go into effect. The agreement of the American side was also influenced by the voices of the American claimants who were not prepared to wait much longer for monetary compensation which was continually losing value due to the chronic inflation in the United States.

In conjunction with negotiations with the United States in 1981, talks were also proceeding with Great Britain. These negotiations were also quite difficult because in their first round the British side asserted as inter-governmental debts and new private claims a request for a total compensation of 47 million pounds sterling. In the negotiations the Czechoslovak side was forced to show that first it could not recognize an obligation to pay the so-called Munich credit in the amount of 4,460,127.34 pounds sterling for a number of reasons, primarily however because this credit had arisen in direct connection with the Munich Agreement to which a representative of Great Britain had affixed his signature. Evidence was also presented of the huge damages, in the amount of about Kcs 40 billion, that had been caused to the Czechoslovak economy as a result of Munich, and which were, therefore, the fault of the British and for which Czechoslovakia had not received any compensation. The so-called Munich credit could also not be recognized because it had not served its original purpose, i.e., to aid in the reconstruction of the industry and

economy of the truncated post-Munich Czechoslovakia. As has already been stated, in March 1939 this credit had been blocked and in 1940 it had been used to create the so-called Claims Fund, from which the British, without any input from the Czechoslovak side, paid off in England Czechoslovak obligations which had arisen prior to 15 March 1939. The discussions were often acrimonious. It was also brought up that it is quite an exceptional phenomenon that a state occupied by an enemy would borrow resources from another state so as to pay its obligations. The loans which were paid off from the fund were to serve in the development of our own national economy and were to be paid off from the proceeds which this development would yield. During the occupation, all of the proceeds of the Czechoslovak economy served the Nazi Reich and resulted in immense damages to the Czechoslovak national economy. As far as payment of the obligations from the Austrian-guaranteed conversion loans is concerned, it was established by an exchange of letters between the High Allied Commission in Germany and Chancellor Adenauer on 6 March 1951 that the FRG would take responsibility for all interest and other expenditure obligations of the Austrian Government that had come up for payment between 12 March 1938 and 8 May 1945. The same provision is contained in Article 28, Paragraph 1 of a state agreement with Austria from 1955. Of the Austrian loan for which the FRG had obligated itself to pay, the British Government had paid out the amount of 1,050,396.610 pounds sterling from the so-called Munich credit. And last but not least, the Czechoslovak side brought up the corruption scandal of the delegate to the British parliament, Boothby, which clearly illustrated the way in which the uncommitted funds of the Munich credit in England had been stolen. These were the major reasons why the Czechoslovak side could cover nothing of the so-called Munich credit.

Regarding the so-called war credit, the Czechoslovak side pointed out that this concerned for the most part resources which went to the arming of Czechoslovak soldiers fighting on the allied side (including Great Britain) against the fascists. Finally, in the interest of achieving an agreement, the Czechoslovak side recognized this obligation as it had been described in the agreement concerning intergovernmental debts of 1949. The total amount was 22.073 million pounds sterling.

Of the private claims of British subjects the Czechoslovak side agreed to pay about half of the original request, which had been submitted as about 6 million pounds sterling, or a total of 2.89 million pounds sterling. The total Czechoslovak obligation to Great Britain amounted to 24,971,427 pounds sterling. From this, however, was subtracted Czechoslovak claims for property of Czechoslovak subjects that was blocked during the war in England, making the final total compensation 24,266,619 pounds sterling, or about half of what the British side had first requested. The agreement with Great Britain was signed on 29 January 1982 and signed in Prague by the CSSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British ambassador. It went into effect after an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries on 2 February 1982.

In this way, the final obstacles were removed from the path of a return of the Czechoslovak monetary gold, even though subsequently there was a complicated resolution of the issues of the simultaneous payment of Czechoslovak obligations to the United States and Great Britain, and related to the transferral of the Czechoslovak monetary gold, its insurance, and its transportation to Prague.

The Czechoslovak side first requested that the monetary gold be transferred to its custody right in Prague, justifying its request by the fact that it had not given its approval to its transfer to New York and London, and that this action had not been in accord with the Paris Reparations Agreement. Finally, after complex negotiations it was agreed that the gold would be transferred to agents of the CSSR Government at the Swiss Bank Corporation in Zurich. In choosing the place for the transfer of the gold, account was taken of the fact that the chosen bank have substantial experience in gold transfers and that it be fully set up to handle such transactions. It was also noted that the Swiss banking industry had a sufficiently good reputation that it would be difficult to imagine that the orders to pay and transfer the Czechoslovak gold would not be carried out. Consideration was also taken of the fact that on 24 November 1953 a trade agreement had been signed with Switzerland, Article 13 of which made it extremely difficult for anyone to attach the property of the Czechoslovak state and its central bank.

On 20 February 1982, a session was convened at the Swiss Bank Corporation in Zurich of the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold. In addition to the commissioners of the United States, Great Britain and France, a Czechoslovak Government delegation was present, led by the appointed government agent for the transfer of the monetary gold, a delegation from the United States and Great Britain, as well as representatives of the Bank of England in London and of the Swiss bank. At this session the Czechoslovak monetary gold, which had in the meantime been transported to Zurich from New York and London, was turned over. At the same time, the governments of the United States and Great Britain received the compensatory amounts which the Czechoslovak Government had obligated itself to pay within the framework of the property rights adjustments. After the transaction was completed, the gold was transported on that same day to Prague.

After several decades, the Czechoslovak monetary gold had been returned to the hands of the Czechoslovak people. Another chapter of our history connected with the Munich Agreement, the occupation and the war had ended.

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NATION'S PLACE IN EUROPE, EAST OR WEST

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[Article by Ivan Berend: "Hungary's Place in Europe, Where Do We Belong in Europe, Which Region of Europe"]

[Text] Where is our place in Europe, in the area where we live, among the peoples with which we share a millenium of history, partly within the same state, partly as neighbors, and as allies or foes?

This question accompanied our modern history with a special emphasis, especially since the events of 1848-49 and then, with an even greater emphasis, as a result of the effects of the first and second world wars. Our relations with the neighboring small peoples and the great powers that surround them--although from time to time they varied as a result of concrete historical situations--were always significant basically to the same extent as part of the Hungarians' questions of existence. So much the more as they were inseparable from the national or ethnic problems as early as 1848-49 and then especially at the end of the first world war, after the peace treaty of Trianon.

What our place is in Europe is also an emotional question of society and political orientation. Where do we belong? Should "the people of the East" (as Szechenyi put it), which happened to find itself in the West, make every effort to adapt to the West, for, according to Gyula Szekfu's admonition, the Hungarians' way has been for a thousand years "to follow the example of Central Europe and Western Europe," as "a peasant state turning to the East would set us back." Or, should Hungarians (this time let me quote Peter Veres) develop their own inner, "Ghenghis-Khanian soul"? "We cannot be burghers anymore, let us not want to be. Thus we have nothing to do in the West." Are we "the last bastion of the Christian West" facing the repeated attacks of eastern barbarians, as the Horthy regime's ideology proclaimed?

Or, with Bela Imredy's words, are we "alone in Europe's joints," foreign even ethnically, with the historical mission to separate Germans and Slavs which are like fire and water? (This view was, incidentally, published as early as December 1919 in the NEVHZETI UJSAG [National Magazine] in a one-page article, demonstrating the recurring character of the various views. It was Janos Bogya who was then discussing that "the weight of world politics centers on us

today," for "the Hungarian nation is one that separates the Slavs, having been able to stop German expansion to the east.") We have perhaps a "Turanian mission": advancing into the southern Russian or even into ancient east Asian territories, as Pal Telski thought before the first world war; or to conquer, according to Szalasi's phantasm, straight to the Mongolian borders to set up a "Hungarist empire" which adapts to "the new order"? Or, contrary to the concept of expansion, is our mission to build a bridge? Or is it the creation of an "Eastern Switzerland" conceived by Oszkar Jaszi, and the establishment of "an historical cooperation of East European states," "with the heroic construction of a European concept and the spreading of east European faith," through which "the historical role of Hungarians is just beginning in Europe"--as was so emotionally propagated by Dezso Szabo? For, according to this, an alliance and cooperation including Hungary, Poland, Greece and Turkey may open a new chapter in "Europe's universal strengthening" and "the revival of European culture." Or: would the Hungarians' mission be to connect the adjacent peoples, resulting in the unification of East and West, expressed by--quoting Dezso Keresztury--"the duality of the great symbol," i.e., the western Papal and the eastern Byzantine crowns welded together by St. Ladislaus?

#### Efforts in Finding a Name for the Area

What is our role in this area? This question has been almost inseparable from the effort to define the area itself. There are many people today who get nervous when Hungary is put in Eastern Europe or even Central Eastern Europe, for they see this as a treason of, or being, Europeans or Hungarians. There are many who emphasize our being "West-Europeans," going back a thousand years. "We belonged to Western Europe ever since St. Stephan," emphasized Gyula Illyes in an interview in the summer of 1982. Others put a special emphasis on our being "central Europeans" and even set it as a goal "to return" from Eastern Europe to Central Europe.

At the same time there were many around the 1930's and 1940's who rejected the Central European category (a German concept) and (like Domokos Kosary or Istvan Gal) recommended the concept of "Carpathian Europe" to be used for the area between Germans and Russians ruled by the Carpathian basin. This concept was interpreted by many as a Hungarian empire with multiple nationalities.

But how contrasting was Dezso Szabo's concept of Eastern Europe, described as early as 1931. In 1935, when the title of his study raises the question, where "Hungary's Place in Europe" is, the subtitle gives the answer right away: "in Eastern Europe." According to his concept, the area is a large unit including, from the German-Austrian borderline: Hungary, Poland, the Balkans, and even Turkey.

In the debate that took place in the columns of the MAGYAR NEMZET [Hungarian Nation] in January 1940, Istvan Gal recollected: "I was once talking with Bela Bartok about naming the area. He also adhered to the name Eastern Europe, giving a detailed explanation about how much this is corroborated by the research in folk music. At any rate, the fact that two such world-famous

geniuses as Bela Bartok and Dezso Szabo unequivocally committed themselves to the concept of Eastern Europe, should give some thought to everyone recommending something else." Laszlo Nemeth's program, conceived more than 40 years ago, demonstrates the same spirit: "We can be Europeans by accepting the fact that we are East-Europeans."

Historian Peter Vaczy, also almost 40 years ago, considered the Carpathian basin as Eastern Europe both geographically and historically; his colleague of today, Jeno Szucs, referred to the "consensus" of at least a small circle of historians and a related group of publicists which considers the area between European Russia and the Elbe-Lajta line as Central-Eastern Europe. This is not so much a definition of geographical location but rather an acknowledgement that this area, in its historical development, followed western models and norms but, in the East European substance the structure of economy and society, was evidently modified. Lajos Bartha separated himself in 1939 from all other views by saying, "Let us say finally that we are neither Central Europe, nor Danube-Europe, nor Eastern Europe. The Hungarian and Bohemian earth belong to the world which is between Central Europe and Eastern Europe. These two countries are the western-eastern world, located between the West and East."

In looking through the older and newer publicistic, political or scientific definitions and names, the chaos and contradiction is startling in which--with Laszlo Nemeth's words--"we have been calling ourselves, in great chaos, a people of" the Danube basin, western Europe, central Europe, eastern Europe, central-eastern Europe, eastern central Europe, Carpathian Europe, between East and West.

#### The Political and Geographical Principle of Organization

And if Tibor Barath urged us in this more than 40-year old press debate about finding a name for this area that "It is high time for a scientific institution of ours...to decide, actually in which historical area we live: in Western Europe or Eastern Europe; in Central Europe or in Central-Eastern Europe; in Carpathian Europe or in the Danube basin...", let me attempt, as another one in the long list to make order in this "great chaos."

Before I try to give an answer, I must say that the obstinate chaos of definitions and names is hardly a result of journalistic superficiality. So much the less as these contradictions can be found not only in the views of publicists or political thinkers but also in those of historians working with a scientific apparatus and providing a great number of proofs. I do not want to mix the lively political and publicistic manifestations of this issue that have been going on for more than half a century with scientific research that has often been very thorough. It is precisely the latter that I will try to summarize and emphasize in the second half of this writing. It is still necessary to state the evidence openly: in one aspect--disregarding methods, form and quality--there is no difference between these manifestations, for the reasons for all of them are political. I want to add right away that I do not question the justification of political definition. In various historical periods, under various historical goals or dangers, it was politically

understandable and justifiable for political thinkers of politically-oriented scientists to emphasize Hungary's character as being "West-European" or "East-European" or in between "Central European," "Central-Eastern European" or in the "Danube basin."

It must be noted here that these definitions, and the debates thereof, came into the foreground mostly when they became especially timely as a result of the challenges of international politics. A decision by a great power, a diplomatic plan, or the political demands of preparing for war or peace evidently coincided chronologically with the debates at home. (This was unequivocally shown by Gyula Juhasz in connection with the "ruling ideologies" of World War II.)

When I begin with all of this, it is to express that I am aware of my own limitations as well. But I still think that the limitations of scientific research are much more extensive and if we approach this topic with the compulsory *sine ira et studio*, i.e., weighing and confronting everything that our spiritual life produced, we can make some steps forward.

Thus in the interest of clarification at a scientific level, we must separate the evident political principles of organization and the given direct political interpretation of area definitions, despite the fact that I emphasized the primacy of political cause. Let me mention, then, only three extremely characteristic and recurring types of the above.

One served the proof and view of the various definitions resulting from the idea of Hungarian supremacy and of the rule over--and a cultural supremacy above--the neighboring peoples. It was the pre-World War I zeal of empire or great power when, for example, Pal Teleki's mystical "Turanian" concept was conceived (which was uncharacteristic of his later activities) whereby in 1913 he called on an advance into the Balkans and the southern Russian territory.

The idea of Central Europe was the result of another, quite different but often recurring political concept of the area--this was independent from, but similar to, the German "Zwischeneuropa" concept; this was, in the definition of Zoltan Szabo, "Europe in a geographical sense, and the small peoples' Europe in an technological sense." The essence of this view is that it defines the boundaries of the area by emphasizing the similarity of the situation of the small peoples squeezed between the two great powers, and their interest in joining forces. In the words of the author above, "It is the world between these 'two pages' what we call Central Europe."

Finally, let me mention the third (today's) political definition of the territory: this defines the eastern and western boundaries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, namely, within that of the "European socialist countries" or the "Soviet block."

A geographical approach may seem, however, a more natural and more exact starting point. The task is simple, for one must only look at the map. Europe extends between the Arctic Ocean in the west and the Ural Mountains in the east. This old continent is found roughly between 20 degrees longitude,

west of Greenwich, and 60 degrees longitude to the east. Between these two points, the 20 degrees is almost a precise geometrical bisection. (If we consider the smaller corrections as well--Europe's western boundary is actually a little to the west of 20 degrees--then it would be more advantageous to draw the bisection at 19 degrees eastern longitude.) The latter, however, easily going through mountains, forests, rivers and cities, bisects Europe precisely at the Dubrovnik-Sarajevo-Budapest-Katowice-Lodz-Gdansk line. In the strictest geographical sense, then, it is easy to solve the problem: even if it sounds strange, Transdanubia belongs to West-Europe, and the area between the Danube and the Tisza as well as Trans-Tisza belong to East-Europe. And if Hungary's territory is divided between east and west, then the areas east and west from the dividing line (roughly the area between 10 and 30 degrees eastern longitude and 45 and 55 degrees latitude, i.e., the area between the western line of Oslo-Hamburg-Stuttgart-Milan-Genoa and the eastern line of Leningrad-Kiev-Odessa) is Europe's geographical middle zone and thus may be considered in its entirety as Central Europe. In addition to these topographical reasons, this is also corroborated by the natural characteristics which, through the chain of the connected Carpathia Mountains and the Alps, naturally embrace this area into Central Europe. It is thus undebatable that Hungary's given territory is in Central Europe.

But this does not make the picture complete. For the Central Europe described above can itself be divided along the already known eastern-western line of bisection (19 degrees longitude), and in this case we can speak geographically of Western Central Europe (including mainly the German, Bohemian and Austrian areas) and Eastern Central Europe (in the case of Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Yugoslav territories). Although in this sense, in an exact geographical classification, Hungary's Transdanubia would belong to Western Central Europe, the country's larger portion no doubt belongs to Eastern Central Europe.

But let us stop for a moment. Making order in the "great chaos" of names is, it seems, impossible on the basis of geography. For the above shows that Hungary can be viewed geographically both as partly West European and partly East European, or in its entirety as either Central European, Eastern Central European or Western Central European. We are thus at square one. But not really. For one conclusion can already be drawn, namely, that geographically almost all area definitions are justified. And it follows from this that all debates which present geographical arguments against an unwanted name (and, let us say, try to prove with these that the designations Western Europe, Eastern Europe or Central Eastern Europe are to be discarded and the only ones to be used are Central Europe or Eastern Central Europe) are unfruitful and superfluous. With this we can put away, I think, the geographical factors of our whereabouts.

#### Similarities Between the Concepts of Belonging Together and Brotherhood

After all this, what are the criteria for defining the field of force in which Hungary finds herself, to which she belongs, which affects her and even prescribes in many ways the track of her historical motion? Common destiny, which has been manifest in the position occupied in the world and in the basic similarities in the relations to other countries and regions, is

evidently a much stronger definition of area than degrees of geographical longitude and the attractions and repulsions of changing politics throughout the centuries. This can be applied both in the sense of a similar position in the European division of labor and on the basis of our economic position (supplying the developed West with farm products and raw materials and importing finished products, technology and capital) as well as according to the similarity between the positions occupied in our thousand-year-old fight against the German, Mongolian and Turkish conquerers, the Habsburgs and Romanovs. But not only the similar situation of the neighboring peoples but also their characteristic mixture contributed to this definition which was often referred to earlier as a geopolitical one. The wide strip between the Baltic and Adriatic Seas was justifiably called the region of mixed population. This is true historically as well as in the modern present. To draw national boundaries on the basis of ethnicity is almost impossible here. States established prior to the development of nations were generally formed, accordingly, as multi-national empires. Some characteristic concentrations of mixtures of nationalities (which can be observed under various circumstances, in the region of the Baltic Sea, in Silesia, in Transylvania or in Macedonia) acquired an almost symbolic meaning.

It cannot be considered incidental that Hungary's belonging to, and common fate with, the central and eastern European peoples was first discovered by people like Gyorgy Klapka, Laszlo Teleki and Lajos Kossuth and was rediscovered by people like Mocsary, Justh, Oszkar Jaszi and then by people like Dezso Szabo and Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky. In these cases, too, of course, the beginning was connected with international politics, expressed clearly by Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky when he warned with a wise political foresight long before the danger of Hitler, in the 23 February 1929 issues of the AVANTGARDE: "...Hungarians stand blind and deaf in front of the evident historical change, the result of which is that the German nation and German politics is prepared to run through us, Hungarians, toward its new goal." Dezso Szabo warns us not to consider the danger of aggression as a passing adventure of Hitler's: "It was not Hitler who made today's Germany, but Germany, the Germans made Hitler." These recognitions were dictated by political necessity and by the most immediate demands of the fight for our existence and future and, similarly, it was politics that put this question again and again into the foreground. Let me refer again to the direct relationship between the trends in international politics and the revival of our domestic publicism and scientific research. Although it cannot be my objective here to follow the history of international relations and diplomacy and the related political thinking, it is still worth referring to the most important historical stations of this connection. The thought of our place, and its new interpretation, made a dramatic entrance in the middle of the 19th century, as a result of our separation from the Habsburg empire and the consequent vengeful interference of the neighboring great powers, as well as when the existence of the monarchy--and multi-nationality--was later questioned.

The new political situation at the end of World War I, and then after the peace treaty, became a period when this idea was emphasized almost to the point of "explosion." Without losing its timeliness, the definition of our place in Europe was made an actual question of everyday politics by the new

international situation of the 1930's, by the open emergence of Hitler's expansive politics, by the ideas related to a new system of European alliance, then by the feverish European planning, orientational insecurity and the given possibility of modifying the system of peace at around the outbreak of World War II.

This was followed right away by a new wave of actuality brought about by the new situation towards the end and after World War II, by the period of the new balance of the great powers, the new systems of peace, the new internal political conditions, and the simultaneously appearing possibilities, new plans and new characteristics. Then, in the past more than 30 years, the trends developing at the turn of the 1940's and 1950's defined the demand for reformulating this idea. Since my task is not an examination of the history of ideologies, I will not even attempt to examine the political views as to the place of our country in the chronology of political changes. Let me emphasize, however, that in the past 60 years these views were from time to time strongly affected by the urgent question of Hungarian minorities left outside our borders. This is precisely the reason why most Hungarian minorities became the representatives or pioneers of the idea of Central and Eastern Europe after World War I. Jenő Gomori wrote in December 1921 in neighboring Czechoslovakia, in the first issue of the periodical TŰZ [Fire] "We live together physically, we live together with the Slovak and Czech peoples. In the interest of peace...we must get closer to one another spiritually. We want to smooth the way of coming together...our cultural ideal is: the Central European United States." And then years later, Edgar Balogh was extremely clear in his formulation of the relationship when he spoke at the Pozsony conference of the Sickle movement: "The Sickle approached the East-European question through the scientific analysis of the Hungarians' situation in Czechoslovakia. For the questions of the Hungarian minority cannot be solved by themselves."

Other people used the concepts of Central and Eastern Europe for a restoration of rule, albeit in a changed form, over the lost territories and a new kind of restoration of "Hungarian supremacy." (László Ottlik argued in his writing "Új Hungaria és Keleti Svajc" [New Hungaria and Eastern Switzerland] by saying that his program helps restore Hungaria's territorial unity.)

But no mixture of the most varied goals, efforts and causes can make us forget the constantly recurring basic idea that originates from a more thorough understanding of the idea of common destiny in Eastern Europe, namely, that the real questions of Hungarian economy, society and politics can be answered only through a democratic cooperation of the neighboring (or even mixed) peoples that is based on equality.

By recognizing this, the most diverse ideas and practical proposals were formulated. The poetic manifestations of togetherness (by Endre Ady and later by Attila József) were as much part of the programs of alliance as were the political utopias of confederation or alliance or the modest east-European historical, literary or linguistic comparative research plans, all boldly based on the brotherhood of the peoples of eastern Europe. A confederation which sweeps aside the past's antagonisms and which makes use of the interests

of European politics--or a preparatory union of customs--must be worked out; this is what enlightened politicians proclaimed in the century between the mid-1800's and mid-1900's. The program of a Danube confederation, worked out by Klapka and Teleki but connected with Lajos Kossuth's name, Oszkar Jaszi's monumental plan at the end of the war, or Dezso Szabo's alliance system that rejected the confederation and guaranteed a close military, foreign policy, economic and cultural cooperation, proclaimed the same thing as did Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky's "broad and organic Danubian plan." "Hungarians only can implement a Danubian policy," he emphasized, "and for this they must find the *modus vivendi* for the time being, then they must find a close cooperation, and finally a very close relationship with the other Danubian peoples." (It must be added that the scale is practically infinite, for these programs include not only plans based on a canton-like organization or democratic equality. These programs also include a Habsburg-restoration, a plan looking for a monarchic base built on Austrian-Hungarian alliance, proclaimed by Sandor Petho in his work, "A Magyar Capitolium" [On the Hungarian Capitolium].

Together with the efforts appearing on the level (or necessity) of power politics, the spiritual streams also began to move, emphasizing, above all, the importance of getting to know one another. With the beautiful analogy of Rezso Szalatnai, in this area "where East and West exchange messages," peoples connected by an "historical organism" live, foreign and unknown to one another, meeting only as "two trains passing in the night." Thus the first task is spiritual cooperation and spiritual togetherness. This is the basis on which Dezso Szabo called on the Hungarian youth as early as the spring of 1921 in the columns of *VIPRADAT* [Dawn], "to undertake extensive studies in Russia and the East" and that "as many young talents as possible should be able to go abroad to study, including the East as well." This is the basis on which he later demanded the starting of the journal *KELET-EUROPA* [Eastern Europe], to become monumental later, and the establishment of a forum or an "East European academy" where the outstanding personalities of spirituality "would, as if in a permanent parliament, search for political, economic, cultural and other ways for the implementation of East European union." And a pupil in this program, Laszlo Nemeth, the professor in Leipzig, in rediscovering Dietrich's comparative East European literary history, says it again: "We live here in the same common destiny, knowing nothing of each other. It is high time to get to know our brothers who were nurtured by the dried-up breast of the same fate."

Aron Tamasi argued in 1935 that since politics cannot bring the peoples together, literature and culture must assume this role. Sandor Eckhardt urges for the comparative study of the Danubian peoples' literature, and the journal *APOLLO* was established with the program of beginning the comparative sciences. Professor Jozsef Bajza propagated hard everyday work, instruction in Balkan languages and the establishment of departments thereof at Hungarian universities. These initiatives were beginning to be partly implemented in the 1930's and early 1940's. At Budapest University, the Department of East-European Studies was established, and a significant journal, the *ARCHIVO EUROPAE CENTRO-ORIENTALIS* was started. In the plans of the newly established Teleki Institute, comparative East European research was in the focal point and, with Domokos Kosary's introduction describing the program a new journal, the *REVUE d'HISTOIRE COMPARE* began to serve the research of this topic.



More perseverant than the enthusiasm of a few lectures or articles or the establishment of a journal, was Bela Bartok with his phonograph, traveling this road from 1910 to his death: he compiled and transcribed Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian folksongs and composed his central and eastern European music that included this common folk treasure and that, precisely because of this, became revolutionary and universal. (His example also inspired Lajos Vajda to create a common East European language of painting.)

The century-old unfruitfulness of power politics and all concepts of confederation, the system of alliance of the small East European countries or the failure of reducing boundaries to being symbolic finally resulted in an emphasis of getting acquainted with one another historically and culturally as a way of carrying out a long-range historical task. With the words of Edgar Balogh, "The discovery of Eastern Europe and its inclusion in Hungarian self-awareness and world concept is the long-range reality that can make Hungarians the "magnificent heralds" of either Dezso Szabo's ideal or another kind of "East European concept" and "East European faith."

Following World War II, many old spiritual and political obstacles were eliminated that stood in the way of mutual familiarizing in central and eastern Europe. True, this was accompanied from the beginning by mistrust, vengeance, an effort to solve ethnic problems by mass translocations, and the practice of mass exodus affecting millions of people that created new hatred.

The great national enthusiasm to find one another, supported by a similar internal social revival, soon resulted, however, in new concepts of union and confederation. The preliminary plan of a Balkan confederation and the establishment of a preceding customs union came as early as 1946-47 in the stage of energetic preparation. The effort of Czechoslovakia and Poland to establish a new kind of economic cooperation was already governed by an agreement. And this new community that was forming, and was hailed in SZABAD NEP [Free People] as a "new great power" at the occasion of Tito's visit to Budapest in early December, 1947, wanted to lay the foundations for a general economic system. "Our concept is," said Imre Vajda in his statement made in those weeks to the NEPSZAVA [People's Voice], "to establish a more or less contiguous economic system through economic agreements between the people's republics of Eastern Europe.

True, these initiatives were unfruitful, for Stalin vehemently opposed them and rejected the processes initiated mainly by Tito and Dimitrov: "...PRAVDA's editors think," it was stated on 28 January 1948, "that the problems these countries face...are not a concocted federation or confederation or a customs union but the defense and strengthening of their independence and sovereignty through the organization and mobilization of the internal democratic forces..." It must be added that the following turn in politics not only severely undermined the processes leading to an economic integration and a possible federation but, as a result, even the comparative historical and literary research and institutions were rapidly eliminated in Hungary. In spite of this, for the first time, a system of alliance was established from the Elbe to the Urals and, for the first time, economies were looking for common

interests. The connected identity of social and political systems, with its successes, failures and significant contradictions, finally gave a great new thrust to this spiritual movement and the related "work of details." The study of the historic economic, social, cultural and political similarities between the peoples of this area proceeded with unprecedented energy partly between 1945 and 1948 and then from the 1960's to date.

And at this point we arrived from the idea of togetherness to the structural similarities of the neighboring peoples' economic, social and political systems. And if in the preceding periods the light cavalry of political thinking and publicism lead the way, then the leading role now decidedly belongs to the heavy artillery of scientific research manifest in thick monographies.

The significance of structural similarities in defining the area was often emphasized, in parts or as a whole, by the earlier political thought and publicism as well. Dezső Szabo, the spiritual father of popular radicalism between the two world wars who affected the thought of an entire generation (he apostrophized once, with his characteristic temper, this generation's outstanding representatives--his "little spiritual grace boarders"--for repeatedly plagiarizing him) talks about a "Western European" and a differing "Eastern European man." The latter is also characterized by a blood relationship, for Hungarians, Poles, Croats, Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Turks have "Turk, Tatar and Mongol elements in their blood." The social and spiritual relationship is more significant, however. For the only representative of racial and national individuality is these peoples' peasantry; the middle class and new leadership must be developed from that. "There are many similarities in the destiny and character of East European peoples"; "the entire mental atmosphere and the mutual effect of the conscious and subconscious mentality of these peoples demonstrate such a similarity."

Laszlo Nemeth spoke in his article published in 1932 in the JANU [Witness] about the "brotherhood" of East European peoples in an identical connection and on the basis of related literary and artistic manifestations. The capitalized West and East of Lajos Jocsik divided Europe into farming and industrial areas albeit not inflexibly and without gradations. Zoltan Szabo's central Europe was, on the other hand, a Europe of peasants in terms of sociology. Sandor Eckhardt, in his 1931 lecture, cited Czech, Hungarian and Romanian examples to show the similarities of the romanticism which had a German origin and had political connotations. Bela Bartok, in his great work that took an entire lifetime, showed the mutual effect and relationship between Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian folk music. Laszlo Galdi, in his work "A Dunataj Nyelvi Alkatas," [The Linguistic Attributes of the Danube Region], contributed to the study of a "common East Central European spirit" by demonstrating the "cultural relationship" between East European languages that are not genetically related.

#### The Historical Interpretation and Development of Similarities

Of course, economic, social, linguistic and cultural similarities could have hardly been always present and "inherent in the genes" of these peoples in

this varied ethnic agency. In speaking of structural similarities, we cannot stop at an empirical registration of fact. The question emerges right away, what causes this similarity? How and when did it come about? In other words, the question of structural similarities probes the similarities of histories. Thus those striving for exact definitions found themselves facing the need for the discovery and interpretation of historical processes. Sometimes this was manifest only in a superficial form of redefining the wishes of modern relationship through an earlier historical formation. For example, Mihaly Ferdinandy, in his article "Kozep-Europa kezdetei" [The Beginnings of Central Europe], says with an historical emphasis that "Central Europe was first called the Avar Empire and then the Hungarian Empire." Opposing the superficial search for historical analogies, the recognition of related East European characteristics necessarily lead to the historical interpretation of the concept of Central or Eastern Europe: "Eastern Europe," states Peter Vaczy in 1943, "is not only a geographical but also an historical concept." According to the historical interpretation, the similarities characteristic of this area developed historically in the broad area between economy to culture. There is a relatively wide consensus in this question among Hungarian historians of the last half century. On the other hand, opinions greatly vary in the question of where and when the clearly apparent related attributes originated.

Before discussing the above, however, the question must be raised whether it is justified to confront the political publicism and the scientific-historical approach as if the former kept changing entirely according to wishes and goals or sometimes according to the direction of the wind, and as if, depending on the effects of international politics, it propagated now Turanian/Hun easternness and then complete westernness, opposed by the absolute truths of scientific statements. Such an extreme confrontation would not be justified, for there were political thinkers who indeed discovered permanent truths by looking at the country's problems through a scientific knowledge and even a thorough understanding and a sense of reality. On the other hand, as I have emphasized already, scientists are also influenced by political concepts and ideals, and even the most thoroughly scientific study of our subject originates in politics; in other words, not even in this case can the prejudices and biases be excluded. Further, we should not forget that one reason why the unquestionable view of "the" science cannot exist is the fact that researchers do not share common views.

Saying all this--including the limitedness of my own view as well--in advance it can be said on the basis of facts, however, that science, which is extremely sensitive to actuality and to ideals--partly because it works with facts and partly as a result of its professional honesty with regard to bibliography and in some cases as a result of its comparative methods--discovers, independently from a conscious or unconscious start, such relationships of historical processes and includes so many countries in its inquiry that, as a result of the activity of researchers that took place generation after generation through additions, debates, complements, corrections and further developments, Hungary's historical place in the European developmental processes is being discovered. We may add that scientific discovery was helped not only by domestic research but also by the results of universal science. There are

thus enough studies to fill a library, giving a solid basis for the demonstration of historical processes.

The characteristic regional similarities--as a characteristic synthesis of totally contradicting views--developed in the entire process of history. I repeat it in agreement with Jenő Szűcs, "we may become more and more aware that Europe's permanently crystallized regions are actually identical with the types of answers given to world challenges." We may add that the answers come about only in the historical agent of the autonomous internal development of the individual countries and territories. Thus the attributes, while they are products of the internal development's continuous processes, were built in the world system's great periods of change layers on top of layers. In this view, although Central and Eastern Europe had its own characteristics from the "beginning" of European development in fifth through eighth centuries and although these affected the subsequent processes, they cannot be considered "original attributes" as if the separation of East and West had already taken place. At the same time, the differences do not appear as a result of unprecedented and unexpected catastrophes or traumas dramatically elicited by outside effects.

The role of the "differences at the start" was identified as early as 1932 by Peter Vaczy when--emphasizing a certain inner similarity between Hungarian, Polish and Russian development--he said that the divergence from the West originated from the divergent development of early feudalism. When the huge area between the Elbe and the Urals became populated by Finno-Ugric and Turk peoples, Europe was divided from the seventh century by the Roman-German peoples of the West and the separate Byzantine-Islamic world of the East. Eastern Europe was located between these two worlds, and its "characteristics were determined by the fact that peoples settled here--and the ethnicity crystallized--relatively late, i.e., at the time when this process had already come to an end both in the East and the West." The European territory east of the Elbe-Saale line, the meeting point and characteristic mixture of the West and Asia, while it is Eastern Europe as well as Europe as a whole, was itself divided into two parts: one with a Latin-western orientation and one with an eastern orthodox orientation. Vaczy emphasizes that "the inclusion of the entire Eastern Europe into the Christian cultural community took place only later, in the second half of the 10th century. This was the time when Poles, Hungarians and Russians established Christian states." In spite of this, in the following centuries no feudalism in the western sense was established, for there was a lack of a social and institutional system based on the private legal agreement. Instead, "the regnum became patrimonium" and, in the public legal sense, the entire nobility became a subject. Thus feudalism was established but, including Hungary, it did not become an organic part of the East European societies. László Makkai also derives--using Marc Bloch's view of feudalism--the "original characteristics" of the East European development from the differences in the development of feudalism. For the model of the western "classic" feudalism was characterized by a harmonic and proportional mixture of Roman and German elements, while in the East these elements were not yet mixed. Thus the northern parts of this area was dominated by barbaric Asian elements (while in the south--using Jenő Szűcs' words--Byzantium, achieving a Pyrrhic victory through her defensive rigidity," prevented the

integration of the barbaric elements). Jeno Szucs also thinks that the early Middle Ages is that starting point of the process of development of Europe's three historical regions. Western Europe was born within the well-defined boundaries of the Carolingian empire, in the region extending to the eastern banks of the Elbe, Saale and Lajtha rivers. Around the death of Charlemagne (800) it was actually this "Christian-feudal society" that began to monopolize the concept of Europe. But the boundaries of Western Europe, as a result of the West's first great expansion, significantly extended in the 11th through 13th centuries toward the east, all the way to the Lower Danube, the Eastern Carpathians and the forests separating the Polish and Russian regions, for "Europe stepped out of the geographic framework and became a synonym for Christianity and a cultural and even 'structural' identity." According to the contrary view of Szucs, at the dawn of the modern age "the Russian state established (and included in the concept of Russia) the homogeneous concept of the par excellence 'Eastern Europe'" from the White Sea to the Black Sea and from the Poles to the Urals. (In this process a great part was played by the Mongol rule, lasting for two centuries beginning with the 13th, i.e., "the western wedge of the Asian Nomad world penetrating Europe" which "stopped in the body of Hungary" just as the Ottoman-Turkish wedge did that penetrated Europe's body from the southeast at the end of the Middle Ages, making these regions play the role of frontier zones.) No doubt the direct contact in the Russian regions and the Balkans with Asia hindered the full development of a western type of feudalism and contributed to the fact that "the East European arch-type of feudalism became more or less crystallized in this region." On the other hand, in this "middle region" (called Central-Eastern Europe for a lack of a better term, i.e., in the Carpathian basin, the Czech basin and the Polish plains) western types of structures were rapidly developing which were "sharply different" from the East European "autochthonous" structures. "The change from being a western periphery of geographic Eastern Europe to being the eastern periphery of structural Western Europe was characterized above all by the development's combined rapidity." At this point Szucz' view shows a meeting point with the concepts which, on the basis of these phenomena, spoke of a similar type of development that took basically the same direction as the West, recognizing the break only at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries. Gyula Szekfu spoke of a Hungarian development that progressed, together with the West--and achieving the same level as the West--in a "straight line" up to the 16th century. The same concept is also found in Istvan Bibo's views when he speaks of a development in Hungary in the 5 centuries following the establishment of the state that "structurally" belonged to the West and was similar to the development of the West albeit with "differences in degree," in a simpler context, and with provincial characteristics. Istvan Hajnal, then Zsigmond Pach, and most recently Jeno Szucs spoke of a feudal development in Hungary that was somehow "compressed" or "mixed" in its speed and was imitative in its character. They spoke of a kind of "qualitative" imitation that could not be made questionable by the fact that the development's shorter time span provided less opportunity to deepen or "digest" the feudal structures. Incidentally, these reservations are expressed by all three authors. For example, Szucs means by the development "of a characteristically mixed speed" that "elements of social structure which were built on each other in the West in a developmental process that took several phases during an approximately 500 years (9th through 13th centuries), emerged in the eastern region,

including Hungary, smoothly compressed and in less than a century and a half. No wonder that their forms were either somewhat unorganically truncate and raw or remained unrefined and hybrid or constantly showed archaic attributes." All of this results in the subsequent "characteristic two-facedness of Western Europe's eastern region": the basic elements of the western structure strike root, "but the roots are weaker to begin with." Feudality appears only in the aborted Hungarian version of "familiarity," without the deep western institutionality and permanence, to undermine the unity of the central state's power, unsuited for a disintegrating "deep tillage"--using again Istvan Hajnal's favorite term--which was so significant in the West and which was considered the starting point of all further development. (For one of the most important attributes of the West's "original characteristics" was, according to Szucs, that, through the disintegration of central power, feudalism replaced the concept of the state with social relationships and that the state's management, military and legal functions, having been separated from the king's power, were gradually distributed in feudal society that was based on private agreement. He adds, "It was this environment from which the embryo of 'contrat social,' destined for a great future, was formed." The separation of ideological--political and spiritual--secular spheres, and the further detotalization of power through the development of cities, finally lead to the fact that it was not possible to integrate western society "from above" and thus the lines of force of the integration began to appear "from below.") On the basis of all this, Szucs does not consider the area included subsequently (from the 11th-13th centuries) in "Carolingian Western Europe," including the Carpathian basin, as structurally West European; he states that "It seems to be more justified, already in the Middle Ages, to introduce the concept of 'Central-Eastern Europe' to designate the entire region which, although it followed western-type models and norms, modified the structure in its 'East European' agency in just about every aspect." In accepting this line of thought, we must not forget, however, that Jeno Szucs par excellence Eastern Europe, Polish-Czech-Hungarian Central-Eastern Europe (which he also calls from case to case, in a structural sense, Western Europe's eastern periphery) and Western Europe extending to the Elbe, are three regions that are actually only two. This is apparent partly in a terminological sense. For the independent region of Central-Eastern Europe, in spite of incorporating western structures, is not an integral part of the West because "the structure was being modified and reformed in the East European agency," i.e., in the final analysis, the point is the East European agency in this region as well. It is much more important, however, that the region called Central-Eastern Europe, considered as independent as the other two, was as unequivocally excluded before the 11th century from the Christian-feudal West as unequivocally it "turned back" to the East beginning with the 15th-16th centuries: "The exact demarcation line of economic and social structure which divided Europe after about 1400, designating the larger eastern half as the area of the 'second serfdom,' stunningly followed that certain Elbe-Lajta border of the 800's."

But, despite the significant differences, the development of the "real" Russian Eastern Europe is not all that different either. The Kiev state, that absorbed Norman and Byzantine effects and that became Christian, had a "common denominator" with the Hungarian state, "its social structure also showing analogies." True, the unfolding of this "late ancient-barbaric symbiosis"

(a later recurrence of the western Roman-Frank formula) was halted in the 13th century by Asian effects, and the situation was stabilized.

In contrast with Jeno Szucs' more rigid exclusive view, Peter Vaczy considered, as early as about 40 years ago, Eastern Europe, extending from the Elbe to the Urals, including Russia, as unified even in the period of early feudalism. Istvan Hajnal, emphasizing the difference of the eastern-orthodox world, showed that the Russian regions also became part of Christian culture and that Russia does not necessarily have to be considered a "peripheral area" of development. Laszlo Makkai makes his statement today: "In my opinion, the Russian development, albeit belatedly, followed East European feudalism....The indirect (i.e., not based on the right of the private landlord) adoption of feudal taxing is essentially identical with the East European (Czech, Hungarian, Polish) system of 'service'..." Makkai emphasizes the similarity also in the system of land ownership.

Subsequently, the Russian state, with its empiric, civilizational and "world economic" framework that was becoming independent, still remained, for a longer period, outside the developing modern world system. The break was no doubt connected with the Tatar conquest and the long rule of the "Golden Camp." The 16th century European agrarian economy revolution did not reach the Russian territories just as the "religious revolution," the Reformation, did not. "Thus the difference from the western development is so great," writes Hajnal, "...that it cannot be explained by geographic location or foreign rule, only by the structural deficiency of society and intellectualism inherited from Byzantium." In spite of all this, Russia's separation ended in the 18th century and the empire became a peripheral part of the European world economy by the 18th-19th centuries. Of course, the earlier separation and the subsequent reconnection induced significant differences. The differences, considering the western-type economic, social and political systems, seem to be in general gradually increasing from the west toward the east.

All of this finally corroborates the significance of the Elbe-Saale demarcation line. East of this we can speak of the various versions of the central and East European type which is different from the western type; within this we can speak of sub-types called by Szucs strictly Central-Eastern Europe or purely Russian-Eastern Europe.

The differentiation of the significant variations in the region extending from the Elbe to the Urals is at least as important as the consideration of this huge area's existing common developmental traits--despite the internal differences. Russian-Eastern Europe or the Balkan region significantly differs from the Central-Eastern European zone, but these, as well as the Austrian and German areas west of Hungary, show relationships in economic, social and political development which is totally different from that of the West; ignoring them would make it impossible to understand the history of the area. If several historic-political interpretations, spiritually opposing the danger of great-power expansion, emphasized the separate character of the zone between the great powers, then it must be noted that this spiritual opposition was hindered by ignoring the historical similarities. For without these the diffusion of the pan-Slavic or pan-German idea or the search for and acceptance

of similar and common solutions of unanswered historical questions would be hardly understandable. It would be hardly understandable how Germany, after catching up with the economically developed countries, fell back, as a result of the historic shock following World War I and then the great crisis, into the framework of typically old-fashioned models of solutions that had a great effect on many countries of the area because of its similarities in social development and the resulting spiritual-behavioral-ideological communities. But this area's adoption of Stalin's model of industrialization after World War II--a model for meeting natural and old needs--would not be understandable either. With this I want to emphasize only that, despite the differences, I consider the similarities in the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe significant. Of course, this view is corroborated not so much by the processes up to the 15th century but rather by the subsequent "ghastly return" or "swerving" and then by the general similarities of the 19th century answer given to the challenge of the industrial revolution.

The decisive station in the development of the historical Central and Eastern Europe is, according to almost everyone, the answer given in the 16th-17th centuries to the challenge of the modern world system.

The earlier tendency to catch up was broken around the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, and Hungary fell back from the level already attained. This idea can be found already at the beginning of our scientific history writing in the middle of the 19th century. Mihaly Horvath thought that the cause of the change was the 1490 collapse of King Matthias' centralization. Ignac Acsady, the outstanding historian of the turn of the century, thought that it was the bloody crushing of the 1514 peasant uprising. Gyula Szekfu emphasized between the two world wars the tragedy of the Turkish conquest of 1526-1541. Several historians found a natural connection between the 1490, 1514, 1526 and 1541 chain of tragedies.

As a result of the tragedy (tragedies), the natural processes were halted, and decline set in. According to Sandor Domanovszky's 1923 assessment, "the people which arrived to early capitalism by the beginning of the 16th century, fell back within a decade to the level of our Nomad ancestors." According to Gyula Szekfu, the "straight line" of the development "was broken by the Turkish era." "The Hungarian conditions, for the first time, took a direction" in the 17th century "that was different from that of the West." The deteriorating condition of the peasantry can also be traced back to the Turks. Consequently, the similarity of Hungary's development to that of Eastern Europe is not "organic" or "inherent." He argues in his paper, "On The Turanian-Slav Peasant State," that it is a complete historical misunderstanding to find a kind of Russian-Hungarian "peasant balance" or historical similarity. In the case of Hungary, we can only speak of a kind of "secondary backwardness." Istvan Bibo, a political thinker, building on earlier views of scientific history, also explained the dislocation from the way of the western development with the 16th century's external phenomena of catastrophe. These interpretations are obvious in the case of Hungary. And I do not intend, of course, to question the tragic role of the events or the important place they occupy in our history. Many historians showed us the consequences of these tragedies. But the inclusion of the processes in the neighboring



countries into the analysis and a broader international comparison made it evident that the changes in question cannot be explained by local causes. For while in Western Europe capitalism was unfolding, the development of the region east of the Elbe--according to Zsigmond Pal Pach's thorough analysis--sharply swerved as a whole from the West, resulting in self-managed landlord estates based on socage-service, in the peasantry's repeated binding to the soil (reminiscent of early feudalism), in the gradual reintroduction of payment of annuities in produce and labor instead of money, and in the "second edition of serfdom." This change took place, beginning with the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, in a ghastly simultaneity in the East German (Prussian, Brandenburger, Mecklenburger), Polish, Hungarian or Russian territories. The ways of the West and the East were sharply separated in the two halves of Europe. Even if this was influenced by local causes and partly by external conquests and tragedies, the universality of the phenomenon east of the Elbe refers to more general relationships. Istvan Hajnal was also among those who drew the conclusion in their comparative research when he called the attention to the fact that the Balkans, because of their certain historical/geographical characteristics, could have been the "center of Europe," and that this did not happen, could not be blamed exclusively on the Turkish conquest (which lasted the longest time and had the greatest influence here), for that came after the Balkans began to lag behind. He also warns us not to originate the differences of the Russian development exclusively from the Tatar conquest. Hajnal's arguments are, by definition, also valid for the break in Hungarian development. The latter is interpreted by Pach in connection with the change in the world economic system. For it was at at this time when the "world trade" of the Middle Ages, which was traditionally concentrated on luxury items, was replaced by modern trade of mass products. The traditional "Levantine route," leading from the Near East through the areas of the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, was replaced simultaneously by the shipping route along the Atlantic coast line from the Baltic Sea through the straits of Sund and Gibraltar to the Mediterranean Sea, and by the land routes between Western and Eastern Europe, and a mass transport of foodstuff began from the Baltic Sea and from Central and Eastern Europe. In this interpretation, the East European processes of agrarian development that differed from those in the West appeared in connection with the modern world system, and a new light was shed on them that opposed the earlier "explanations of tragedy." The labor division of the new modern world economy, which gave the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the role of supplying grains and living stock, evidently was not independent from geographic factors. The geographic discoveries and the new trans-Atlantic routes not only elevated the countries of the Atlantic coast to the center of the new world trade, but also opened the way for them to begin the "initial accumulation" of monetary capital. The influx of precious metals and the connected agrarian price revolution served as a basis for the processes of internal structural changes, and at the same time it connected the original accumulation of the modern colonial system (the third factor of the modern world economy), with the economic-social processes that guaranteed dominance in the world system for the West European nations. But the countries of the Atlantic coast also reacted to these changes in greatly different ways. It will suffice to refer to the basic differences between the Spanish, French and English solutions. Thus the external challenges created only conditions and possibilities, the

ability of the individual countries and regions to meet or pass these having been the significant factor. Consequently, the role of central and East European attributes, which existed in the birth of the feudal system and were still present in the Middle Ages despite the West's following, greatly increased. The overproliferating noble society, which hindered the incomplete development of cities and bourgeois mentality (and which increased the ratio of nobility to 4-10 percent--as opposed to the West's approximate 1 percent--and identified it with the nation in Hungary and Poland), and generally--to use Istvan Hajnal's 1942 expression--"the social structure's general and common" "historic/social problems," which characterized the path of Europe's "outermost regions" or "outermost nations" (in today's terminology, peripheries), now played a leading role in the newly possible "reservation of place" brought about by the change in the world economy. Society stood in the way of the development of the peasantry, through its inflexible structure and primarily through the elimination of rights the peasants already achieved and through the system of "Leibeigenschaft," making the formation of the middle classes from the majority of society impossible. This cannot be balanced by the contradictory mixture of the historic processes. The peasantry, as proven by Imre Wellmann, was able to defend, within the limitations of swerving and setback, its institutional freedom, and as was shown by Istvan Hajnal, the efforts and wishes manifest in the laws was hardly realized in life. Within the framework of the law, the discontinued, banned and centrally "abolished economic, social and political phenomena" continued to live in some cases with stunning persistence. "The structure of society keeps the belief alive...that the entire world can be changed through orders and laws..." "There is no basic law aside from the monarch's will, but the official proclamations often get lost in the self-serving apparatus; after 10 repetitions, the official calmly writes on them that their implementation is not possible, and the local official has already become used to throwing the government's harsh decrees, that show unfamiliarity with the situation, out the window for not knowing what to do with them." Under such conditions, characteristic historic "loopholes" were created, and natural processes were progressing in a distorted way. For example, the peasants' inability to enter the middle classes led, within the rigid feudal framework, to the overproliferation of nobility. For it was actually possible to enter a higher social class, but mainly through purchases of noble status. The privileges of nobility also became in this case a strange guarantee for the peasants' and city dwellers' rise to the middle class.

All of this made the central and East European processes not only complex and contradictory but also open to other influences. But they did not question the existing order. (Determining this order has always meant in history a mere abstraction and an emphasis of the main tendencies, never the colorful reality of life. But this cannot question the validity of the abstractions, just like in the case of physical laws, for example. For instance, it is hardly possible to question the justification of physical differentiation between flexible and rigid material and the inclusion of rubber in the first category and wood in the second. The trouble is that this is the same abstraction of colorful reality as is the historic differentiation of East and West in Europe, for the "flexible" rubber will at some point of tension react rigidly by breaking while the "inflexible" wood will to a certain point of stress bend quite

flexibly.) The mass of nobility, hiding behind their privileges, was rigidly closed to the process of movement toward the middle class--this can be emphasized as the main tendency of the processes. The Hungarian landlord, still a trader in the 16th century, gradually gave up trade by the 17th century when he even scoffed at this activity which did not suit his noble being anymore. In society's middle spheres, which were closed from below and rejected from above and which Marx called "interspace positions," external and foreign newcomers gained a foothold. The central and East European nations, occupying a subordinate and peripheral position in the new world economy and living through the painful processes of a characteristic re-feudalization resulting from the swerving from the progressive path of capitalist economy, remained in the quagmire of the painfully slow and halting historic period of the many centuries of "late feudalism."

All of these processes were connected with the characteristics of the development of the state and nation. Zsigmond Pal Pach wrote in his introduction to the volume III of "Magyarország Története" [Hungary's History] "The fact that economic and social development took a wrong turn affected, of course, even the political sphere. The structure of the 'second serfdom'--just like that of the 'first servage' of early feudalism--resulted again in the combination of economic exploitation and political/legal coercion at the level of the village and the estate. As opposed to a central political power, it was precisely the crystallization of decentralized aristocratic power and feudal institutions, and the existence of the private landlord's and the region's apparatus of coercion that served as a state structure suitable for the development of the late feudal system of serfdom." True, all of this was consistently realized in the 16th-17th centuries only in the Polish-Lithuanian state. The feudal aristocratic republic or "aristocratic democracy" of the Rzeczpospolita was a "chemically pure" manifestation of this political process. But similar tendencies also appeared in the Habsburg empire. The feudal Standestaat was well established in the principality of Brandenburg and the east German regions. "The triumph of feudalism appeared complete in this region of Europe in the early 17th century."

But the increasing military and political power of absolute states in the west and north at the second blooming of feudalism brought not only a potential threat but also a most direct danger. The invasion forces of Sweden, which was at the height of her imperial power, repeatedly attacked the states of Brandenburg, Habsburg, Poland and Russia. By 1640, they occupied a large part of Moravia and set up camp at Prague. Ten years later they conquered Warsaw and Krakow. The Swedish "flood" washed away the Polish Rzeczpospolita, proving the weakness of "aristocratic democracy." The superior power and pressure of the new West European and Northwest European absolute monarchies elicited--in opposition to internal tendencies in the 17th century--an effort to establish absolute monarchies. This was apparent both in Brandenburg/Prussia and the Habsburg monarchy and in Russia. Characteristically, Friedrich Wilhelm I signed a pact with the Junkers in the same year (1653) in which the last Zemsky meeting took place in Russia; "the change from feudal state to absolute monarchy" was rapid.

(Those countries which were unable to react appropriately to the external pressure and insisted on holding onto the segmented feudal state structure, not only declined but often lost, like Poland, their independent statehood.)

But the new absolute states were, in their structure, quite different from their western models in the different economic and social environment. Socially, they were connected with the system of the "second serfdom"; historically, on the other hand, they were built on a foundation which, unlike the West, realized a "nationalization" of society rather than a "socialization" of state functions. All of this provided now a stable ground for the establishment of a defensive, strong, rigid and self-serving central power. Unlike the western absolute monarchies, these new states did not foster capitalist development. With their different social backgrounds, they became the bases of a rigid East European feudalism and, in contradiction to the reasons of their birth, often tried to balance their internal instability through aggressive expansion.

But it was much more significant that the central state power, resulting from external threats, did not correspond in Central and Eastern Europe with the nation. While in the West the modern state and the nation, the budding nationalism and the developing democracy met in a natural way in the centuries of capitalist bourgeois development, "in Central and Eastern Europe the boundaries of state and nation became separated" as a result of "the trauma of becoming a nation," the breaking up of Germany, and the establishment of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires--writes Istvan Bibo in his study, "A kelet-europai kisnepek nyomorusaga," [The Plight of Small East European Peoples]. Furthermore, national existence and that nation's territorial integrity were also constantly endangered. This was clearly proven by the Czech, Polish and Hungarian states' loss of independence, by the repeated division of Poland, and by the long Turkish rule of the Balkans; according to Bibo, this insecurity "was the point from which the political hysteria of the central and eastern European nations started."

On the other hand, since central power and nation were separate, the multi-national absolute state could never be successful, for it greatly strengthened feudal and noble representation by also making it a representation of national cause.

In spite of all this, great progress took place in the course of these abortive processes in agricultural production. With I. Wallerstein's words: re-feudalizing Eastern Europe still became in this form a part of the developing modern world economy which had several sectors. And the feudal absolute monarchy, lacking the Western two-facedness in every respect, will become a great force, as a result of the new challenges of world economy, helping the structural reforms initiated and implemented from above--well known in Central and Eastern Europe from the earlier stage of feudalism.

As early as the middle of the 18th century, the central powers had to react to the new challenge brought about by the new great change in the West; this gave birth to the system of enlightened absolutisms characteristic of the region. This characteristically Central and East European type of state

subsequently tried to eliminate the deficiencies resulting from the internal weaknesses of the internal economic, social and state developmental processes. Because of a missing middle class, the modest number of entrepreneurs appearing with the encouragement of the enlightened absolutisms to meet the new demand, came from the rank of strata that were more or less assimilated by the "gap positions." The peasant land communities, communal autonomies, and especially the characteristic (and, from the western aspect of bourgeois development, retrograde) autonomous institutions of societies which persistently existed under the characteristic backwardness and the oppression by the landlords and the state, could become the starting points of new progressive processes originating partly from national efforts.

According to my joint research with Gyorgy Ranki, this process became especially strong and apparent by the "long 19th century" when the industrializing bourgeois democracies, rapidly developing under the influence of the West European double revolution (the English industrial revolution and the French social-political revolution), were gradually increasing in the first half of the century the gap between West and East.

While the level of economic development (expressed by per capita gross national production) changed from 1:2 to 1:3 within half a century, the great change in the world system provided many challenges again to Central and Eastern Europe that was lagging even further behind. At the same time, the industrializing West offered a market for more and more food and raw materials. Through this it provided great opportunities for marketing as well as encouragement for the modernization of East European farming that, with its traditional system based on the inefficient work of serfs, was unable to make use of this opportunity. Characteristically, the most interested party in this change was the ruling elite of landlords. This was not, however, the only form in which the challenge appeared; it also permeated the entire social and political life. On one hand, the conditions had to be created to make use of the greater economic possibilities; this entailed the removal of obstacles resulting from the fossilized privileges of the nobility and limitations of the serfdom. The western institutions necessary for a capitalist economy had to be transplanted as well. On the other hand, the social threat of the challenge (the ideals of the French Revolution and the attraction of English wealth) in itself demanded a reform of the rigid feudal systems and an adaptation to the West. Last but not least, the military-political effects of western progress, changing the earlier balance of power, endangered the old great-power positions of those lagging behind, i.e., projected the possibility of dependence and subjugation.

It is self-evident, then, that the eastern answer to the western challenge (an old historic reflex in this region) consisted above all of a series of state reforms implemented from above (from the Prussian reform of Stein and Hardenberg through the Russian liberation of serfs to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, ending the revolution with compromise and reforms, and to the Russian reforms of Stolipin, continuing the reforms of 1861). However, the answers were not made only within the limited national boundaries. This is shown by the fact that a European railway network was built with Western capital, by free trade, by the creation of an international monetary system

(based on gold), by the establishment of a modern bank system, by extensive Western financing of economic improvement in general and of building a modern statehood, by the development of economic branches through foreign capital, by the greatly increased foreign trade, and by the establishment of financial and credit relations.

As a result of the successful or unsuccessful answers given to this world challenge, the borders of the region also began to change. The western zone of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e., the German states, the western half of the Habsburg monarchy (similar to certain other lagging European zones such as the Skandinavian region) began to close the gap despite their late start. The Balkan countries (again, similar to other lagging countries such as the earlier great powers of the Iberian peninsula) went through a most bitter failure and not only became even more separated from "Europe" but also defenseless--in some cases in the form of direct financial control. The countries in between, such as Hungary, the Polish monarchy, and Russia (similar to south-European Italy), were only partially successful in their answer. In the cases of failure (Balkans), there was only a certain quantitative increase within the framework of the old structures--in spite of all successful progress. Foreign concerns remained foreign islands serving foreign interests. The half-successful countries (Hungary, Poland, and Russia) were also unable to break through the backwardness of the agrarian/peasant structure even if it was greatly changed, a modern infrastructure was built, farm production tripled, new industrial branches were created (starting from agrarian exports and including export-oriented branches), and the role of internal capital accumulation increased. The spectacular economic catching up in Central Europe's western zone, and Germany's leading role, although it eliminated the earlier economic lag and other detrimental effects of the late start, also widened the gap between the modernizing economy and the rather rigid social-political structures. The traditional ruling landlord outliving his own day, the unquestioned political power and decisive social influence of the military/bureaucratic elite, the outmoded autocratic political system, and the rule of militaristic absolutism became crying anachronisms.

The more or less modernizing economy and the slowly unfolding process of capitalism generally increased the conflict of the lag of social-political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The weaknesses and the lack of the old aristocracy of landowners, the bureaucratic-military elite (so characteristic from Germany to the Balkans), the cities' middle class and the new bourgeoisie created a characteristic "Ersatzklasse" (substitute class) which lead the capitalistic change, so much the more as the structure-changing reforms implemented from above as well as the building of railroads, the state guarantees attracting foreign capital and the legislative support of industrialization were directed by, and remained the tasks of, the state.

Thus the traditional ruling elite saved its power together with they system of large lands. The lower nobility, which had lost most of its privileges and land in the earlier noble societies, flooded the government positions, the megye apparatus, and the positions of army officers. The military-bureaucratic "gentle classes" gained significant strength, continuing to make it impossible for the peasants to advance. In the course of the reforms, the peasantry was liberated on its small patches of land hopelessly squeezed between the large

estates or--as was shown in detail by Emil N iederhauser--even without land, and continued to be regarded, even in the case of the more well-to-do groups as "outside of society." There were no peasant parties in countries of mainly peasants, and schools and offices were closed to them. This was true even in the peasant Balkans where the earlier ruling elite of landowners left at the end of the Turkish rule which resulted in the elimination of the system of large estates; however, the power in the "incomplete societies" (described by Zoltan I. Toth) still went into the hands of the new national power elite formed by city traders, very seldom by wealthier peasants, and mainly by a corrupt military-bureaucratic stratum that wanted to acquire wealth rapidly. The characteristic foreign immigrant tradesmen and middle class that began to appear in the 18th century became in certain countries (especially in Poland, Romania and Hungary) leaders of capitalist enterprise in the 19th century; they included not only one-third or one-half of retail traders and artisans but also those who played decisive roles in large industry, and the banks established as a result of the accumulated capital in grain trade. They were also present in the new class of workers, especially as a result of meeting large industry's demand for skilled workers by employing workers from abroad.

As shown by Ferenc Erdei in the case of Hungary, a characteristic dualism was created in these societies. The ruling elite began to include, along with the traditional ruling circles of landowners and politicians, the new bourgeois class of (mostly German-Jewish) bankers and large industrialists; similarly, the gentry-middle class is supplemented by groups of modern middle class or lower middle class elements of foreign origin that accompany the capitalist development. This duality also characterized the new intelligentsia in that the intelligentsia recruited from the noble-gentry circles (and assimilated elements) to fill government-related positions (judges, prosecutors, teachers) included a large proportion of freshly assimilated Jewish-bourgeois elements in the free professions (lawyers, journalists, actors).

As a result, these societies faced many difficult and unsolved problems: along with the "question of workers," characteristic of the new capitalist environment, there was the characteristic question of the gentry, the question of the peasant, and the question of the Jew. In connection with all this, the strategy of catching up (which was the main demand in Central and Eastern Europe for a century) came to a crisis, no matter whether it was successful or unsuccessful. This was hastened not only by the depression resulting from a lack of success or from partial success or from the impossibility of advancement, but also by the fact that, even in the case of beneficial economic processes, the national development, hindered by earlier problems in the development, could not always catch up. The late national awakening, which took place in its early stage by emphasizing cultural and linguistic endeavors (as was amply documented by Endre Arato), created a demand for independence and catching up that would not be met by following the rough road of catching up. The earlier problems in national development "brought even the elite of these nations into a radically false relationship with reality: they made it build on demands instead of reality and efficiency, and think outside of the simple relationship of causes and effects"--stated Istvan Bibo. "The frightening and misleading experiences of great intensity," which permeated

many generations through the communal shocks of national grievances, elicited actual mass emotions, making masses ready "to believe half-truths and lies through which they could justify their self-deceit and could satisfy some of their emotions." This was then topped by the shattering of the developed capitalist bourgeois democratic West's self-confidence and its values, considered natural in the age of liberalism. Was what Batsanyi or Szechenyi once considered a natural example to be followed?

All of these questions were amplified in the aftermath of World War I. In these decades new answer models were created in Central and Eastern Europe that were nurtured by lagging, a late start, and the difficulties in economic, social and national development. It can hardly be considered accidental that this is the area where mid-19th century's Marxism was connected in the early 20th century--through R. Luxemburg and even more through Lenin--with the answer for backwardness. It was Central and Eastern Europe where the socialist revolutionary movement began, and it was here where the attempt at revolution (Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria) and its first success (Russia) happened. The Marxist theory and the unfolding socialist model, which were further developed in Eastern Europe, were searching for, and were experimenting with, a new way for breaking out of backwardness, for industrialization, and for the accumulation of the necessary internal resources.

The suppression of the revolutionary attempts and the defeat and isolation of the socialist revolution simultaneously aided the emergence and stronghold of other Central and East European answers. As I tried recently to summarize this question, in certain cases the small countries were expecting their belated national revolutions to solve all of their economic and social problems. Independently from this (although in certain cases in connection with it), they declared war on the West's values, on French enlightenment and English liberalism, and on western parliamentary democracy, but not in the name of a social revolution rejecting capitalism but in the name of right-wing radicalism and mystical racial/national ideologies. Having been pushed to the periphery or having been set back led to the angry negation of previous paths to follow and to the victory of irrational ideals. It would be a mistake, however, to consider irrationality simply as "senselessness." It shows a characteristic "peripheral" ideology. The sense of failure in catching up (even if, as in the case of Germany, it resulted partly from the fact that, despite its economic advancement to the top, it could not join the club of the colonialists, and then, as it wanted to join them by force, it was thrown back further and lower than its original starting point was) naturally guaranteed an acceptance of views which rejected the rationality of the powers ruling the world, and which did not want to accept in the competition of catching up the "rules of the game" determined by more advanced and dominating powers, but wanted to be more competitive by their own tailor-made rules. In this sense the views of extreme irrationalism were quite rational indeed. After a late start and lag (made worse by set-backs), all of this led in this entire region from Germany to the Balkans to ruthless dictatorships, Nazi-type systems, monarchic autocracy, and heated nationalist pseudo-fascisms. (It is worth mentioning that although such ideologies and movements could also be found in Western Europe, they gained power only in Central and Eastern Europe--and in Southern Europe which was similar in many respects.)



Then World War II (which was fought from the beginning to the end mainly in Central and Eastern Europe) brought about in many countries of the region the victory of the socialist model which was unable to break through after World War I.

We have arrived at the present of Central and Eastern Europe. In this present the traditional dividing line between Western and Eastern Europe has been redrawn, with the broad pen of economic and social divergence starting at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, on the same Elbe-Lajta line which was the Carolingian dividing line of West and East at around 800 A.D. With a stunning exactness, this is where Germany is again divided.

The East European nations made an effort to change their situation in the new and great post-World War II period of challenge when dependent and backward countries--the peripheries of the capitalist world system--made their greatest effort to break out of their subjugation, and when the several centuries-old colonial system collapsed within about 20 years as a result of the possibilities offered by the new, bipolarized power balance. The possibility for a revolutionary change came from without. However, affected by internal economic and social contradictions and distortions, and by archaic and oppressive political systems, the internal conditions and the mass demand for change provided a suitable ground for structure-changing reforms that were again initiated from above. At the beginning (and in some cases between 1945 and 1947) these were partly oriented toward the West. Peasant and other democratic parties advocated long-awaited democratic reforms. The system of large estates was abolished right away. The autocratic/bureaucratic state power collapsed almost automatically with the collapse of Nazi/pseudo-fascist regimes, and this was the first time in several countries when really democratic elections took place.

Under the world system's new balance of power, for the first time in the 1000-year-old history of answering challenges, however, it was not the West's solutions that were adopted; instead, what was realized was a path of breakthrough, offered by a special East European socialist model.

After the attempts at catching up through the promising 19th century strategy of imitating the West, through the negation of rationality between the two world wars and through the answers given by the irrational right-wing dictatorships, results were now being expected from the socialist answer which rejects western capitalism as a whole and which meets the historic demands of Eastern Europe. (The goal is to catch up to, and even surpass, the West!) It should not be forgotten that Stalin, the leader of this strategy, wanted to eliminate Russia's 100-150-year industrial lag behind the West in just 10 years (as he proclaimed in 1931), and that Khrushchev, dethroning Stalin post mortem, almost 30 years later gave only 20 years for catching up to, and surpassing, the West in the areas of production, efficiency, and living standards.) Thus the greatly different answers were aimed at the identical goals of catching up!

The subsequent changes were great indeed, and the Soviet model, which was followed for a longer period in a uniform (and orthodox) way east of the Elbe,

made Central and Eastern Europe more uniform than ever. In the given system of socialist change, the role of the state became almost omnipotent, creating new conditions for the forced and one-sided industrialization of the earlier agrarian countries, changing in turn the internal economic structure of the region's countries as well as their place in the international division of labor. This process, aided by a conscious application of socialist ideology, also eliminated (or at least began the elimination of) the society's traditional peasant/provincial character. It destroyed, through a specially extreme (and sometimes brutal) levelling-off, the earlier extremely hierarchic social structure. Through a social change affecting one-fifth or one-fourth of the population, the earlier power elite and most of the middle classes were abolished and new classes of people's leaders and intelligentsia were created.

The economies consciously following similar paths and the societies organized according to similar models joined, for the first time in their history, a single political/military system of alliance within similar political organizations--under Soviet leadership. Political Central and Eastern Europe became identical with historic Central and Eastern Europe.

Of course, this could not, and did not, mean the automatic solution of national and ethnic problems that continue to exist in these mostly multi-national small and medium-size countries formed from ethnic mixtures, from hindered national development, and from multi-national empires. Although the post-war conflicts of nationality were "buried" for a while by government policies almost everywhere, soon the national and ethnic question not only revived but in some cases emerged with the unchanged force and heat of the old unsucccess. (Attention must be called here again to the abstract character of this process' description.) Despite the fact that Central and Eastern Europe is more unified than ever (albeit burdened by old and new problems) and that the institutional system is identical and the socialist framework is similar, the reality of behaviors and activities greatly differs from the surface structuredness just as it did in the 16th-18th centuries. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe show the significant differences between the sub-regions delineated by the differences are apparent in the every-day life, in the characteristic forms of behavior as well as in the economic and social structure.)

It cannot be my task to evaluate the characteristic East European answer to the post-World War II period. At any rate, the history of the last 30 years (aside from its political evaluation) has put additional layers on the 1000-year-old layers of similar structures.

At this point we can turn back to our initial question. For the historical/chronological examination of the region's identification (when the similarities appeared) is closely connected with the historical/geographic identification of the region's boundaries (which areas are characterized by these similarities). These two questions are inseparable, and the answer to them is the answer to the initial question of Hungary's place and role.

## What Is Actually Central and Eastern Europe, and Where Are Its Boundaries?

As we have seen, the region, which shows historical economic, social, political and structural similarities and which includes Hungary, may be defined by the huge area between the Elbe-Saale line, the Urals, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea. This is true even if the area's boundaries moved throughout the centuries either to the east or the west, unprotected by an impenetrable Chinese Wall. It must be added that the realization of German unity under Prussian leadership (which meant, according to both Kaiser Wilhelm and Treitschke, the period's outstanding German historian, the enlargement of Prussia) symbolically replaced after 1870 the Elbe with the Rhine. Thus the historic Central and Eastern Europe included, from a certain aspect, the unified German empire despite the significant differences in the development of Germany's western areas. In this sense it is justified to speak of a Central and East European historic region. (And it was extended to the west the same way as--using Jeno Szucz' clever words--Western Europe was extended by the inclusion of North America and as Eastern Europe was extended, within the Russian empire, by the inclusion of Siberia.)

Thus the definition of the region's historical framework does not yield any real justification for the view of the "zone of small peoples" which is based almost entirely on the picture of the 20th century and which was, from the 1930's on, mostly trying to find historical arguments for political wishes and plans. This region was much more a zone of large multi-national empires, from part of which small countries were indeed cut out in the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century by the late national movements of elementary force and by the great powers ruling the world. But the similarities of development were characteristic of both the large empires and the small nations replacing the empires. Of course, this cannot exclude the significant historical differences that are apparent of this otherwise homogeneous area. Within the basically uniform region, then, we must differentiate between sub-regions defined by different characteristics. One of these is obviously the narrower Russian Eastern Europe (which, through its path in the Middle Ages or in the 19th century, can hardly be connected, in a narrower sense, with the other countries of the area east of the Eastern Orthodox religious borderline as some people proposed). Similarly, it also seems self-evident to separate the Balkan region on the basis of the 5 centuries of Turkish rule as well as its failure to meet the challenge of this industrial revolution of the 19th century. The third, historically connected sub-region is the area that was earlier called, in a narrower sense, Central-Eastern Europe, including mainly the Carpathian basin and the Polish plains. Finally, the region's western zone, the Austrian, Czech and German areas, may be separated on the basis of many similarities in their development in the Middle Ages, similar problems in their national development, or even their 19th-century economic catching up to the most developed European regions, in spite--or because--of which many similarities in their social development remain.

Hungary's historical development and the level of development achieved is closest, of course, to the narrower "Central-Eastern Europe," the sub-region characterized by similar internal structures and external influences.

Consequently, the differences that separate her from the other sub-regions of the broader Central and Eastern Europe, the classic Russian Eastern Europe, the Balkans, or the western (most "Westernized") zones of the region, should not be forgotten or belittled. At the same time, a broader European comparison emphasizes the evident common attributes of the communities that exist despite these differences, the historical similarity that connects her with the other sub-regions mentioned, with the entire area called Central and Eastern Europe. In this area, where historical similarities characterize both large and small peoples, where large and small peoples lived together for a 1000 years under ruthless hostilities or alliances, peoples must finally live together in the present and future by getting to know one another, respecting one another. The discovery of the past, and an honest description of the long history of views and ideas related to Hungary's place and role, may make a modest contribution to that.

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## HUNGARY

### PECS BISHOP CALLS FOR CHURCH-STATE COOPERATION, DIALOGUE

Budapest UJ EMBER in Hungarian 15 May 83 p 1

[Text] Our country's church-state relations were the subject of an interview by columnist Eva Eory with the president of the State Office of Church Affairs, which was published in the 9 April 1983 issue of KEPES UJSAG. We might want to take note of the lengthy interview for several reasons. Apparently, it not only summarizes what had been said by different high personalities during the last few years, but in addition it courageously gives voice to that "outlook" which is necessary when, taking the past into consideration, we want to follow more resolutely on the road already started.

In fact, the purpose of the realistic and optimistic tone is to convince us that "these last few years, through the efforts of both parties, existing good relations have become more valid, firm and sincere". Presently, our primary concern is the assurance, safeguard and progress of our national unity. For it, we need the churches too!

We certainly can count on the churches while searching for a solution or securing support for economic, political and psychological means to prevent danger. "Fortunately, the overwhelming majority of the religious masses approves of socialism." This, however, is not a question of "lucky" coincidence only. Through a slow, self-initiated process and interest, religious people have come to the conclusion that while the socialist system builds unilaterally on the value system of this world, it labors for the achievement of human and social coexistence and the building of a more perfect humanity. Socialist humanism is an existing reality!

A successful cooperation has emerged, not only in terms of the abstract definition of church-state reality but also in terms of real social rallying true human coexistence, of living side-by-side and for each other by religious and nonreligious people. We have discovered the human being in each other, without applying the standards of ideological commitment of a party member, fellow citizen or coworker. Our shoulder-to-shoulder advancement has become a moral imperative: it is not only within the framework of the state's legal system that we belong together but all of us have become parts of social activities of mutual interest. Accordingly, in my view, we may now rightfully speak of church-society relations, of religious and nonreligious people's common search for their role in society and of their political and national commitments.

Undoubtedly, our country is ruled by Marxian-socialist political authority through Communist Party leadership. This also means that government identifies with the nonreligious masses--which, however, does not follow necessarily from basic Marxist or socialist principles. Yet it is precisely in this area where a decisive theoretical and practical change might occur, by taking into account religion and its creative forces, while giving up the now antiquated notion of religion's hopeless future as professed in the past. On the other hand, it sees the eternally changing and rejuvenating human face of progress, culture and civilization, no longer through the collision of ideologies but in the rightful and not negligible multiplicity of the human being.

In Marxism, recognition of realities and achievements of progress within their historical context have to be valued highly. Up to now, we have been truly afraid of each other's ideologies and have attempted to confront them with inner arguments or often with sentiments and passions only--and more than once with prejudices. At present, we look to each other for mutual values but also for separate ones--for the many-sidedness of human reality. Mutually, we have to accept that there is a transcendental faith which attempts to build on the hereafter and the invisible forces of the soul and spirit, while there is also a purely immanent ideological view staying within the closed world and accepting the priority and uniqueness of constantly changing matter as the basis of interpreting reality--that is, a different kind of faith. "The question--either socialism or belief in God--is not being asked anymore. We have to live and work together," says Imre Miklos.

#### Dialogue in the Service of Unity and Peace.

The road we had to follow to arrive where we are now has been long and rough. It is a pity that everybody has not arrived there yet. And if we too accept the fact that while "ideological debates are pursued uninterruptedly," a level has been already reached where neither one of the parties can afford "confrontation": we have to be able to meet in a creative dialogue, through our desire to learn and appreciate our mutual values. In the past, "we had been inexperienced and impatient: we jointly committed mistakes. By now, experience has proved that dialogue and cooperation are possible only between partners having the ability and readiness to protect their own principles while respecting those of the other partner." If only these words could find acceptance at a "lower level" too where, up till now, so many complaints were heard.

Let us accept with satisfaction the statement that "good relations between state and church were not shaken or destroyed either by outside influences or by inner difficulties. Their stability seems to be safe. It is our important task to safeguard it because its value will be a very necessary asset in the years to come, too." Let me interpose here--out of commitment to the relationship of logic and history and to my optimistic conviction--that in addition to the realities of fact, we have to accept the realities of the demands and possibilities of progress. Religions and churches are universally searching for inner renewal, and, moreover, they voice what they want: as the third millenium approaches, within the current signs of a new era, we see the appearance of the new man wanting to build a new society.

According to the undersecretary, it has become fashionable to be interested, even absorbed, by religion. Moreover, this has become a world phenomenon, too. Undoubtedly, it does not mean a "directly proportionate increase in piety, too." In our opinion, the emphasis presently is not on this. We should see the moral forces pointing toward a solution in a deepened absorption in the Gospels and Christ's teaching rather than in a numerical increase. Those who sense God's presence and its necessity in their innermost are not being carried toward the Church because of today's crises or fear or a search for "self-insurance" but because of the lack of a moral or spiritual solution to our present universal problems, because of a veritable moral downfall and crisis. We admit that in the case of youth, "those who lost their way" could be driven to escape toward religion because of certain complexes of psychological and intellectual frustrations, but here too the essence is a search for "human perfection and the formation of personal values" which again might be grasped and understood through the teaching of the Gospel.

#### Church Community Building and National Unity

The undersecretary makes an appeal to us concerning a serious omission: "In my opinion, our youth knows less than necessary about churches and religion. For this, the older generation is to be blamed. We failed to do something--hence there is a vacuum, a feeling of want. We have to fill it by making up for our omission. We need to teach the Bible in high school, but by whom and how? In addition, we also need more suitable and easy-to-understand handbooks of religious studies. Youth is curious and inquiring; they should not be stifled."

The Church Office for Teaching and the organizers of pastoral work have to take into consideration the needs and expectations of the faithful. "People, especially youth, need to belong to some kind of a community." Pastoral group work has to be based, according to the wish of Pope John Paul II, on "religious instruction," on the catechism. That is, the teaching of Christ's Gospel with a modern polarization: instead of selfish, prejudiced and exploiting man, we have to create the man who thinks and lives for others in the spirit of objectivity and altruistic inspiration. The family is society's cornerstone, and only through its members can we rebuild a healthy creative society living in the spirit of collective responsibility and for common happiness, "one great united family" to which every human being belongs. Finally, acknowledging and proclaiming the necessity of radical social changes, in the interest of social justice and peace, we have to take a stand for improving the fate of humanity and for averting the greatest disaster: a nuclear conflict.

Undersecretary Imre Mikes gives credit to the Christian churches for their work of saving people and building a nation: "Surely, church activists and preachers knock at doors even late in the evening, calling on families. Nobody who approaches them is turned away. Ideological conviction is conditioned on working with people and on building the framework needed for community life." In our days, the Church does not seek to draw attention through flashy actions in an utopian frame. Such external effect-searching or propaganda is in contradiction to its inner spiritual structure. The great need of our time

is the renewal of the framework of parish community, common rallying of the faithful belonging to the same parish, the satisfaction of people's needs to participate actively in external and internal church affairs, the possibility for young people to satisfy legally their spiritual needs through liturgy, Bible or prayer groups, thus bringing up believers and patriots of a truly Christian attitude. Moral education always serves the purposes of patriotic education. Finally, the parish communities need to organize the work of Christian human service for the aged and the inform through corporeal and spiritual acts of mercy.

The hierarchy of the bishops and the leaders of government should get together as soon as possible to discuss in mutual agreement all of the above because this is the only way to satisfy the urgent appeal of the Patriotic Popular Front to strengthen our national unity collectively.

By working to lay down these new foundations, we all sincerely deplore the fact that there are troublemakers in our ranks--priests as well as laymen--who unreasonably oppose government legality, thus endangering others. Let us hope that we will overcome these difficulties too. At the end, let us quote the undersecretary's closing remarks: "Trust, responsibility and patience are very much needed. Based on past good experiences, we hope that the cooperation of religious and nonreligious people will weather the new trials and will help the building of socialism, in the interest of a better life for all of us, for the peaceful and happy future of the Hungarian people." We do believe that we can live up to our commitments on the ground of the power of our religious conviction and build our common Hungarian fate according to expectations.

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'PERIPHERAL' JOURNAL DISCUSSES CULTURAL REFORM ROLE OF MEDIA

Debrecen ALFOLD in Hungarian No 5, May 83 pp 46-56

[Article by Pal Beke: "A Withered Institution or a Flowering on the Periphery?" First of a series debating the need for cultural reform in conjunction with economic reform]

[Text] A Few Thoughts About Community Culture

The thought is spreading in broader and broader circles that the policy of shaping the economic direction will not reach its goal if the reform is limited merely to the sphere of production and does not extend to all areas of life. From this broad topic we wish to deal in accordance with our profile with the necessity and opportunities of community culture, encouraging all who ply the trade to take a position and engage in the debate. We intended Pal Beke's article as an introduction to this exchange of ideas. (The editors.)

Dear Mr Editor,

I am writing this text in a bad mood, or more correctly, with reluctance to tackle the job--and you know how it is, wanting to stretch or postpone the deadline. It is not as if it did not make me feel good that you commissioned me, nor as if I had not felt it important to reflect on this topic. I myself also have a need for the summary, and the time has really come for this topic to receive publicity. Yet I feel my reluctance is well based. On the one hand, because what I will be writing about has for a long time been relegated to the peripheries, and for many people it is an uninteresting activity and institution. If we did not have a national holiday or two, when the dedications of a couple of cultural buildings made the headlines, many people may even think that this has not existed for a long time. But on the other hand, when speaking about this topic we cannot reel off lists of megawatts, tons, kilometers, hectare per ton ratios, export increases, or foreign currency forints; and there is no use in listing what we can, that is, numbers of participants, spectators or informative presentations. Activities that can fit into the collective name of community cultural improvement, which is my profession, cannot be measured with today's fashionable units, and the ones with

which they can be measured have bulky or mass characteristics, quite contrary to the essence of the thing. But I am also afraid that if I do not write with the necessary care, if I hurry, I will inevitably insult some colleagues or offices; but this time I don't even know if I can release those brakes which have been built into me, willingly or unwillingly, while in the state's service. I am convinced, of course, that all considerations which create the rounded-off say-nothingness with the structures of "on the one hand--on the other hand" and "even so--however" should be set aside. And finally my opinion is that to be on the periphery of society's attention is a sad and bitter thing, but may all the saints save us from being placed in the focus of attention in the way and to the extent as we were at one time. After all, it is possible here, too, to put things into order and magically to renew ourselves. And that this can be done our colleagues have been proving for a decade all over Hungary.

And now at this point, dear Mr Editor, I must explain myself again. Because how can I prove that they are proving it? Even if I had data, nowadays even they are not given the necessary credit. If I told stories, others would immediately refute them. Our words and examples have been devalued by the incantations of recent decades and by the half-completed experiments of the last decade. The texts have lost their meaning; those who want to make changes define, reason and justify things the same way as those who don't. The cliches which, considering my profession, live in almost everyone are oppressive, what with grand ballrooms, ceremoniously rising curtains, draped tables, major events with big to-dos, recountings of experiences with slide projection or painful silence at evenings of debate. To those to whom this means community culture (and to whom does it not?), I find it difficult to believe that it is also possible just to chat, to gab, to shoot the breeze; I am searching for the word to which necktie-wearing behavior does not attach. It is difficult to believe that bowling with a beer party, building a house by swapping help with friends, suggesting home furnishings in opposition to what the store offers, sewing, embroidery or weaving with a set of samples and tools and not locked into a time frame, working together on the leased land, raising hogs together, pruning the vineyard or cooking also belong in this category. And how could I prove the credibility, operation and human relationships of all these when none of them has caused national scandals, they have not been banned and there is nothing to unmask talking about them; how could a cultural home be interesting to someone who--because s/he does not live there--provides nothing and ensures nothing to the person? This institution is no avant-garde theatre nor an artistic movie house nor a club of the few, specializing in something. One does not have to travel here and appear there; one can use it in place, and that's all there is to it. That is, whichever can be and whichever is worth using.

I have come to a new step in my worries. There are quite a few, about 50 million, of us who visit these institutions each year. It may be presumed, of course, that this number of visitors, significant in itself, is not seen by the almost 3,000 cultural homes, but most of it by a quarter or a third of them, while the majority have very few visitors compared with the above numbers. This cannot be stated due to the lack of accurate data, but I am certain that the multistory palaces and the centers working with ample finances

and many workers started out with a more significant advantage in this race than the club libraries which can only afford to turn on the lights and heat only once or twice a week. Even though Hungarian citizens live in the settlements of these latter also. And it is probable that these are the very settlements where there are no other institutions such as theatres, movie houses, exhibit and concert halls where people could go. So the lack of proportion, the unjustifiable difference of the citizenry's opportunities cry out--but how can these be mentioned in these times which are called difficult? Needless to say, the sentences thus defined call for development, for investments and of course at the same time also for the criticism of a several-decades-old institutionalization policy. Or should we make no demands and not criticize; should we cover all this with the volume of people who visit these institutions, which is five times the population?

I must run a victory lap to the extent of one sentence, since it is no small thing to service such a large number of people (to come up with the programs, organize and execute them, make accountings as well as heat, light, and cleaning) with the increasingly tighter finances and the deteriorating facilities and equipment. It is no small thing, even if for the most part unnecessary. A gigantic performance, only for what?

I think, Mr Editor, now is the time for me to sweep away my fears and worries.

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The Hungarian dictionary defines the profession I learned, public cultural worker, as planned activity outside the school designed to raise the cultural level of the masses. And we were actually prepared to be knowledgeable professionals to teach culture, which is deemed acquirable. That is, someone somewhere declares what the standard is, what the level of culture is that is to be learned and reached and if others provide this who are capable of teaching and explaining it; then we are to sell them and their production in a planned manner. But we have also been trained to recognize the knowledge and experience necessary to learn on location in order to reach the desired level of culture and be able to organize acceptance and acquisition by our institutional means. We were taught the science, forms and methods of gaining this information and the ways of planning it. It was unavoidable that in the people thus set up in their careers an awareness of being regional commissioners of the cultural policy has developed, a sort of an avocation of being engineers of awareness and of the soul. It was unavoidable that they felt authorized to sort out cultural values, to judge without being judged. Because, naturally, they took the frequent apathy of the local people not as judgment but as being culturally undemanding; the public is stupid, you see, they don't want intellectual nourishment.

This basic position was also reinforced by the institutional system dealing with large numbers of the popular culture counselors and by the tradition of the cultural learning homes. This institution, imported after the year of the turnabout, soon created with its several thousand units a theretofore unknown quality. When it was established, people discovered that organizing and operating it eliminates the cultural monopoly--so-called--of the earlier

ruling class and that the masses by rapidly acquiring culture and by immediately learning and absorbing the sciences, the arts and the law and morals can work better, more accurately and with greater enthusiasm in the factories and the fields. It was also assumed that organized and guided discussion of the propagandist who explains the world, of the radio program heard together or of the newspaper read together will produce unidirectional thoughts (thoughts? judgments!). Thus the only task is to multiply these opportunities here and there, everywhere and at any cost, and to provide the audience, and our problems will be solved.

They will not be solved, we know it today. On the contrary, the cultural house which replaced the institutions, locations and opportunities of community cultural training which were organized, created and operated earlier in innumerable ways--the reading and people's circles, workmen's homes, casinos, associations or the singing choirs and theater groups which met somewhere only occasionally and the classic communal opportunities of the peasant past: the feather plucking or corn husking evenings, the grape festivals, the church patron saint's festivals--was unable to substitute for them. On the one hand, because it did not even really want to, and on the other hand, because even though it did support certain self-initiated activity, it allowed this only in the area of preferred artistic branches. Its existence was judged justified in contrast with the very communal cultural activity self-programmed earlier, since the cultural house organized cultural activity considered to be of a higher degree than those by providing a planned cultural "supply." In time the propaganda became dissemination of information and the chastoushka brigades literary theatres and the casual traveling shows organized program services; the clubs, deemed dangerous in earlier times, were allowed to organize later (after drawing up rules of the house and bylaws and creating togetherness based on regulated programs). A kind of a freer, less restricted activity began during the 1960s which encompasses a broader scale of the cultural values; but the institution's operational logic has hardly changed at all.

The nationalization of community cultural learning has destroyed more than the harm it caused [sic], but I should not be making fun of it because my throat all tightens up because of what we missed then and what keeps getting missed to this very day and because I know the way the memories of the age of founding it lives on, affects and functions on the hidden nerves of my profession, in spite of all denials. The way schematism inherited from that era dresses up into the scientific robes of "areas of learning" and the way its mechanical application creates identical activities in settlements with different traditions and cultures, the way the "cultural level" to be reached all over the country creates similar formats with identical contents by yearly actions which are to be implemented everywhere and the way the past lives on in the secret hiding places of work planning desired to be accurate, budgeted economic operation, and quantity-oriented statistics, in spite of all the progressive proclamations of the last decade. As if nothing had happened in the last 30-some years!

But many things did change. Broadcasting of information and entertainment by radio and television have become mass operations, and the book lending and

book sales networks have been built up. Informative broadcasts, newspapers and a large number of permanent departments in newspapers and publications want to catch up to the science of our era; multicolored inserts, informative printed material, magazines, exhibits, regional lectures, guest plays, books, radio and television programs to the arts of our age. Completed roads, scheduled transportation and the increasing number of private automobiles makes it possible to travel also in the interest of acquiring culture. And we are making significant efforts to provide proportional theatrical culture, to provide smaller settlements with programs, to furnish differentiated movie programs which satisfy the special needs and to provide regional radio and television programs which supply information from the megye. All these are significant even if we can measure the changes not in years but, unfortunately, in decades. The radios and television sets, tape recorders and record players, cameras and slide projectors are our natural tools even if--and I know it well --not every family has them; our record industry and program cassettes provide a huge selection even if there are many shortages and even if the classics are not singing from every set. Of course the list is far from being complete, because I could mention the growing numbers of museums and regional houses and the guided tours for learning about our country, for visiting museums and art relics or for learning about our regions and traditions. I did not strive for completeness since all this is only an indication: in addition to the cultural house, which at one time was created as the only source of cultural and educational learning, so many other things have been developed and built up, exert their effects and are operating in today's Hungary. It would be an illusion to believe that the cultural home is capable of guiding and influencing all these effects and attractions; and it would be silly to ignore these and organize the same things the same way as in the classic age of this institution. It is both funny and anachronistic that--generally on command from higher levels, but often because of the traditions of obsolete organizing activities, awareness of drilled-in avocation based on this, romantic spirit changing with the personality of the cultural agent, or quite the contrary, because of cultural policeman-like behavior--the cultural home prepares its working plan, its medium and long-range programs as if it and only it were responsible for cultural progress and able to do something about it. As if the things listed above did not exist and as if local or family traditions which determine the cultural behavior, productive and social culture which shape and define the whole, and the lifestyles, ways of living and life activities which conform to this, did not exist.

But, from a bird's eye view, we do exist. Wise debates and smart statements have explained, thorough evaluations, research and analyses have justified and declarations in determined tones of voice have recorded the needs for other types of cultural activities under the changed socio-economic conditions--and within this, for different activities to organize the community's cultural activities and those of the cultural homes. In the mid-1970s the professional who had earlier worked in popular culture, became a worker in public culture (meaning a worker for society's cultural and intellectual growth), which--if we think it over--is quite different from the job definition described above. I think this difference is also one of the reasons for our confused situation today; that we live in the era of "still and yet"; that everything that was and that could yet be, is present; that we have not

rejected that which could have that fate; and that we have not clearly accepted that which could be desirable for the future. And yet, there is no denying that--at least theoretically and at the level of the declarations--we have already progressed far from the implementing-organizing work of raising the cultural level of the masses in a planned way; and it was the flight of the idea of community culture, replacing the notion of providing culture for the public, which had expanded the tasks. The declarations defined in the synchronization of the early 1970s made the institution of community culture step forward from its earlier limited framework; that was when it became clear that its activity cannot be restricted to disseminating and relaying culture; that it has a part and a role in developing real public life, in expanding socialist democracy; and that it has an important role in developing the community's spirit, activity potential and public life activities and in shaping the ways and styles of living and behavior. The public culture concept acknowledges the multifaceted nature of the offerings of the cultural institutions and organizations developed over the last 30 years and emancipates the adult citizen. That is, it acknowledges that the cultural opportunities are used according to desires and need and has changed the notion of the people being given culture by someone into the population acquiring culture together.

Professional experiments which took the new opportunities seriously were organized in several areas during the mid-1970s to try them out and interpret them; this was also the case in the cultural homes. These latter were characterized by accepting to organize groups based on real interests and demand; to serve the everyday culture; to provide information about public life, culture and production; to allow free and unrestricted use of its buildings and facilities in such a way that it should almost just be an excuse for people to meet each other, learn about each other and at the same time catalyze intentional activity even for those who are not determined to acquire culture. Instead of predefined and accurate working plans, a hypothetical circumscription of things to do was born in some places; and not because of uncertainty but deriving from the recognition that the spontaneous individual and unexpected social demands and desires should be noted and served. Our community cultural education, which had lost its memory, began to explore its traditions, and the adaptation of the one-time workers' homes, reading and popular circles and cultural associations adjusted to our present circumstances really became a professional program.

The interrupted synchronization of the economy and society suspended this process in a strange way. The "still and yet" which has for quite a few years characterized the present situation and, it seems, has also taken shape for the longer range; the classic cultural home activity structure, which had been relaxing, has solidified; and the renewal process which began has slowed down. This or that could be classified as excellent nowadays, if anyone were to classify this activity or institution which has been swept to the peripheries. The meaning of words, the power of examples have dulled because of this sudden stall. Due to the lack of another yardstick, quantity became the ruler again, but even this does not command much credit. Those who experience the sense of loss are abandoning the profession, and the prestige of the institutions and the activity is not elevated by the untrained masses replacing

them. But there are those who consider this stalemate situation to be only an appearance; the writer of these lines is one of them. These latter feel that it is our fundamental social interest that the cultural home--like many other institutions--should finally become identified by itself. In what follows, I will explore the possible stages of this.

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The purpose and meaning of all cultural institutions and of the activities, the culture acquisition process they organize and offer, are that people should become aware of and develop their abilities and capabilities as early and thoroughly as possible; that thereby their self-fulfillment should become as complete as possible; that, having learned about the closer and the broader worlds which surround them, they should find their ways in it and shape it; that they accept the other man as a cooperating partner; and that their way of life, view of the world and knowledge be modern and capable of change and growth. The many kinds of cultural and mass information institutions, organizations and systems all organize and carry out their work for this purpose in their characteristic and specific ways; the cultural home is no exception from this. However, while those who take advantage of, or make use of all the others, cannot have a direct say in the functioning and operation, content and programming of them and while the individual can only take advantage of the selection of opportunities the system offers, the cultural home is a local communal cultural institution in which the desires and self-initiated activities of those who live (or work) there--related to culture, public life and social togetherness meet a system of conditions which provides for this. This is how the cultural home becomes the scene of the really active and creative activities of those who live in the community and of the spontaneously organized groups. Thus it truly helps self-implementation, the awakening and development of the creative ability, the formation of groups by citizens with similar abilities, interests and circles of interests, with its professionals, information, facilities and financial support. Beyond all this, its local character is also expressed by the fact that the information and cultural program it offers, occasionally or continuously, is related to the economic, production, social and ways-of-living formats of its own surroundings (settlement, part of a settlement or factory), and its entire activity's purpose and sense are to help solve the tasks and problems which derive from this by offering alternatives to it, providing examples and initiating cultural processes.

The key words of a cultural home and of the community cultural program are volunteering, self-initiated activity, interests, interest in something, so that when we speak about an activity and about the institution helping that activity, we don't have to emphasize at all costs and primarily that the cultural "level is being raised," as this can only be the task of the overall Hungarian cultural policy (and I will even expand this: of the social policy) and of its institutional systems. And even less can we speak about "supply" of this nature; this can refer to electricity, drinking water, fresh bread, meat or milk, if it can be made to refer to those. In no way may one speak about directives and actions which program the contents of this activity nationally; the community cultural programs and the cultural homes, their

institutionalized organizers, must reflect their operational regions and the people who live there and not each other.

Though I am not using them as synonyms, the words naturally follow each other: community culture, cultural home. The former, community culture, obviously can be organized not only in cultural homes. Activity groups, clubs, amateur artist groups, movements to learn about the country and about a region, about its history, as well as reading and touring groups and others are also formed in schools, museums and libraries and alongside social and mass organizations, and knowledgeable operation obviously increases their success. In spite of their large number according to the statistics, it is my opinion that the task of all these institutions and organizations is fundamentally different, as the cultural home is called upon expressly to organize the community's cultural program. This is what it is for. Besides agitation and propaganda and the cultural "bringing to level," this was the very thing it received as its third function when it was established, even though I know, of course, how much the self-initiated artistic activity accepted into the institution was made the maidservant of the former two. But with the passing of severe times they are freed from the excessively directed regulation, and within the framework of the opportunities provided by the institution, the relative autonomy not only of the groups but also of the people participating in them is enviable. Because s/he can do whatever s/he wants to: sing, dance, play music, work with puppets, watch the stars, collect bugs, take air samples, embroider or sew, do one of the 168 kinds of activities listed during the course of a study of cultural homes by the authorities. Their situation is almost idyllic: they are measured by their own abilities, industry and knowledge. Freedom suited to the other person's tolerance is created in their midst, which is significantly different from the system of customs of the world outside the groups. Beyond the joy of creating, this is a byproduct of such value that it is one of the highest values, even if in that certain outside world it is the source of conflicts with behavior that becomes determined and deliberate. Under our cooling social and human conditions this is one of those precious few fires by which we can warm ourselves.

Of course, our performance-oriented world often attacks this idyllic picture; the maintaining force demands production, and often also an income; the maintainer's maintainer, success, gold, silver or at least a bronze level from somewhere. The real one is the one who can travel abroad; the one in demand only within the borders should have his expenses paid; and why does the one exist who is not invited anywhere? The trills are heard, of course, that the whole thing is for the community, but the ones who say them are also handing out the medals. We cannot yet imagine values without medals, but there are already many who thumb their noses at it.

Even though there would be things to be expected from these groups. Its members are making progress in their own artistic education; they are people accelerated in social-communal growth. Many of them have an excellent understanding of what they are doing, and the great majority of them are filled with communal experience. We should make more intensive use of the knowledge and experience accumulated in them in the kindergartens, special study circles



of the schools and the daycare centers, colleges, workers' hotels and youth clubs. Even though the most industrious of them are made suitable to lead groups, this is a long training process. We should have results sooner than that! Because today amateur artistic groups, study groups, seminars, clubs may operate in places and only in places where there is a professional able to prove his abilities with a document; those who want to may not dance, sing, embroider, experiment, recite poetry or build models elsewhere. Our institutions which lack professionals do not need professors; "trained" workers also suffice. No matter how profane this sounds, I believe that having clothes designing or sewing, clay modeling, chamber music or any branch of the fine arts--and I could list the 168 kinds of activities already mentioned--in a community, having it locally available, is an elementary part of the right to culture specified in the constitution. And even if everything cannot be offered in the community, then it is the national obligation of the regional cultural home to organize all this in the city in such a way that it should still be possible to commute home in the evening.

But this is still the traditional system. England's correspondence university, known also from the television, travels on the borders of higher education, but I consider the likewise well-known Scandinavian study group activity to be a part of my profession. It does not offer a license enabling one to obtain a primary job, and why should it, when in this case also, knowledge is an excuse to organize the community and society? Its domestic adaptation made its trial run in this country in Hajdu-Bihar; this attempt was terminated by a publication issued in a small number of copies and a conference in close circles. We should be more courageous! We have all the necessary conditions to make it nationwide; we have huge intellectual organizations and those have general and specialty branch groups in the megyes and cities; and we also have respected cultural centers as organizations in cities where industry, higher education and administration concentrate a significant number of intellectuals. We are also currently producing educational materials and tapes and films used in community cultural programs. With their joint cooperation why couldn't we set up an educational format to supply information for any kind of interest, to encourage self-education by correspondence and to bring people of similar interests together?

The community cultural program and its institution, the cultural home, have been forced out to the peripheries not by higher-level decision, but primarily because the great majority of the population does not care about what it does or what it offers. But what if we once tried to be truly available to them, to satisfy everything and everyone--the mass needs in the community, the general ones in the regional centers and the rare ones by means of correspondence and educational material? Whomever is interested in whatever, if anyone has the time for it and if they want it.

I wrote, "want it." There is no denying that there is a significant mass which wants nothing in this area. "They are not interested in culture," we wave a hand, and by doing so we create a category of a half a country immaterial to us, even though they do work somewhere. They make friends, they get married. They expect and raise children. They get an apartment, build a

house, furnish it, then remodel it. They have a household plot or garden, washing machine, car. They have vacations, and they travel. Their child chooses a career. Anyone can expand this and continue it for himself, but it is simpler to say it this way: they live. Our life is full of decisions even if it is only to build a fence, repair a machine, buy an easy chair or plant some plants. Of course their knowledge is determined by many things, but it can be assumed that consideration is given among them to those received by tradition from the grandparents, heard from the neighbor or attested to by the friendly jack-of-all-trades of the neighborhood. Of course, the furthest thing from my mind is to lump all those who do not spontaneously participate in community education or those who at the most visit the cultural center when the traveling troupes put on a show there, under the same hat. But that much is certain that their disinterest is not to be resolved by intrigue so that they would progress to Chekhov, and that much is also for certain that they are not coming to listen to Hungarian folk songs so that years later they could come to the same place to enjoy a woodwind quintet with their eyes closed. And that much is also for certain that it is insulting to them, and also to culture deemed more valuable, to have a poster hung next to the assembly line in the chicken factory or to have the ball interrupted by showing parts from an opera. Our birdlimes, the so-called "activators" or "attention getters," thought to be disseminators of information, would be funny if they did not shatter the popular cultural desire which deserves better and if they did not deepen the chasm between the person without motivation and the artistic creation.

Most people would be paying attention to the practical life, to a livelihood even if our world did not force them to do so; they want to live and live better, and this is a sufficiently natural desire. If he is building a house, then by that, or if he is working on his household plot, then by that. We can do nothing else than provide him with orientation in this, that is, in whatever is a realistic situation and a real problem to him at the time. To him, the path to culture is the vineyard, fixing his car or planting seedlings and not something else. It is comprehensible and understandable that this is where he must be given information, shown alternatives or even have several variations demonstrated. Not in the hope that after being helped to make the right decision he will in gratitude become a member of the chamber choir, but because the thinking after familiarization with the variations, the weighing that precedes the decisionmaking, the justification which accompanies the decision, and later evaluation of the correctness (incorrectness) of the decision are cultural processes even in themselves and are just as valuable as finding out who knows more about the Great Nebula of Andromeda. Let there be no misunderstanding here: the latter is no disadvantage, but the former is more desirable.

The affairs of our public life can be discussed, our democracy can grow and smart and economical production and consumption can be had only with citizens able to gather information, willing to think and experienced in making decisions. It is not immaterial what the school of this is composed of: only from headline articles and TV newscasts or also from an atmosphere at the place of work which lines up realistic problems and from experience in public

administration. And perhaps it would not be immodest of me to think that the cultural home can also have a place and role in this process. It has tried and experimented with thinking, evaluation, justification and, judging with its members of the speciality groups, seminars, amateur groups and clubs. With its visitors who travel a road of individual education, by providing them with orientation through information. With the interested parties who had grown out of the house construction advisory programs and who now build houses in groups for each other, with those who are planning a joint grape harvest after receiving grape pruning information and with those who started out using a motorized hoe as a sample on loan and formed a garden lovers association.

Offering activities based on interests and seeking information have long ago infiltrated the walls of the cultural home because of financial necessities. The registration fees from special study groups and seminars and the ticket prices of events they organize provide for the operation of the institution, since in many places the state subsidy they receive is not enough even for the record keeping. (Of course, one could analyze by what rights the supervision can demand local implementation of the central cultural policy when they do not provide the conditions for professional operation, but let's avoid this trap: if they don't, they don't.) We could, of course, select the solution they used in a cultural home in Csongrad megye: they sold first the construction materials purchased for remodeling because they had no money, then the more expensive pieces of their professional equipment, then one-third of the chairs. (The question automatically presents itself, why the director of the cultural home is always held responsible for the cultural performance, and why not the local leadership for the lack of conditions?) But if we don't just yet want to close down the institution, we could also elect to vegetate on while awaiting better times, and until then we will maintain the cultural home (to use the slang of "local needs") by renting it out and by traveling shows, but why? Just as a half a century ago, the main hall of the local restaurant is plenty good for this. And we could also elect to raise the ticket prices all the way to the stars in the sky, in the interest of our survival: let them pay if they want to see it! But they and we have already paid, from their wages and ours, as the amount from which social benefits of this nature are financed and have already been deducted once from the profits of our work. So why should we have to pay twice?

But are we down to our last reserves? Aren't there even many products of the special learning circles in our satchel, which we could sell and thereby create new monetary sources for ourselves and for their creators? Couldn't the supply shortages and at the same time also the lacking horticultural knowledge be supplemented by the mutually advantageous sale of the products of the garden lovers operating within the fold? And in cases of shortage of services, couldn't business deals be implemented by the demanding amateurs which would be mutually advantageous and useful to the buyers? In possession of our buildings, facilities and equipment, couldn't we have a part of the youth and village tourism? Couldn't we organize a whole series of special creative camps for those who could try out their abilities in the weaving, whittling, basket weaving, blacksmith and other shops the existence of which

seems so natural to us here? Couldn't we be the enterprising guides and salespersons for the local natural, architectural and historical values and souvenirs? Naturally this listing could continue, and my opinion is that if the path were free and if we were not hindered by customs and monopolistic sales rights, if these were accepted as activities which could also be organized by the cultural homes, there would be people to make use of it, there would be those who would participate in it, and there would be someone who would try to organize it. Having implemented these things, hopefully some day we will step beyond the "special study circle-club-amateur group" holy trinity which until now has been accepted as the community activity of the cultural home. And not in contrast with it, but in addition to it.

One good example for the pharisaical behavior is that even though the financial conditions of operation are not ensured, we receive with doubt and do not expedite the thing which could help the problem without burdening the central budget. One has to be two-faced to talk about the opportunities and improvement of culture when the cultural homes are hardly operating or not at all in most of our settlements, or perhaps there even aren't any. And this is hypocritical even if we know well the general enrichment of our cultural environment. But everybody knows that the TV, the radio, the newspaper, the book, the exhibited object, the theatrical play, the film or the picture on the wall is not enough. The other person is missing from it.

Nothing proves better the diagnoses of scientific social analyses which record the lack of community than the fact that over a hundred associations, which themselves organize community cultural programs, registered in response to the first official initiative--during the course of which several national organs promised small assistance in terms of equipment. The shortage is so great that this many applied in spite of the short deadline of the official announcement; what would happen if the initiatives coming from the lower levels did not have to be expedited from above, but rather if they would all bloom by themselves on the soil of society's general mood? Would our present groups and communities perhaps become unnecessary? Perhaps our network of cultural homes would become unnecessary?

I don't think so. If someone wants to learn or acquire something from a professional leader and from associates with similar interests and abilities, s/he would do this even if other companies besides this would be available to him/her. Belonging not to just one but to several groups and the opportunity of spending time, being entertained and acquiring culture there are even desirable. But for the time being our problem is not the confusion of abundance but quite to the contrary, that there is no place to go. It is a rather natural thing that also the above-mentioned contests were intended primarily for the population of newly created areas with a lack of social communities: for the housing complexes built as a result of large-volume apartment construction and for those settlements because of the shrinking of which the apartment complexes became necessary: the small villages. That is, this shortage is most conspicuous at the two extremes of our populated settlements. In the apartment complexes there is no institution or building yet to provide space for and organize the community's cultural program, and

there won't be one presumably for a long time because of our investment difficulties; and in the small villages and grange centers these functions have already been closed down, regionalized.

The theater, the movie, exhibits, concerts and the equipment-intensive special study circles can be regionalized, even more so because after all it is unimaginable to provide everything everywhere, and it is very probable that in order to satisfy his curiosity and interests, man is willing to travel some. But it is unimaginable to create a location at a distance of several kilometers or a half or three-quarters of an hour from the residence for spontaneous meetings, for shooting the breeze, a place for someone just to stop in. Where one can always celebrate a name-day, play chess, play cards, knit, embroider together or taste someone's homemade wine. Where one can use or rent a photo-enlarger, workshop equipment, farm spraying equipment or movie projector, even more so because they bought it for themselves by joint decision and with joint money. Where, if that is how they all decided, one can hold weddings and funeral wakes, baptismal parties and wedding anniversaries, celebrate New Year's Eve together or have name-day dances. Which is a roof over togetherness, nothing more, and does not pretend to be anything more. Where, of course, the doctor can be invited if some illness concerns several people, and where the council member can be invited to give a report on what he has done and why.

So that our residential settlements would be not only silos for manpower, so that the lack of a "role" of our small villages should not result in being exiled and so that people would feel at home in their places of residence, we must elevate their accidental proximity to each other to human relationships. By administrative tools, we can help them organize themselves into cultural, sport, village beautification or free-time associations; we can promote their organization into residential, popular front, tradesmen's or village clubs, by giving them for use the onetime public facilities not in use now, the unused rooms of the apartment complexes and the facilities of the cultural home which is used only occasionally for programs from the regional center. By our financial opportunities, by providing them with construction materials for their community projects and by contributing to their equipment and furnishings. By our cultural program opportunities, by having the experts take their programs and intentions there at times--and we can help them meaningfully by preparing or obtaining informative and educational material for them--or by lending them equipment.

The real victory of the community cultural idea is the renaissance of the old formats and organizations of our community cultural programs, their self-initiated and self-programmed organization, partially or completely independent from the institutions of the cultural authorities. But it would not be a problem if the office managers and those who direct production would know more about the importance of cultural programs and about the institutions which organize it from the viewpoint of our progress and that the future of community culture will rise or fall on whether the citizen requires it and wants it where he lives. On whether he takes part in it if the opportunities are given, and on whether he helps shape it, if there is anything

to shape. On whether he will demand it for himself if there is someone to demand it from, and on whether he will create it for himself if he is left alone. There is an unheard-of large task awaiting the cultural homes and us, public cultural agents, if we accept all this. Because otherwise we can stay where we are now: on the peripheries.

8584

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DEBATE OF EARLY 1900's CONSIDERED TIMELY

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Apr 83 p 9

[Article by Gyorgy Litvan: "Timelessness of the Century's Early Decades"]

[Text] The Hungarian Political Science Association held a scientific debate on 25 March about the principles of the turn of the century. The session was organized by the department of political theory and history. Janos Peter, the association's chairman, also participated in the session. After introductions by Tibor Hajdu and Ferenc Tokei, the session continued with the presentations of high-ranking scientific researchers. We are publishing below the lecture of historian Gyorgy Litvan.

It is really not easy to say anything new about the progressive political thinking of the early part of this century to a knowledgeable audience within the framework of a few minutes of comment. In the last one-and-a-half or two decades we have written and talked quite a lot and with a variety of emphasis about this topic. Thus, without any detailing and evaluation of the contents, I would like to pose a few questions rather briefly only in reference to whether our crisis-filled end of the century sheds any new light on their roles and to the pioneering they began just about 80 years ago.

Perhaps we can risk the statement that the turn of the century had the last politicized and intellectual generation in Hungary--I am referring here to the entire generation, not just to its so-called progressive wing--which sought passable ways apparently not yet in a directly forced situation. From the social and national viewpoints this generation was still "within the property," and thus it could have rather felt that its own and the country's fate were in its own hands. But the deeper-thinking minority with its more sensitive nervous system and conscience also sensed that this calm era, this being within the property, was nearing its end. And perhaps the meeting of these two feelings, of self-confidence and restlessness, provided the incentive and impetus for that not everyday work which this "second reform generation" accomplished largely in a decade and a half, mostly between the ages of 20 and 40, with the hurried belief that "it can still be done today, but this is the last moment."

Actually, because of the backwardness of the country's development this was work tailored for not one but two generations, two different kinds of work, and the two could not coincide in terms of time in either the more developed or the less developed countries. And for the sake of seeing clearly, it does not hurt to differentiate between them in our country either.

The first job the reform generation did with great resolution and with truly "radical" consistency was to develop the system of requirements, the system of standards for a modern democracy and, in parallel with this, a courageous and annihilating criticism of the "Hungarian wasteland." Jaszi, who was the most active and most conscious figure of the struggle, wrote with justification: "It has happened for the first time since the transformations of '48 [1848] that a larger and organized group of the Hungarian ideologists openly broke with all the traditions of the official, the nobility's state philosophy and publicisms, and embarked on a position of severe criticism against them in the interest of the oppressed classes of the people, using the scientific arsenal of modern sociology."

It will be sufficient to indicate only by title words that the issues involved here were the defense, further development, and expansion of the achievements of liberalism up to that point, of the existing rights of freedom; introduction of the general voting rights expanded also for the popular masses, that is, of the real popular representation system to overcome the executive powers in the hands of a gentry practically without any constitutional supervision; separation of church and state, equality of rights for the nationalities, creation of healthy morals in the public life and in the press and similar things, but at the same time also the economic and cultural conditions for these: overcoming the condition of "morbus latifundii", agricultural reform, and reform of the public education and public culture.

It is hardly necessary to prove that this simultaneously critical and constructive activity is a lasting value of the Hungarian political thinking, even more so since this democratic system of conditions was never able to become completely and lastingly realized. In several respects even today it exists only in the sphere of words and desires. But we did progress at least to the point that today we value highly--in the context of the past--this clearly democratically oriented activity of the reform generation.

But there are that many more problems with the other branch of their activity, seeking the path to the future, which even at that time they conducted with much less decisiveness and agreement than the former, rather with some kind of feverish feeling around, reading and thinking passionately and arguing among themselves and doing so in addition mostly during the first decade of the century, in the youthful years of the Sturm and Drang. We know well that they sought the laws to explain and solve everything, the theory of salvation or the recipe sometimes in Spencerism, sometimes in Marxism, sometimes in social Darwinism, in Georgeism and in other theories, and sometimes in the various marriages of these, since they all considered the bourgeois democracy only as a transitional stage.



But later, as they dug deeper into modern sociology and as they were beginning to "discover" Hungary and the real society, the attractive force of the salvation theories decreased to most of them and their youthful faith in the scientific planability of politics became shaken. In 1910 Ervin Szabo also gives a strongly skeptical answer to his own question, "Is scientific politics possible?" and expects gradual, slow rationalization of the social action only in the more distant future, when freedom and intellectualism provided by the world's economy and by socialism will gain space. And at the same time a democratic reform concept ripens in Jaszi which instead of utopias and dogmas starts out from actual social needs, breaks with the antinational pose and antireligious windmill fight (but not with the struggle against chauvinism and clericalism!), wants to strengthen the landowning peasantry and middle classes rather than make them disappear and instead of the historical and cultural "tabula rasa" tries to build on the viable and valuable traditions. A new type of political left began to take shape here, but one which could not develop roots and develop due to numerous objective and subjective factors.

Even for Jaszi this tendency became fully conscious only later in the 1930s, but as we look at it with today's eye there is hardly a doubt that the fateful isolation of the progressive Hungarian politics could have been eliminated by traveling in some direction of this type. Instead, we used to blame Jaszi and several of his associates largely because of these very efforts of theirs--earlier in the form of accusations, today more in the form of excuses. Because it represents a difference not in ideology but only in style to mention eclecticism, favoring a third way, reformism or vacillating revolutionaryism as an accusation or an excusable shortcoming which can be explained by the circumstances.

I don't know whether we have the right to accuse or excuse Jaszi and his associates and whether they need excuses at all, when the forced theoretical and practical reconstruction of the building built according to the principles he once questioned is taking place in front of our very eyes. Do we have the right to talk about eclecticism when the world over a similar supplementation of Marxism is taking place within the schools of Marxism, with which they tried to work in their youth, those who at least took the purity of the individual theories seriously? Does it make sense to talk about favoring a third path at the very time we are busy reviving the market economy and the enterprising spirit? Can we keep mentioning reformism and class cooperation when this is the official policy of the communist parties today in the whole Western Europe (and also in many other places)? Can we blame the state of Eastern Switzerland when we bitterly experience that even the countries of the socialist camp have been unable to solve satisfactorily the problem of antagonistic nationalities and of the minority nationalities?

However, in one respect we must admit that the severe critics are right: the Jaszi group really did vacillate, worry, and fret a lot. Because they would have liked to coordinate such difficult-to-fit pairs of contrasts that the old liberalism and old dogmatism recognized only one side of them.

Individualism, freedom of the individual, with socialist collectivism.

A flourishing, well-operating economic life with socialist institutions.

Protection of the national interest with international solidarity and brotherhood.

Reformism which counts on the realities and traditions with revolutionaryism, that is, to find that necessary measure of the changes which does in fact bring changes but does not unnecessarily cause a wound on the sensitivities of the large masses.

During the past 70-80 years we have learned that these pairs of contrasts do indeed belong together very much. Only together do they make life bearable. If anything connects the peoples of the world together, today it is that they are trying to coordinate these things, each in its own different way. After many bitter experiences and after questioning many kinds of recipes, we have also returned to the questions the beginning of the Hungarian century posed.

8584

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## CUSTOMS REGULATIONS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES NOTED

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 4 May 83 p 5

[Text] Among the countries bordering on Hungary, Austria permits the duty-free import of articles for personal use, clothing, underwear, books, jewelry, medicines, small-sized sports equipment, kayaks, canoes, rowboats, cameras, movie cameras, one portable musical instrument, tape recorders, radios, typewriters and baby carriages, wheelchairs. Passengers over the age of 17 may import 2 liters of wine, 1 liter of hard liquor, 200 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams tobacco per person for their own use. Travelers may carry 400 shillings worth of gifts to their relatives and friends living in Austria. It is permitted to take out of Austria without a customs permit 1,000 cigarettes or 200 cigars or 1 kilogram of tobacco, any amount of alcoholic beverage and one-fourth liter perfume in an unsealed bottle. No customs permit is required to export 12,000 shilling worth of merchandise and 15,000 shilling cash money. For exporting merchandise over this value, as well as for excess amounts of cash, a permit from the Bank of Austria is needed.

Czechoslovakia permits duty-free importation, for the duration and purpose of the trip, of articles and food for personal use and gifts worth not more than 600 crowns. Importation of pure alcohol is forbidden. Duty-free export of the following is permitted: travel articles, 300 crowns worth of gifts received or purchased, furthermore, for persons over 18 years of age, 1 liter of alcoholic beverage, 2 liters of wine, 250 cigarettes or a corresponding quantity of other tobacco products per person. With Bureau of Customs authorization and payment of 100 percent duty the following are exportable from the country: inflatable mattresses and rubber boats, tents, sleeping bags, all kinds of sports equipment, carpets, articles of cut glass, household china, enamel and aluminum wares, chandeliers, materials for electrical and other conductors as well as building materials.

Yugoslavia too permits the duty-free importation of travel articles and camping equipment. In addition, articles valued at 1,500 dinars might be imported; 200 dinars worth of these articles are duty-free; for the rest, a customs duty has to be paid. According to Yugoslav foreign exchange regulations, 1,500 dinars cash can be taken into the country yearly for the first entry, but only 500 dinars at every subsequent entry; the rest can be carried in checks.

To Romania, in addition to articles for personal use, as much food may be imported as needed for the duration of the trip. Romanian authorities grant to travelers over 16 years of age the duty-free importation of 2 liters of alcoholic beverages, 4 liters wine or beer and 200 cigarettes per person. Tourists can carry duty-free gifts valued at no more than 2,000 lei. They are not entitled to import or export food. From Romania, one's own travel articles as well as a total of 1,000 lei worth of goods, with proof that it was paid for with foreign currency, may be taken out of the country free of duty. Further merchandise of not more than 500 lei value may be exported by paying customs duty of 20 percent, and, in excess of these goods, up to the limit of 5,000 lei value, by paying customs duty of 40 percent. Food can be exported in very small fixed quantities only, by paying a 100 percent customs duty in foreign currency. Even so, export of the following articles is prohibited: meat, vegetable oils, sugar, rice, wheat and cornmeal, coffee, cocoa, olives, honey, pure alcohol, fruits, vegetables and imported spices.

To the Soviet Union, travelers can import duty-free articles of personal use, food, beverages and tobacco as needed for the duration of the trip. Only persons over the age of 16 may import alcoholic beverages and tobacco in quantities of not more than 1 liter of hard liquor, 2 liters of wine, 250 cigarettes or corresponding tobacco products per person. Without paying customs duty, one can carry out of the Soviet Union the articles for personal use previously imported, tourist and sports equipment, merchandise purchased for personal use and souvenirs of small value.

12214

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# EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR GRADUATES DISCUSSED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Apr 83 p 9

[Article: "23,000 Jobs for 10,000 Graduates. University Graduates Entering Job Market"]

[Text] At the end of the present academic year, 14,000 day-time students will finish their studies. Of these, 3,200 have social scholarships, 400 are for foreign citizens--that is, 10,400 are looking for a job. Companies and institutions are advertising 23,300 jobs for them. The significant majority of the university graduates finishing their studies will have the opportunity to find positions in their chosen profession. In most of the professions, job advertisements outnumber graduates.

Every technical university graduate has a choice between four jobs, at least two of which are in Budapest. Graduates of technical academies have the same proportion of job prospects. However, besides these favorable opportunities, there are problems too. In the categories of civil engineering, road construction and maintenance, railway mechanics and transportation automation, there are only 67 jobs advertised for 92 graduates. Meanwhile, the academies applied for help to higher authorities and there is hope that some of the jobs in the capital will not be filled because half of the students will graduate elsewhere.

This year, fewer economists and business economists are needed; compared with last year's 4.6, the number of per capita job opportunities decreased by about one and a half. This is particularly true in the job market for graduates in the professions of international and foreign trade, transportation and shipping.

In the field of agrarian higher education, job opportunities are twofold and while there is less need for professionals in the agricultural cooperatives and state farms, this means only a limitation of choice and does not affect the opportunity to work.

One thousand two hundred and seventy-three students entitled to compete will graduate in the field of public health. There are 1,519 positions advertised for competition. This year again, it seems likely that some of the doctors and dentists will not accept jobs in the country, even under favorable conditions, but will persist to obtain a position in the capital.

For non-teacher university graduates of the arts and sciences, 255 jobs are advertised for 276 graduates of law schools. Nonetheless, it is likely that those who graduated from law school at the beginning of the year had succeeded in finding jobs because no employment problems have been reported to the ministry. Six hundred and seventy jobs have been advertised for 387 science faculty graduates. A scholarship for sciences, announced by the Committee for Qualifications of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, to be awarded in the second quarter, will help these graduates to make their choice. Most of the advertised jobs are not always what young people expect: graduates prefer jobs in research institutions, yet these are hard to find among the jobs advertised. This year, 194 liberal arts graduates are eligible to compete. In all likelihood, just as in past years, the majority of these students will find suitable work only in a field related to their qualifications, or after a long waiting period, because the companies and institutions offer jobs only to 50 percent of the graduates.

For the 4,400 college graduates in the teaching profession, 7,600 jobs have been advertised. In response to the need of public education and the expectation of graduates, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs has decided not to put a number limitation on staff to the county positions to be advertised. According to job advertisements of 15 April and published in every institution of teacher training, there are 135 kindergarten, 205 elementary school, 176 junior high school, 380 special education and 120 music teacher and 137 high school teacher positions available for every 100 graduates respectively. According to the job advertisements, benefits for those starting a career have improved. Especially for elementary school teachers, starting salaries and relocation aid are higher, and there are more offers to solve housing problems too. In the institutions for teachers' training, applications have to be made by 3 May.

12214

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SOCIAL, ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES DISCUSSED

Budapest KOZNEVELES in Hungarian 1 Apr 83 pp 4-5

[Interview with Zsuzsa Ferge, sociologist, by Robert Gal: "To Reduce Inequalities"]

[Text] [Question] What sort of phenomena force sociology to deal intensively with social inequalities?

[Answer] In our society there are many institutions which distribute important goods and opportunities so that very many people should share in them satisfactorily. In their case we cannot say that they are members of society with full "rights" because too many are left out of everything. I am in the habit of formulating this briefly by saying that their physical and social life chances lag behind what is customary, behind the average or normal, what is accepted in society. Physical life chances include health and death and what suffering people live with. Inequality is not important in itself, rather it is important because of the briefly listed consequences.

[Question] Does every social-economic form produce or reproduce its own inequalities? What unique aspects characterize a socialist society?

[Answer] What I have said thus far applies to socialist society. If there were ever in history societies where inequality did not appear sharply, they were small, economically undeveloped societies with a relatively simple structure. Very essential inequalities, much more serious and more destructive than ours, always developed later. So we are not saying that our inequalities are greater or more tragic than these but rather that they are significant compared with our level of economic development and our social ideals.

[Question] If we tried to rank social inequalities in order of importance which ones would you put in first place--as the most important and involving the most tension?

[Answer] The most important inequalities and those involving the most tension are not necessarily the same. What causes the greatest tension is that which is most admitted. But the most serious is that which determines all the rest. It is probable that income and property inequalities cause the most tension today. But from the viewpoint of the entire system of inequality

these are not so important to me as the fundamental relationships, what I would call the background questions: what sort of inequalities come into being in the organization of social work, how exclusion from power results in inequality, the sort of inequalities created by one's relationship to knowledge. It is customary today to compare freedom and equality on the basis of very important 19th-century theories. The price of greater equality is alleged to be less freedom. But I would join those according to whom equality and freedom are concepts closely interlinked. I raise the question of power and knowledge because in these areas one can achieve more freedom and more equality simultaneously.

[Question] What sort of inequalities arise in the organization of social work?

[Answer] In order to give an answer we must first define the quality of types of work. Some types of work have developed historically in such a way that one can make use of his various talents and thus be autonomous to some extent. There are types and spheres of work which limit talent, deprive one of the opportunity of being master of his own work or of having an influence on the work of others. Many are completely at the mercy of those who define the goal of their work, who may even say under what conditions and in what way that work should be done. So the organization of social work and the technology and social work relationships built thereon are such that one man has more chance to develop his own talents and define his own work than others have. Those who do work all their lives which limits their talents and permits no sort of autonomy suffer this inequality in many respects. If work does not demand much from a person, then in the majority of cases his life will not be demanding in general in other areas--in public affairs, style of life, etc.

[Question] The inequalities arising in the acquisition of knowledge may be the most obvious and the most dealt with.

[Answer] In the past 20 years Hungarian sociology has dealt much with the causes, processes and nature of inequalities realized via education and inherited between generations. It may be that educational sociology is one of the most developed branches of domestic sociology. I cannot say much new about this. It is well known that society, the social structure, makes the organization of social work such that very many use very little knowledge in it. The school can do no more than prepare the children to fit into this structure in some way. The children are given much more knowledge than many will use or profit from later, and this gives rise to strong tensions.

If the schools are to work better then the social structure must progress in the direction of change. The schools and the teachers have relatively little room for maneuver otherwise. I consider myself an optimist; I believe that the sphere of action of the schools is not entirely determined, that they could do more to reduce inequalities--by liberating certain forces, energies and internal reserves. In the economy--necessarily--a number of measures have been born and are being born to start more modern renewing processes. It would be important for this aspiration to spread to other areas of life



and thus to the schools too. I call this the liberation of energies, which means that the schools, and the teachers therein, should be given more scope by society to define their own work and the tasks connected with the children. This "new mechanism" has not yet reached the schools.

[Question] The third great area of social inequality is the relationship to power, participation or exclusion. What sort of inequalities does sociology observe here?

[Answer] I can answer this question only by staying within the limits of my own competence. The very simple answer to the question of why we have the sort of power we do is that it is not yet democratic enough. This is an answer which everyone knows and there are very many genuine efforts to decentralize and democratize participation in power, in making decisions and having supervision over decisionmaking. Others formulate this by saying that a greater role must be given to its public nature.

It is also well known that the institutions of the power structure are not yet democratic enough. There are many historical reasons for this which are not worth going into now. I would make only one observation. We must separate central decisions from local decisions. The direct participation of society cannot be realized in central decisions. The possibilities of direct democracy are limited in making and preparing decisions. At the local level, in local public administration, there is a greater opportunity--and no special preparation is needed for this--for people to inform the decisionmaking bodies of their needs, to participate in decisionmaking directly in person or through delegates, to get information and have a way to express their opinions.

[Question] If there are so many social inequalities behind social phenomena, is the "general desire" to put equality in the place of inequality justified?

[Answer] Theoretically, equality is a concept standing at a different level than inequality. When I speak of reducing inequalities, I am not saying that we must achieve equality. What inequalities determine the life opportunities of people and which ones cause tension are questions which can be measured statistically and analyzed scientifically. But equality is a concept which cannot be defined or handled. If we were to build social practice on equality, then everyone would have to have the same talents, everyone would have to do the same sort of work, etc. This is a bad, naive, primitive interpretation of equality. We went beyond this long ago. I imagine equality to be a much more general concept at a much higher theoretical level than inequality. If we succeed in taking definite steps toward liquidating the painful inequalities which have piled up, then we will be approaching--but always only approaching--greater equality.

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ALCOHOLISM RATE AS INDICATOR OF MAJOR SOCIAL ILLS

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 6 May 83 p 7

[Interview with Pal Avar, authority on alcoholism, by Laszlo Zoldi: "The Illness of Our Times?" date and place not specified]

[Text] Is only lamentation allowed? Under this heading appeared a lengthy and remarkable conversation in the 28 November 1981 issue of ELET ES IRODALOM (Life and Literature). Sandor Csoori and Laszlo Levendel summarized articles about alcoholism. The writer-poet and the doctor established: "The atmosphere of the whole dispute was like wailing in front of the Wall of Complaints. Moreover, it was as if not a steady, not a present distress had extorted the sentences from the speakers, but a complaint of an already accomplished, already settled affair." I wonder, today in 1983 in Hungary, how much is alcoholism an affair, how much the exploration of the path leading toward it can be considered settled? Dr Pal Avar, psychologist and head physician of the Scientific Center of the Methodology of Alcoholism, talks about this. It is worthwhile having him speak because the participants in the talk 1 and 1/2 years ago emphasized that they would not dwell on the medical treatment of alcoholism.

[Question] If I understand well the thoughts of the publicist and the doctor, then it seems as if alcoholism were almost the Malligand index of bad social and human relations and it could be traced back--at least in Hungary--to "a neurosis hidden for ages" which "lives in our history."

[Answer] I respect immensely the efforts of Sandor Csoori and Laszlo Levendel to publicize this subject from time to time. Actually, I would agree with their complaint if I did not know the data of the World Health Organization of the UN. The WHO held a general assembly nearly 2 years ago; it is evident from its report that alcoholism, at present, is the most serious health problem in the world. I also add--perhaps the partial expert is speaking from within me--that alcoholism is the most serious problem in the world.

[Question] More serious than armaments?

[Answer] More serious.

[Question] If this is so, then why does Pal Ipper not report about alcoholism in the television news?

[Answer] Perhaps because mankind destroys itself more slowly by drinking than by bombs, which take effect in moments. People drink excessively not only in developing countries but also in the well-developed ones; consequently, the presumption is eliminated that alcoholism is the illness of the poor. This is so extensive that there is even a developing country whose entire medical staff was almost destroyed. And naturally people drink a great deal also in moderately developed countries, such as in Hungary. Thus I would not willingly search for the reasons of the epidemic only in history, as I would not readily designate one cause as an exclusive element.

[Question] It is convincing what you say. Nevertheless, I think we should not worry about the neighbors' problems. Let us find our specific reasons either in history or in the present.

[Answer] It is not certain that our fellow countrymen drink for a different reason than others. The Japanese, for instance, consume relatively little alcohol, because the yellow-skinned man has an endowment of his own kind: his face reddens even from a little quantity of alcohol. His ears will be red like a tuberose and his peers take it as if he drank on tapering-off pills. However, the Japanese man is disciplined; it is not proper there to turn red. Moreover, those people who indiscretely break the collective norm with drinking can easily be ostracized by their peers.

[Question] I understand the example, the disciplinary power of the small collective, but I do not understand the lesson to be learned at home.

[Answer] Even if I cannot report on resounding results, we already have certain experiences in the curing of alcoholics. For instance, we have been observing 68 nephalists for many years. Among them are remarkably many peasants, who in olden times oozed up from the village and freed themselves from the moderating discipline of domestic custom in the structureless swarms of people, in the workers' hostel. Namely in the old environment, for centuries typical offering rules were developed. The countrymen could have taken a biscuit, a glass only at that time when--after various rhythmical sayings and practiced persuadings--his turn came. Getting away from this medium, in the midst of urbanized circumstances, he lost the communal control; thus he got into uproars, binges, and that is why he finally--if he was lucky--got to us. We, however, tried to entice him into the trap of group-dynamics, strived to cure him by the means of a conscious attachment to the community, not rarely with success. I could say practically the same about workers.

[Question] And intellectuals? The anecdote is well-known according to what one of our writers would have said: for how much foolishness people spend money--for breakfast, lunch, stockings for children, tuition and the like, but from all that there could be wine spritzer!

[Answer] Obstinancy is the element of the existence of the intellectuals. They know everything better than anyone else. Perhaps our intellectual model

is defective. Many of us live in the misconception of some kind of super-human narcissism. They consider themselves sort of an autonomous personality who are inclined to put themselves above every scale of values, from which, of course, they cannot cut themselves free or if they try, from so much higher they fall down. I know, actually we are all children of alcoholic parents, since mankind has been drinking thousands of years. So we come into the world with an aptitude for the illness of alcoholism, but this susceptibility is realized in self-destruction relatively more in intellectuals. And since they are also liable to generalize their specific experiences, sometimes I have the feeling that we suffer from a national neurosis instigated by our teachers.

[Question] I enumerate the facts; I know them from one of your studies. In 1951 the average consumption was 4-5 liters of alcohol; in 1966 6 liters and in 1980 12 liters.

[Answer] From the first decomposed product of alcohol the organism makes a substance similar to morphine (we, by the way, paralyze the enzyme which breaks this up). But the so-called endorphine supply can easily accumulate; a great deal of study proves that with continuous drenching a festive mood can be produced. At this time, the person in question feels what man experiences when he suddenly realizes freedom. Whoever enters a pub can at any time lengthen out his experiences of freedom in exchange for a receipt. His ego expands into the area of illusion; he is able to interfere in other people's--people in the pub--affairs in moments. This basic situation awkwardly reminds us of that episode, which was written by Baudelaire in his classical and scientific work, "The Artificial Paradise." At that time the French peasant sprinkled hemp seed--a plant of drug content--into the wedding fodder and the horses ardently hurled the wedding guests into the church.

[Question] Actually, why do you want to prevent people--with tapering-off pills, group-therapy--from creating paradise for themselves?

[Answer] I want to dissuade my fellow man from creating an artificial paradise. And I would like to persuade him to live in his freedom without self-excitation.

[Question] We have not even talked about the essence of your method, about the medical-psychological means, although we are slowly running short.

[Answer] I think it is useless to burden the readers of ELET ES IRODALOM with professional details. The essence is that man has a compulsion for union. Everyone can feel comfortable in the world if we deliver them from frustration, let us say, with the help of a problem-solving union. The drastically intervening collective extricates the sick man from his agonizing position and reveals at once the experiences of success in front of him, which were hidden so far by his narrow-mindedness.

[Question] I know doctors do not willingly use metaphors, but I ask: is the frustrated sick man interchangeable with the frustrated nation?

[Answer] In my opinion, not only the analogy can be used, but the therapy is also applicable.

PROVINCIAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS NOTED

Party Members Looking for Objectives

Lodz GLOS ROBOTNICZY in Polish 3 Mar 83 p 3

[Article by Krystyna Majda: "Looking for the Way"]

[Text] Lost and divided people are still looking for their way. Sometimes, they are silent so as not to betray their inner indecision. This condition is also evident in small party organizations.

Few basic party organizations [POPs] are often divided into those, who would like to express their partisanship, but are not always successful, those who are indifferent, but acknowledge that their party membership is becoming a key defensive "shield," and also those who are dependent on those with whom they are: either they are comrades or they are critics.

The first secretaries of the POPs complain that they are deprived on assistance and condemned to work by themselves. Even if there are hundreds of such small, independent organizations in Lodz and the Lodz Province, they often suffer from an inferiority complex when dealing with large party organizations, which are managed by the plant committees. At the Lodz Reports Conference, there was a lot of concerned talk about these POPs, which are active in many institutions, schools, hospitals and processing centers.

Is this the only reason why these small organizations, forced to rely on themselves, fell unappreciated and lost? After all, thousands of party members belong to them. These people could captivate the society, in which they were active, by their example, regardless of whether they were in groups of 9 or 50. But this has to be the goal; one should not complain that there is no strength left to drive on.

When the Crafty Get Ahead...

I visited the Hospital for Lung Diseases on Okolny Street, A small POP is active there. Around 60 people belong to it. Once again I heard the same opinion repeated here, which I had heard the day before at a plenary session

of the party District Committee in Srod miescie. Here a majority of the secretaries would like to do something for the party, but are not able to manage the number of issues.

For instance, party members did not defend a female doctor, against whom a nurse had spoken out. The nurse stated that the doctor should spend less time "drinking tea" and do what she is instructed to do by the doctor, in this case, apply a drip to a very sick man. On the other hand, these same comrades defended a young man at a meeting from party reprimand. The young man explained that he had committed no crime in making off with medicines from the hospital! Someone even tried to pass on to me that the medic who caught this young man committing the crime became a victim in the battle between the generations.

Why are party members so merciful towards those who do not understand very well concepts of morality and professional ethics?

Dr Wieslawa Szymanska, ward head of the 4th Department of the Hospital for Lung Diseases on Okolny Street, answered: "Some of the comrades have had their heads turned by Solidarity. People still do not know which side they are on. Sometimes party comrades want to fight for pertinent issues, but cannot find the support. Often our meetings are silent. Maybe it is that way because much had been said over many years, proposals tabled, demands--and nothing has resulted. The criteria: what is good and what is bad, are not very effective. Today, when someone is caught stealing, others say that he was just 'unlucky.' No one thinks that this individual should be removed."

Dr Szymanska speaks with open bitterness: "In certain centers, a cult of slyness has formed. When one person attempts to act in accordance with party regulations, he is considered to be 'from another planet.'"

Other party members from this organization did not conceal the fact that people, who have to act fairly, are still losing. But who is courageous enough today to be called right?

Nothing at any Price

Catching people in their ranks almost at the "crossroads" sometimes brought small party organizations to ruin. So long as statistical data could be increased.

Alicja Graber, the nurse from the Hospital for Lung Diseases, has been a party member for 20 years. She joined Solidarity because it seemed to her that a rebirth of the union movement had occurred. Today, after many months of experience, she said: "I never lost my belief that our basic party organization would find itself. But after our last meeting, my faith **wavered**. How can one defend people against the law when they obviously are breaking it? Maybe it is so because doctors, nurses, ward attendants, porters and supervisors are appreciated in our party organization at the hospital. There are no ties between these groups; their interests do not converge. It is difficult for each of those comrades, mentioned by me, to understand what makes up the ethics of people who are responsible for the health of their patients."

More than 7 percent of all those who are employed at the hospital belong to the POP. This is not a large percentage; but despite it, a small group of people does not always speak the same language, or even a common one, or fall silent at a meeting. Why? After all, there is a rule which distinctly encourages sincerity and the open expression of views.

Dr Jan Warda, the hospital's director, does not conceal the fact that people belong to the party organization, who have experienced much in their lifetimes. The number of members is growing smaller, because people are retiring or are taking other jobs. It becomes clear that no one can accuse him of not having a stable relationship with the executive board, or treats those issues with disregard, which the first secretary of the POP, Dr Halina Petrykowska, brings to him. The problem of distribution is the usually recurring one; sometimes, however, social matters are the issue. The most difficult issues to deal with are those of a group of personal nature.

Dr Warda considers the atmosphere at party meetings to be heavy. Sometimes, the leadership experiences a vote of no confidence at the hands of the comrades. A hierarchal system exists in the health services. And it has to exist since it is a question of a person's life and health. Ward heads cannot allow a breakdown of their authority vis-a-vis their assistants and nurses.

People who make demands on themselves and their subordinates, do not generally seek approval. People say of them that they are often in conflict. The executive boards and first secretaries of small party organizations are under great pressure from all sides.

#### Some Secretaries Suffer From Complexes

It is no better in other small party organizations than it was in the Hospital for Lung Diseases. During the Reports and Elections Campaign, the comrades were encouraged to take on the public functions of the POP first secretaries. They were promised assistance in the conduct of their political work. These obligations, however, have not been fulfilled everywhere.

At one plenary session of the Lodz regional echelons, a member of this session spoke during the discussion and would not conceal the fact that first secretaries of the POPs, in fulfilling their social functions, are often dependent on their superiors, even if it is only a professional dependence. They want to be on the right side of their superiors because, as our mentioned discussion participant stated: "...even the saint is not without sin."

How then are small party organizations to be advised so that they do not feel lost or superfluous? The comrades, to whom I put this question, generally answered: "The executive boards of the basic party cells cannot work on the principle: 'They have ordered in the regional committee that...', or, 'the regional committee wants it so.' Simply put, it is an issue of their being independent, that they resist in their centers harmful manifestations and the frequent violation of the dignity of honest members of the POP."

It is difficult to understand also, when one of the basic party organization first secretaries complained that the department directors in Warsaw never come to him, or never ask him for his opinion on important issues. Why cannot he himself, the first secretary of the POP, talk directly to the director and present to him those problems which need to be settled? I do not think, however, that everyone, who comes from Warsaw, has to announce his visit to the secretary, and if this does not happen, then the secretary should not feel left out.

Is one Teacher Responsible for Another?

Just as of the medical and many other professions, various things, good and very bad, can be said of the teaching profession. What kind of impact do the POPs have on the formation of public opinion?

There were 8 people in the POP in the 31st Education Lyceum. This is really a small group, but... Mirosława Golygowska, a history teacher, does not conceal her disgust when asked the stereotypical questions: "Is her party group divided? Are the members honest with each other? Open?"

"We are a close-knit, tough group," retorted Golygowska. "We are not conspicuous on the team for vociferousness; we always try, however, to be the first on duty and always there where the young people are. I personally always feel that support of my party comrades. None of them has ever denied me help. But I do know from somewhere that such unity is not prevalent in every school. I was also convinced of this by a case cited to me by one of the teachers, who was reprimanded by the school's executive board without even having had an interview with him.

"While at a meeting of one of Lodz's elementary schools, I became convinced of the fact that strong party groups are not in every school. I did not leave the meeting with the best impression. None of those present discussed idealistic education; instead, there was much talk about how to deal with unruly children during the breaks between classes.

"Do only matters of deportment make sense to this party organization? The director of this same school put off the problem with just one sentence: 'The period just before martial law taught our comrades how not to discuss party matter...'"

I could hardly share his view, because the teachers in many schools are not afraid to show their party attitudes.

To Be Together...

To speak in a common language, honestly, without being suspected by the others --such are the dreams of POP members, who have had to work in unsettled and divided environments, but who know their strengths and weaknesses.

It does not seem, however, that the sometimes inferiority complex of small party cells is well founded. Even a small group, if it can reach internal



agreement, can implement everything which it jointly plans. Simply put, it is necessary to be together and not to complain how difficult it is to trust others.

After many conversations with the secretaries and members of independent POPs, I drew the conclusion that the majority of these people wants to fulfill its lawful duties, but without the support of the group, often loses, even when fighting for basic issues. Have they really lost?

I think that our times need to build psychological resilience in those who have joined the party because of their convictions and by their own choice. It is wrong, however, when one comrade says of another, who is searching for the rebirth of the party organization: "He is a fellow with a fairness complex; he demands too much from himself and from others."

As before, the issue of small party organizations is open. This column of our newspaper is also open to anybody who has something to say about this issue.

#### Party Errors Under Discussion

Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 25-26-27 Mar 83 p 3

[Article by Zygmunt Rola: "Knowing How To Speak of One's Mistakes; Let us not Become Presumptuous"]

[Text] "The time has not yet come for us to cease reminding ourselves that the guiding role of the party is by no means the result of an entry in the constitution, but is sanctioned by this entry. There are still many of those among us who think that this entry is sufficient legitimacy to exercise political power in the country--much too many to acknowledge that everything here is really clear."

I read these words as a sign of the time. I found them now in February 1983 in TRYBUNA LUDU, the party's central newspaper. The signature under these reflections belonged to a full-time employee of the party apparatus in one of the provincial echelons. Especially for this reason, I think, they are a sign of our times, different from those times of barely 3 years ago when the expression of similar opinions about the guiding role of the workers' party would have been unthinkable. And the times will also be definitely different when the party will be looking for its legitimacy not only in our constitution, but also, above all, in a relentlessly affirmed and unquestioned authority in society.

In a short period, from the preparations for the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress, we have successfully begun to win back some lost territory. Only those who do not want to fail to understand how much has already changed for the good. All the more so when other attitudes are equally evident, which sometimes contradict the trends, obvious in the actions of the party's central authorities. As if in Poland, in the Polish United Workers Party, nothing

had happened; as if the most recent history had been poor in bitter lessons, here and there trying to return to the methods of leadership which, it would decidedly seem, had been acknowledged as ineffective, bringing only hardships and leading to conflict.

Admittedly, many careerists have been removed from the party; people who had violated the party's fundamental rules and regulations and the basic norms of human honesty, should be gone. Things are moving forward as before, but have we rid ourselves already of all those who perhaps because of their unusual inefficiency or perfidiously and premeditatively would harm the process of the rebirth of the social trust in the party?

I think that all are not gone. Not only my own observations convince me of this, but also the proposals of the members of the party leadership. Wojciech Jaruzelski spoke during the Warsaw reports conference: "The party must be made extraordinarily sensitive to even the smallest trends of the rebirth of everything which leads to a violation of leninism, to conceit and formality, the abuse of position and moral degeneration, to the advancement of special interests ahead of those necessary. We must be without compromise in these matters. Their domination in the past cost the party and socialism far too much. These mistakes will not be permitted anywhere again."

We also cannot commit mistakes when we interpret the leading role of the party. We cannot regard a constitutional entry as a patent for infallibility. We hear this sometimes from people, who seem to have forgotten both the congress discussions and the current contents of party declarations before the congress of the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth [PRON]. Today, we have to constantly confront people with their evaluations which refer to the current situation and actions being undertaken. We need to strive for the public's trust in order to win authority, which no one has ever given to anyone else gratis. At the same time, we cannot forget that the matter will be decided in practice and not in theory; otherwise, the goal is more difficult to achieve. We must not forget that the results, acquired not only on different planes of social activity but also on different levels of authority, besides the central level, will become reality.

Looking practically at the matter, all centers have much to do in this regard. Among the items to be done, the important, though not always enlightened, role falls to the journalist, or more broadly put, to the centers of mass communications. One can, after all, read in the Resolution of the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress: "An essential element of the political crisis in our country was the lost credibility of the press, radio and television. This loss was caused by the limitations, including administrative, on the flow of information in the management of mass communications... One of the most important ways of averting another confidence crisis in the future is to return to the proper significance and role of public opinion. In order to facilitate the honest informing of the people, it is necessary to guarantee journalists almost advanced access to information, indispensable to them, and also complete rights and conditions to present their critical and polemic materials--without regard to the positions of people who are the object of criticism or focus of attention."

I quote these words, although I hear almost everyday: there can be no retreat from the policy, emphasized in the resolution of the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress. At the same time, however, there is no shortage of observations which show that among us there are still those who, while concerning themselves with the guarantee of party efficiency and its political, ideological and organizational unity by publicly criticizing people selected for responsible functions in the party apparatus, recognize attempts against the solidarity of the rank and file, party discipline and democratic centralism. I heard recently: Do you want to write critically? The party is not a discussion club. Public criticism does not serve the party today because it has been utilized by our enemies as an argument against socialism.

Such generalizations, having been related to specific situations, when criticism could have helped nip in the bud those blunders which first grew into irregularities and then into mistakes difficult to correct, often end discussions just when they should have been opened, and then only on specific issues. Of course, the party is not and cannot be a discussion club. But there is room (even there where there is not, it simply has to be found) for open and even public talk about the most important issues. Clearly, aggressively and specifically; and even in the name of socialism.

After all, Vladimir Lenin wrote: "We should not have to hide our errors from the enemy. Without discussion, polemics and battle of opinions, no movement, including the workers movement, is possible; all parties which have rotted in the past, rotted because they became arrogant and did not know how to distinguish between strength and fear to speak out about weak points."

Not only in the party but also outside of it, there are many people who are trying to disregard the lessons resulting from Poland's and her governing party's most recent experiences. It is not true that there is always time for a lesson; it so happens that some reflections are coming too late. Really, it is not possible to overlook this in practical activity, all the more so as to forget that the party's leading role is more than just the result of our constitution. In order that constitutional responsibility be identical with political strength and unquestioned significance in public life, it is necessary that there be daily concern in every job on the part of both party activists and the party's rank and file. In the manner ordered by the party's rules and regulations.

#### Current Differences in the Party

Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA in Polish 29 Mar 83 p 3

[Article by Helena Pilipiuk: "The Party Is the Same, but not Quite the Same"]

[Text] A saying about the party is spreading that it is the same, but not quite the same. Based on the observations of recent months, one can recognize that the above saying is also heard in our region.

Proof is not hard to come by. But so as not to lose myself in the selection of examples, I decided to cite my observations from recent plenary sessions

of the Bialystok city and provincial echelons. How very different they were from the meetings of earlier times.

In accordance with a motion proposed by Stanislaw Stolarz at the February Reports-Program Conference in Bialystok, the nonattendance of individual plenum members is being recorded. Comrades who for any reason cannot make the session, must advise the party echelon about it.

Greater discipline and responsibility are now felt during the proceedings. Even the meetings, announced as being almost entirely formal in nature, are filling up with blushing cheeks. The March plenum of the provincial council, dedicated to the confirmation of party echelon activities schedules, prepared earlier, did not foresee much discussion. In the meantime, the proceedings went on in a climate of involvement.

Jerzy Panasiuk insists on the construction of a hospital in Hajnowiec being added to the program plan. Arguments did not help that the councilmen of the National Provincial Council had succeeded in approving this investment; i.e., there should not be any anxiety about its implementation. Unfortunately, things can get sidetracked. The comrades in Hajnowiec obligated the first secretary of the City Committee to campaign effectively for this indispensable investment, also by way of the party. Comrade Panasiuk does not agree with the counterarguments of the plenum's participants. There are demands to remove the hospital issue from the provincial activities program.

The classification of proposals made during the reports campaign proceeded even more differently. Two years ago, before the 9th Party Congress, several thousand of these proposals had been written. As many as 2,006 of them had been addressed to the central and provincial authorities. A stream of respectful wishes flowed abundantly then not only in the Bialystok Province. In the meantime, the chances for implementation were extremely modest. Only 20 percent of the requests from before 2 years had been positively dealt with. The decided upon number of 1981 proposals did not see fruition. Simply put, they were too difficult for the economic conditions of the country.

This year's list had been made up with a greater sense of realism. Here are some examples: a proposal to increase the allocation of building materials by the central authorities drew a significant counterproposal at the March provincial plenum--to mobilize Bialystok's production of roofing tile and wall materials, because it is crumbling, sand and clay are found in the province in abundance and there is currently no lack of cement.

Comrade Makolaj Miruc from Bondar made the proposal for an increase in the funds for social welfare: "In our rural community of Michalow, we have much money from grants, the provincial authorities first granted 5 million zlotys and then pledged an additional 1.5 million zlotys, but with the stipulation that we quickly spend everything, otherwise they will reduce our funds next year. In the meantime, we have been successful in satisfying all those who were in need, but we do not intend to help the wealthy." Recently, as a result of the discussion, a proposal is made: do not subject the allocation of funds for social welfare to their expenditure in the previous year.

The removal of the proposal to finance student horse-riding and yacht clubs did not cause much of a stir. The argument that these clubs were a bit too exclusive and might not appeal to society convinced all participants of the provincial committee.

Verification of many proposals caused some lively discussion in the proceedings hall. Thus, the chairman of the resolutions and proposals commission reads out the demands: to introduce work orders for the graduates of secondary and, especially, higher schools. The commission decided to remove this proposal, inasmuch as it collides with the premises of the economic reform, it violates the independence of the enterprises. One of the Provincial Committee members, a farmer-worker from the rural community of Narewek, was in opposition. In his opinion, only thanks to the efforts of all citizens will we manage to extricate ourselves from poverty. His proposed work orders could be binding in the short-term. Ultimately, the argument of Mikolaj Kozak, a provincial committee secretary, prevails: "We have signed an international treaty; we should respect it." The work orders would be a step backwards: they would limit the citizen's freedom. The voting indicates that the majority of comrades had moved away from the demand to obligate graduates to work. Through joint efforts, it will be easier to get out of "the ditch," but it also depends very much on the respect of the peoples of other countries towards us. The slogans duplicated by Radio Free Europe about "the party's pillars" do not fit with my observations from the plenary sessions in Bialystok. From my participation in the last plenum of the Municipal Committee in Bialystok, I perceived great concern for a more thorough analysis of the subject being investigated. The problems of young people, being currently worked upon, were presented in various ways. Scientists prepared a sociological diagnosis. Members of the youth commission of the Municipal Committee drew up a comprehensive report on the attitudes of Bialystok's younger generation. Reports on the activities of individual youth unions provided a modest informational contribution to this idea.

The rich studies, which present a picture of the younger generation, were developed during the discussion in 3 problem-solving teams. Here, the reasons for the generations became clear; here, the different barriers facing youth today were shown; here, an attempt was made to mediate the prescriptions, and above all, youth was given the right to speak about their problems frankly. Whether all youthful participants of the Bialystok plenum know how to take advantage of these rights is a different issue. There was, however, no feeling of paternalism on the part of older, mature members of the party, who made up an illustrious majority in the proceedings hall. None of the oldsters tried to teach the young or direct them. Simply put, the principles of democracy were respected, while the right to formulate the final proposals was charged precisely to the young under the slogan: "Nothing about us without us."

The observations, which I cited from the last meetings of the party echelons, perhaps are not completely characteristic. However, I can affirm that the party stands out from practicing incorrect methods and is beginning to act in a different style. The clever conclusion: "The same, but not quite the same," finds expression in everyday life. Of course, examples of activities, done in accordance to old schemes and ideas, are occurring as before, but they are retreating before the new, less dogmatic forms of action.

## Improvement of Party Tasks

Zielona Gora GAZETA LUBUSKA in Polish 1 Apr 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by ZG: "Do Away with Negligence--Promote Thrift"]

[Text] Economic problems currently dominate the meetings of basic organizations and the meetings of the echelons. It is understandable that this theme takes up a lot of time, but there is the spring work in rural agriculture; in the factories, these problems are the various headaches associated with the introduction of economic reform.

Much space in the discussions was equally dedicated to political and ideological problems. An example here is the departmental organization in the Welmy Weaver Shop No 1 in Zagan. The comrades spoke about the causes of the excessively slow rate of implementing the resolutions of the 9th Congress; the indications, that certain individuals enriched themselves at the expense of the working people, were evaluated critically; it was also announced that the party and government must decisively engage the breakdown of rights and norms in community life.

The manner in which social consultation was conducted was evaluated negatively. It refers to price increases, but not exclusively; it also refers to projected legal statutes. In Jasien's Zremb Rapair Construction Enterprise, party members are of the opinion that the conduct of consultation exclusively in several large factories is a collection of opinions from a too-narrow group of working people, predominately better situated. The topic was higher wages. For this reason, a more extensive system is necessary in order to reach the opinions of people who work in small factories and towns. This, in the end, gives a more complete representative evaluation.

Odrzanski evaluated at the plenum of the Municipal and Rural Committee the implementation of proposals from the reports campaign. Of 56 demands, 42 have already been carried out. Trade and supply efforts seem to have been improved.

During a meeting of the aktiv at the municipal echelon in Leknica, a municipal committee for social activity was appointed. The adopted activities program considers the proposals and needs, expressed by professional and organizational centers, including city beautification, playground equipment and the renovation of sports and recreational installations.

The party organization in Lubiechow, in the rural community of Malowice, discussed rural economic issues. Here, there are good conditions for cattle-breeding; there are meadows, but lime fertilizer needs to be brought in. The rural area barely received 70 tons of soil lime, while 500 tons are required. It is rumored that there is lime, but that there is also no one to deliver it to the country.

We wrote frequently about the difficult work conditions at the Polish State Railroad's junction in Zagan. The economic and working problems and the

modernization of equipment were the subject of a traveling session of the Municipal Committee's executive board. After having conducted interviews, research and analyses, the executive board concluded: labor shortages are appearing, principally because of an improper system of emoluments; the decline in work discipline threatens the security of the movement and is caused by an excess of overtime. A stable technical base and the equipment are obsolete and require a greater number of workers, outlays for conservation and strenuous effort. In the meantime, the tempo of the modernization efforts is moving along at a snail's pace. The District Directorate of State Railroads in Poznan considers the junction in Zagan to be secondary; negligence is not decreasing but increasing. The workforce does not agree to an extension of the repair efforts to 1987. The leadership of the municipal party echelon completely shares the position of the railroad workers and has turned to the Communications Ministry for a high priority in completing the junction's modernization. An acceleration of the work and a guarantee for an uninterrupted flow of electricity, funds and materials were also requested.

#### Party Problems Among the Workforce

Budgoszcz GAZETA POMORSKA in Polish 6 Apr 83 p 3

[Article by el, bur: "The Difficult Problems of the Romet Workforce"]

[Text] The Bicycle Assembly Department W-28, is a production cell of the Romet Bicycle Works in Bydgoszcz. Here, on the assembly lines, the finished products of this great factory come into being. To a great degree, the extent of bicycle production depends on the productive, rhythmic efforts of the department's workforce; the accuracy and precision in the assembly work have a tremendous influence on the quality of the vehicles. Recently, a meeting of the Party Sectional Organization of Department W-28 took place, it was dedicated to an analysis of the implementation of the proposals from the reports meetings and also to a discussion of current party and economic tasks.

The meeting was conducted by comrade Edmund Fronczak, first secretary of the District Party Organization; Col Boguslaw Kolodziejczak, office director for the first secretary of the party central committee, also participated.

The party organization of Department W-28 numbers 68 party members, the majority of them workers. It exerts a strong influence on the political and professional attitude of the department's workforce. This workforce is happy with its good reputation in the factory, and its work brings very good results. The representatives of the Romet management would emphasize this during the meeting. The department's assembly potential has considerable reserve capacity, however, three assembly lines are operational only for one shift and only the fourth line operates during both shifts. The operation is not always rhythmic. A shortage of labor is felt in the department, just like in the entire enterprise.

Comrade Jozef Wieczorek, head director of Romet, touched upon this in his speech. He reminded us that the production of the Romet bicycle should grow

this year by 11.6 percent, while employment will grow by only 3.2 percent. Production growth needs to reach an 8.5 percent increase in worker productivity.

It is a difficult task. Participating in the discussion, the comrades from the assembly department pointed to the need to raise the efficiency of the cooperation of other departments of the factory with assembly operations. The components and parts of bicycles should be delivered regularly, eliminating assembly stoppages. This refers to the delivery of parts from coproduction. The discussion participants talked equally about employment problems, the situation on the work market and several sore points of everyday life, felt by the workforce.

Comrade Boguslaw Kolodziejczak raised these last issues in his speech. He spoke about current economic problems; he also highlighted the sociopolitical situation in the country.

A great commotion among the factory's workforce and society's taking interest were caused by the recent news, provided by the Polish Press Agency in its newspaper columns, that Romet had understated its achieved profits by 325 million zlotys, thus lessening the income tax due to the state treasury by 329 million zlotys and the stabilization tax by 28 million zlotys. Taking advantage of the opportunity, Director J. Wieczorek explains to us that the entire issue was in reference to the fixing of financial accounting on the 30th of September 1982. The enterprise's data on actual costs were not complete then, considering the lack of price stability for the deliveries from coproduction, the calculations of investments made, etc. Determining the actual profit is possible only in the annual balance. Romet, however, remitted taxes, resulting from an estimated fixing, adopted by the financial supervision. A considerable part of this payment of 225 million zlotys was returned to Romet in February of this year by the Treasury Chamber in Bydgoszcz as a tax overpayment.

Izopol International Material Works: "We Have the Crisis Behind Us"

Waclaw Anderschon, Izopol party plant committee first secretary in Trzemeszna, and Bogdan Dolata, a plant committee secretary, evaluated the crisis of their party plant organization as being over with. "Our party organization has been reduced to 54 people, but we parted without conflicts, without sorrow. Those, who left, were indifferent members anyway; they did not participate in the life of our organization. A reverse process is beginning for us today. People are joining the party and this, in our opinion, points to a growing confidence in our activities. Recently, we accepted three new candidates and two other workers are planning to make the same decision."

The Izopol party plant organization has disposed itself mainly to supporting all those activities which serve the development of the mechanisms of democracy in the plant. There are many instances of this trend in the plant's activities, and that builds faith in our own ranks to work more efficiently. The conviction dominates among the workforce that the party members do care about its interests.



For example, the party organization helped considerably in reactivating the Socialist Union of Polish Youth circle and supports its initiatives. Przemyslaw Wypijewski, the circle's leader, has managed to increase the membership to 42 people in a short time. The young people have already founded their own building cooperative for single-family homes. They have taken the plant radio center under their care and are trying their hand at cultural activity.

The party organization is focusing much attention on the reactivation of the plant's workers' self-government. This was done in November of last year. The Izopol self-government was elected already in 1981 in accordance with the law on self-government in the enterprises. The factory's personnel recognized that it was necessary only to reactivate the self-government and not to elect a new one. None of the elected individuals had given up any of the duties, which they had assumed a year earlier. They resumed their activities with the election of a presidium for the self-government; in 1981, there had not been enough time to do this. The reactivated self-government went straight to work confidently; it first dealt with the issue of correctly forming reserve funds and costs of production.

The Izopol comrades are strongly concerned that all important plant decisions be made after consulting with the workforce; they themselves often initiate such consultations. For example, when there was talk about changing rewards, the workforce itself decided to take care of chiefly the basic rewards; afterwards, an increase of 30 percent in the basic sum was designated for the premium's fund. Thanks to the application of a supplement for work without it, absenteeism has been distinctly reduced. This allowed the workforce to exceed last year's production plans, while simultaneously cutting the costs of processing. True, production was lower than in previous years, but finally (after 6 years of waiting) the renovation of the roof of one of the halls was completed; previously, a whole production line had been idle for an entire year. The plant has also cut employment.

The plant party organization also had to undertake the issues, which professional unions are supposed to soon occupy themselves with. It supported the petitions to the municipal and rural authorities for building lots for workers, who want to build homes in residential areas. It spoke out for bettering supply to Trzemeszna stores, because there were once headaches there even with rationing. Without a break, it is bringing up the issue of protective clothing for the workers.

Barely 16 percent of the needs has been satisfied in this area, the worst problem being shoes. It was necessary to "consult" in the plant about the deprivation of protective clothing supervision... Thoughts were voiced already about vacation time for the workforce. Space in their locality had already been sold to other plants for their vacation requirements at a sum of one million zlotys. This money then buys area in other localities also for vacation spots. This is all right as far as the workforce is concerned.

## POST-MARTIAL LAW PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL FORCES VIEWED

Hamburg AUSSEN POLITIK in English No 2, 1983 pp 155-170

[Article by Christoph Royen]

[Text]

Western media not only in the USA are dominated by a distinctly negative portrait of the situation in Poland and by a pessimistic assessment for the future. As far as such an evaluation is adopted by Western governments and business firms, clear reluctance in dealing with the Jaruzelski regime is the result. On the other hand the Polish leaders are engaged in combatting the dominant mood in the West as well as the frustration in their own country and the continuous concern of Poland's neighbours in the Eastern alliance. For this purpose the Polish leadership gives prominence to those aspects, which seem to contain certain elements of beginning "normalization" and which let Poland appear capable of overcoming its isolation in West and East. Christoph Royen of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, Ebenhausen near Munich, attempts in the following analysis to free our view from a polarized perception, where actors and tendencies are categorized by applying the simplistic dichotomy between "oppressors" and "oppressed". Thus we may win a better understanding of those forces in Poland, which devote themselves to the seemingly impossible task to overcome the Polish crisis by reducing internal polarization and confrontation. At the same time, a more balanced evaluation might contribute to a necessary coherent and stable consensus within the Western alliance's policy towards Poland and the other Warsaw Pact members.

## I. Principal Participants in the Present Stage of Poland's Crisis

## 1. The Party and the Military

Since December 13, 1981 most Western observers and commentators refer to the political leadership of Poland as the "military regime". Almost automatically a much more significant proposition is added, namely that the "Polish United Workers' Party" (PUWP) was deprived of its power by the Military or, at least, that itself saw no other way out of its agony but to hand over the supreme power to the generals. The mere notion "military regime", of course, can be justified since the proclamation of the "Military Council for National Salvation" (*Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego*). The suspension of most of the "martial law" regulations by December 31, 1982, has not removed the correctness of that label.

Questionable, however, is the implied conclusion concerning the role of the Party. There may be involved a natural tendency to make good for past errors, when not only "Solidarność" and its followers in Poland, but also the almost unanimous consensus among Western observers failed to imagine the capacity of the Polish military to enforce an "internal" solution in order to end the challenge to Communist rule in Poland. However, such an attempt to correct erroneous judgments of the past tends to oversimplify a much more complex issue. The consequences are not restricted to the analysis of the Polish situation as such. In addition they play a role in the prevalent understanding of the general model of Soviet Communist rule<sup>1</sup> (and in turn affect again Western views of the Polish future).

As far as Poland is concerned, before one adopts the image of the Party deprived of power, the following questions require clarification:

- To what extent the Polish communists, who never commanded more than a negligible allegiance among their compatriots, after they had come to power with the help of the Soviet army were permanently forced to modify and adapt Lenin's orthodox model of party rule to Polish conditions?
- Didn't the PUWP try since years to integrate the military leadership into the top decisionmaking bodies of the Party, thus creating a symbiosis of Party and Military?
- Doesn't the dominant line taken by the military press during the "Polish summer" show, that it was just here, where the orthodox elements of the PUWP, bent on resisting "renewal", found strong support<sup>2</sup>?
- Doesn't the alignment of Mieczysław F. Rakowski, whose "liberal" views time and again had met opposition in the Party, behind General Jaruzelski already in February 1981, when Jaruzelski formed a new government, indicate that a start was made to modernize the concept of the "leading role of the Party"? In order to remove the double obstacle: the broad segment of corrupt apparatchiks and the small band of stubborn orthodox "hardheads", whose inability to maintain a consensus between the Party and the nation was becoming obvious during the second half of 1981, it appeared necessary to combine partly "liberal", partly "technocratic" reforms with an enhanced role of administrative discipline, which resembles Prussian standards<sup>3</sup>.
- Isn't the tendency to classify Rakowski and his friends as "opportunists" – if we leave aside the special grievances and the disappointment of Polish intellectuals – stemming from an insufficient grasp of the difficulties, doubled after December 1981, to which any attempt of systemic reform is exposed in Poland between the embitterment or impatience of domestic society and the watchful eyes of the "brotherly" parties beyond the Polish borders?

Turning to the more general question of the military's role under the Soviet Communist form of "Real Socialism" ("real'nyi sotsializm") we must ask above all: Do not Western observers and analysts tend prema-

1 Cf. for example two articles by Michel Tatu: "Les institutions communistes face aux crises – Les militaires seront-ils le recours?", in: *Défense Nationale*, November 1981, p. 45–55; "Le 'cas Jaruzelski' ou la tentation militaire", in: *Le Monde*, 3. 11. 1981.

2 This can be shown for the daily *Zołnierz Wolności* as well as for the monthly *Wojsko Ludowe*.

3 Cf. the critical remarks by Mieczysław F. Rakowski addressed at the Party during the PUWP's Ninth (extraordinary) Congress on 15. 7. 1981 (Radio Warsaw I, 15. 7. 1981, 19.30 hours; excerpts in: *Trybuna Ludu* (TL), 16. 7. 1981, p. 6); also Rakowski's analysis, which was written in 1979, but published only in 1981: "Rzeczpospolita na progu lat osiemdziesiątych" (The Republic at the threshold of the eighties), Warsaw 1981.

turely to discard the ideological fundament of the power monopoly of the Party as irrelevant, while they focus instead on material instruments of domination which are more familiar to our thinking, i.e., in the Soviet case: military strength? No doubt, with the achievement of so-called "strategic parity" and capability to project military power world-wide, Soviet foreign policy attaches primary importance to the competition with the other super-power in the sphere of military strength. This causes enlarged attention to the demands of the Soviet Military and strengthens the Military's voice in decision-making in domestic and economic policy too. Yet we should not overlook the immanent limits of this trend<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, confined to the scope of this article, we may conclude with the counter-thesis: The "leading role" of the PUWP will be reestablished again. But it is too early to say whether the Party will fill her role with a new content and what will be that content.

## 2. "Solidarność" – A Real Factor or a Myth?

The development of the new trade-union "*Solidarność*" from a partner, accepted – though reluctantly – by the Party, when the agreements of Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie were signed in summer 1980, to a "social movement", which by late summer 1981 competed openly with the PUWP for power in Poland, has been described sufficiently<sup>5</sup>. A remaining field for controversies may center around the question, whether this development was inevitable and predictable from the very beginning, or whether it became visible only at a later stage. Moreover, by now it is an established fact that "*Solidarność*" after those months when it mobilized the Poles, whereas the Party simultaneously appeared like a helpless dinosaur, was unprepared for the "internal" solution of December 13, 1981. This delusion of the union's leaders and members made it even easier for the government's repressive apparatus to drive the active nucleus of "*Solidarność*" into the underground. And again contrary to certain hopes – or fears – the government succeeded within one year in containing open resistance (like mass demonstrations and strikes) to such a degree, that it could afford to announce the "suspension" of "martial law".

Today the Polish leaders as well as the external world are confronted with the crucial question: Is the radical hard-core of "*Solidarność*" already thoroughly isolated from the rest of society, which has reluctantly resigned itself to the struggle with everyday worries and to hopelessness? Or does "*Solidarność*", even acting out of the underground, command sufficient appeal and support to call for new disturbances in Poland dur-

4 For similar views cf. Seweryn Bialer: "The Harsh Decade – Soviet Policies in the 1980s", in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 5 (Summer 1981), p. 1016; Peer H. Lange: "Aktuelle Änderungen in der sowjetischen Darstellung des Nuklearkriegs und der Militärdoktrin", *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP-AZ 2350)*, Ebenhausen, January 1983, p. 55 ff.

5 Cf. the volume edited by Hermann Volle and Wolfgang Wagner: "Krise in Polen – Vom Sommer 80 zum Winter 81 (Beiträge und Dokumente aus dem Europa-Archiv)", Bonn 1982, especially the contributions by Erik-Michael Bader; Neal Ascherson: "The Polish August – The Self-Limiting Revolution", 3. exp. ed., New York (Penguin Pocket Book), 1982.

ing the coming years of an extremely difficult process of reconsolidation?

Obviously, in this case it is more difficult than in the case of the Party to give solid answers from outside to that question, after the period, when Poland's media provided almost unrestricted insights into the dynamics of "renewal", has come to an abrupt end. Still, such an attempt should begin again with two critical reflections:

- After those sixteen months of world-wide fascination emanating from "odnowa" (renewal) under the symbol of "Solidarność", Western media as well as the general public tend to devote much more attention to news depicting the activities and the suffering of "Solidarność" than to descriptions of the painfully slow and complicated efforts underway to get the country again back on its feet.
- This tendency is reenforced by a phenomenon, which has to be stated soberly without any trace of Teutonic arrogance: Many Poles traditionally show an inclination to prefer in their history the tragic hero, who rises like David against a superior foe, but who cannot defeat him like Goliath, whereas the representatives of a "realistic" pragmatism are held in low esteem<sup>6</sup>.

Thus the myth is created, where "Solidarność" is still to be reckoned with as a force which will take revenge for the suppression of "odnowa". In the internal struggle in Poland this myth becomes itself a real factor the authorities have to take into account and are forced to combat. Symptomatic for the actual political relevance of the myth is the fate of the government's efforts to set up a new trade-union movement, after in autumn 1980 the discredited old union's structure had come apart. Despite the fact, rarely noticed abroad, that the new trade-union law, adopted by the Polish parliament in autumn 1982, is the only one in Eastern Europe which provides for the right to strike, thereby preserving a cardinal achievement of the "Polish summer", many workers hesitate to join the new union<sup>7</sup>. Their motives to a considerable extent are formed by the idea that an application for membership would be tantamount to betray the ideal of "Solidarność", no matter whether this ideal has been proven to be an utopia.

The myth of heroic resistance against a seemingly invincible superior force has been cultivated for many years by the Party itself, when it tried to legitimate its own rule with the memories of the partisans' warfare against the German oppressors during World War II. Now that myth seems to be backfiring among the younger generation, which regards it

6 The discussion of this phenomenon does not only take place in the actual situation (cf. for instance Daniel Passent's article in: *Polityka*, No. 37, 30. 10. 1982, p. 16), but it has a long tradition. Cf. the reflective book by the late Harald Lauven: "Polnische Tragödie", 2. ed., Stuttgart 1956.

7 The text of new law on the trade-unions is printed in: TL, 9./10. 10. 1982, p. 3/4. - According to official statements the membership of the new union passed the mark of one million early this year, cf. TL, 7. 2. 1983, p. 1.

as the test of honour to use every occasion for skirmishes against the Polish "satrapes of Moscow" and takes refuge in a conspirative counter-culture.

Even among the ruling elite in Poland nobody would seriously deny that it is simply impossible to provide for a new convincing and encouraging perspective for the Polish nation after the Poles' hopes had been so utterly disappointed four times already within little more than one generation: First at the end of World War II, when the country was freed from German reign of terror to become a part of Stalin's empire, then under Gomulka and Gierek, and finally in December 1981. Therefore the myth of "*Solidarność Walcząca*"<sup>8</sup> remains only the most recent link in a chain of historic events. Its force may not be sufficient to challenge the rulers of the system frontally. But it prevents Jaruzelski or a potential successor from persuading the Poles once more to join in Gierek's famous slogan: "Let's go!" ("*pomozemy*").

### 3. The Catholic Church – Protector of the Nation, Mediator or Torn Apart between Resistance and Accomodation?

Based on the old equation "*Polak = Katolik*" it was always the Catholic church, which since the decline of the Polish state, beginning with the first division of Poland in 1772, offered the Poles a refuge and self-confidence against foreign, non-catholic occupiers. The establishment of a Communist "People's Republic" in Poland was unable to change this relation. Expectations according to which the transformation of Poland as a backward agrarian country into a modern industrial state would drain the social roots of the Polish church, proved idle exactly during the decade, when Gierek set out to build the "second", i.e. the modern Poland. And the more Gierek since the middle of the seventies ran into trouble stemming from workers' indignation, the more he turned to the mediating role of the Church under its leader, the Primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński. The Church, used since centuries to think in epochs rather in short time-spans and being free from the pressure to realize goals which are attainable only in this world, agreed to Gierek's request, thereby strengthening its position as the only serious contender and partner of the Party<sup>9</sup>.

As soon, however, as "*Solidarność*" rose as a force bent on challenging the Party's political power monopoly directly, the Church too was faced with the growing danger that her mediating capacity would no longer be able to reach both antagonists and to foster a pragmatic reconciliation. True, initially the Church succeeded with those advisers of the new union, which were prominent standard bearers of Polish catholicism in

<sup>8</sup> A present reminiscence of the wartime resistance movement which used as an identifying symbol for its activity the two letters "P" and "W", standing for *Polska Walcząca* (Poland is fighting).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Karl Hartmann: "Dialog zwischen Staat und Kirche", in: *Osteuropa*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 1978), p. 883-891.

public life, and with that faithful son [of] the church, Lech Walesa, to stem the tide of radicalism in "Solidarność". But even Cardinal Wyszyński, who died in May 1981, would hardly have been capable to halt the rising resolve among both sides of the conflict to seek a final decision<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, the various measures of repression and provocation, used by the Party and the authorities on all levels against striking workers and peasants, inevitably had the consequence, that the lower clergy, being on the scene and therefore easily influenced by the youthful élan of "Solidarność", made the demands of the people on the regime increasingly their own.

Already immediately after the imposition of "martial law" the new Primate, Archbishop Glemp, criticized on the one hand the measures of repression. Yet on the other hand he admonished the faithful to abstain from violence and to "forgive"<sup>11</sup>. While the regime welcomed this position, the Primate encountered opposition not only among the ordinary laymen and the priests, but also among the members of the Polish episcopate. This opposition was further fueled by certain opinions emanating from Polish emigré circles and by the Polish broadcasts of "Radio Free Europe"<sup>12</sup>. Tensions within the Church culminated at the end of 1982, when during a conference with clergymen assembled from all over Poland Archbishop Glemp had to listen to strong reproaches, which reportedly found their sharpest expression in the sarcastic addressing "Comrade Glemp"<sup>13</sup>.

At the same time among the orthodox Communist forces in Poland and in the neighbouring countries a growing number of voices could be heard who declared that the construction of Socialism in Poland had failed so far also because of too much tolerance for the activities of the Catholic church<sup>14</sup>.

The actual political significance of the test for the coherence of the Church, caused by the imposition of martial law, may be illustrated further by the fate of the Primate's "Council on Societal Concord", which comprised some highly respected Catholic laymen and was in spring 1982 still engaged in the search for a viable compromise for Po-

10 The position of the Church during the "Polish summer" is analyzed by Hansjakob Stehle: "Kirche und Papst in der polnischen Krise", in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 37, No. 6 (25. 3. 1982), p. 161-170; Dieter Bingen: "Die polnische Kirche, der Papst und die polnische Krise", *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, No. 34/1982, Cologne 1982.

11 The sermon given by Archbishop Glemp in the evening of December 13, 1981, subsequently was broadcasted several times over the Polish radio-network; excerpts in: TL, 14. 12. 1981, p. 6.

12 Cf. in this context the sermon by the bishop of Przemyśl, Tokarczuk, to pilgrims in Częstochowa, reprinted in: *Kultura* (Paris), No. 11/1982, p. 152-161; the editor's article: "Trudny i drażliwy problem" (A difficult and delicate problem), in: *Kultura* (Paris), No. 3/1982, p. 32-34; Tymoteusz Klempski: "Widziane z bliska" (Seen from close by), in: *Kultura* (Paris), No. 1-2/1983, p. 13 ff.; Krystyna Milorowska's commentary, broadcasted in the Polish language program of "Radio Free Europe", 5/16. 11. 1982.

13 Reports on this meeting in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ), 12. 12. 1982, p. 4 (B. Osadczuk); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), 16. 12. 1982, p. 3 (A. Nacken).

14 For the Polish side cf. for example Wiesław Mysiek: "Z problematyki światopoglądowej konfrontacji w warunkach kryzysu" (The problem of competing world views under the conditions of crisis), in: *Nowe Drogi*, No. 1-2/1982, p. 142-154. - For the viewpoint of Poland's neighbours cf., for instance, the contributions to a conference of propaganda specialists, which took place in Prague in January 1982, in: *Kommunist*, No. 5/1982, p. 40 ff; the TASS condensation of an article in the Bratislava newspaper *Pravda*, cf. FAZ, 12. 7. 1982, p. 2; the attack by the central organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, *Rudé Právo*, on Archbishop Glemp and his advisers, cf. FAZ, 6. 5. 1982, p. 2.

land's inner development<sup>15</sup>. However, after "*Solidarność*" was definitely dissolved by the law enacted in autumn 1982, most of the Council's members saw the sense of their efforts thwarted for an indefinite period of time<sup>16</sup>. Hopes linking the release of Lech Wałęsa from his confinement with an intensified role of the Church in union activities appear to have become unrealistic for the foreseeable future. Wałęsa's former personal appeal is diminishing steadily, since the authorities seem to have decided to destroy his prestige and to reduce his status to that of an ordinary citizen.

Whether the second visit of the Pope to his native country can, even if the journey takes place as planned in June 1983, generate an improvement of that precarious situation in Poland's Catholic church, must remain uncertain. Also the regime therefore is bound to weigh the instant benefit of implied recognition for the present rulers, involved in the Pope's visit, against a lasting repercussion, which consists in additional estrangement between the regime and the nation, while the Catholic hierarchy's mitigating influence is still further eroded.

#### 4. "PRON" – A New Bridge between the Regime and the Nation?

Throughout 1981 the political leadership and its media repeatedly propagated a "front of national reconciliation". It was supposed to replace the former "front of national unity", after that body had lost all credibility as a mere instrument of the Party in streamlining the two smaller parties and the other political representations according to the PUWP's demands. The new front should provide the framework for enlarged participation of all relevant social forces of Poland, including "*Solidarność*", in the task of "Socialist renewal". Following December 13, 1981, the military commanders initiated all over the country on the local level so-called "Citizens' Committees for National Salvation" – or, as Jaruzelski preferred to call them, "Citizens Committees on National Rebirth" (OKON). During the period of strict enforcement of the martial law these committees, of course, had hardly any chance to gain prestige and respect. In July 1982 the new formation entered the national stage by publishing the founding declaration of the "Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth" (*Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego*)<sup>17</sup>.

The function of General Secretary within the "Preliminary National Council" of PRON was entrusted to Marian Orzechowski, professor of political science at the university of Wrocław and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, responsible for ideological matters. But it should be noted that PRON's National Council comprises also a number of personalities without a party affiliation, who are on record

15 Cf. the Council's analysis of the situation, dated from April 5, 1982, reprinted in: *Kultura* (Paris), No. 5/1982, p. 3-10; a slightly shortened German translation appeared in: FAZ, 22. 5. 1982, p. 10/11.

16 The Polish bishops themselves criticized the legal dissolution of "*Solidarność*" at their regular conference at the beginning of December 1982, cf. *Życie Warszawy*, 4./5. 12. 1982, p. 7; NZZ, 5./6. 12. 1982, p. 4.

17 Cf. the report in: TL, 21. 7. 1982, p. 1/2.



since many years for the independence of their views and for their readiness to speak out nonconformist critical truths. This can be said for example about professor Ryszard Manteuffel, an ardent opponent of the official agricultural policy and a brilliant advocate of individual farming's superior production potential, who initially had been himself a member of "Solidarność"; or about professor Janusz Reykowski, whose advisory opinion, warning against the consequences of the ban of "Solidarność", as well as his recent plea for a cooperative form to settle conflicts have raised considerable attention in Poland<sup>18</sup>. Their participation in the Patriotic Movement offers a certain chance, that PRON will not serve simply as another new transmission belt for the PUWP.

The members of the "Preliminary National Council" appear – like the government itself – to be aware of the fact, that the new movement can win credibility only if it can also as a group develop common autonomous initiatives and find for them the open ear of the leadership of the Party and the government. Recent months, though, have shown already, how limited the scope for such independence is: The proposal of the National Council for a definite abolition of martial law apparently met so many objections from the hard-line wing of the PUWP (probably in Moscow as well), that the mere suspension of martial law fell short considerably – and visibly for everybody – of PRON's suggestions<sup>19</sup>.

Thus it is unlikely that the attempt to broaden the basis for consensus between the regime and the nation with the help of PRON, can generate soon satisfying results. At best PRON can mean a modest step into the right direction and contribute for example to a new election law, which goes beyond the existing minimalistic solutions in the procedure of selecting candidates – at least at the local level and at the regional level. Another proof of the lasting significance of the Movement would be provided, if within those Catholic groups, who so far refuse to join PRON, a tendency would win the upper hand, which intends to close ranks with PRON's Catholic components after some of the reasons for the earlier split may have lost their original importance<sup>20</sup>.

## II. Looking for a Way out of the Crisis

The overview presenting those forces which play the most visible roles in the present constellation in Poland requires an added attempt to clarify the contents of the most likely direction, the development of Po-

18 Cf. Manteuffel's article in: *Polityka*, No. 8, 21. 2. 1981, p. 1, 4/5, and his interview with *Polityka*, No. 3, 15. 1. 1983, p. 1/6. – Details on Reykowski's report are to be found in: *International Herald Tribune*, 20. 10. 1982, p. 4, and in: *FAZ*, 2. 11. 1982, p. 2 (J. Bremer); see also Reykowski's article: "Rozwiązanie konfliktu" (The solution of conflict), in: *Polityka*, No. 1, 1. 1. 1983, p. 1/6–11, which has initiated a still continuing discussion in the Polish press.

19 Cf. *FAZ*, 26. 11. 1982, p. 7, and *FAZ*, 8. 12. 1982, p. 5 (J. Bremer). – The text of the Council's appeal is printed in: *TL*, 25. 11. 1982, p. 1.

20 This concerns in particular the group around Sejm deputy Janusz Zablocki, which had split off from the church-aligned "ZNAK"-group in 1976 and is acting today under the name "Polish Catholic Social Union" (PZKS). Since December 13, 1981, the PZKS deputies' speeches in the Polish parliament remain among the few, occasionally dealing openly with negative or problematic measures of the government.

land will take. Will Poland – as it is increasingly hoped again also in Western discussions – be able to follow the example of János Kádár and find a way out of the catastrophe of the “Polish winter” into a model, which may win respect in the West and possibly approval in the East as well, concerning mainly the field of economic reform? Or reversely: will Poland share the fate of Czechoslovakia under Gustáv Husák since 1969 and become an externally pacified, internally stagnating territory? Or are these suggestions misleading, because Poland will take an own, so far unprecedented road?

### 1. The Cardinal Problem of Economic Development

The latest official figures<sup>21</sup> from Poland tell us, that the repression of “*Solidarność*” and the militarization of the economy during 1982 have brought at best the dizzying speed of deterioration to a halt. Yet it is by no means clear, whether Poland has definitely reached the bottom of decline. National income in 1982 has once more decreased by 8 per cent. Following the wave of consumer price increases, which had been so many years over and again postponed, by approximately 100 per cent, and after a simultaneous average rise of nominal incomes by almost 60 per cent, the real incomes on the level of low wage-earners or of social security recipients have decreased by 10–15 per cent, while for the earners of higher incomes the respective figure looks much more drastic.

The volume of foreign trade with the developed capitalist countries has shrunk in 1982 by about 15 per cent. For the first time since 1971 Poland achieved last year a positive balance of trade with its Western partners and was able to maintain the level of accumulated debts accruing from Western credits at 25 billion dollars. But this was only possible due to further curtailing of imports from the West by 25 per cent (in the sector of agricultural products by 40 per cent), whereas exports remained by a narrow 1,2 per cent behind the result of 1981.

Partial progress was made in the debt service’s regulation with Western creditors<sup>22</sup>. Western private banks agreed to a settlement, which encompasses due payments for 1982 amounting to some 3 billion dollars. There are prospects that also for the following years a comprehensive understanding can be achieved. On the other hand, Western governments felt compelled by the imposition of martial law in Poland to refuse a repetition of the 1981 regulation. Therefore thus far neither for the approximately 3 billion dollars due in 1982 nor for the similar amount in 1983, covering repayment and interests resulting from government loans or guaranteed credits, a solution has been found. It is obvious that the governments of the Western alliance will continue to make their consent to Polish requests for a settlement dependent not only – like the private banks – on more solid information concerning the soundness of the

21 Cf. the annual report of the Polish Main Statistical Office (GUS) for 1982, in: TL, 12./13. 2. 1983, p. 7/8.

22 More on that subject in the article by Klaus Schröder: “Rescheduling the Debts of CMEA Countries”, in this issue of *Aussenpolitik*, p. 139–145.

economic program initiated by the Polish leaders, but also on the internal political development in that country.

In relations with the other members of COMECON Poland has undertaken a strong effort to increase exports by almost 24 per cent. As a consequence the balance vis-à-vis the smaller COMECON-members is practically restored again. Only the Soviet Union as a creditor of at least 2 billion dollars (other estimates speak of 4 billions already) will have to wait for a similar repayment.

On the whole, such a drastic push of exports combined with a consecutive restriction of imports from the West inevitably cause, as already witnessed during the late seventies under Gierek, new shortages in the domestic market.

Behind the sober figures three main uncertainties overshadowing the future of Poland's economy emerge:

Firstly there are no certain indicators which would show that the program for economic reform, discussed already before December 1981 and partially introduced during 1982, really has the desired effect of long overdue decentralization of the economic system and will create the instruments required to guide the economy with realistic prices reflecting scarcities. True, when compared with the Hungarian reforms, which had been prepared for almost an entire decade and once they were initiated in 1968 met rather favorable external economical and political conditions, the time-span is too short to reach a final negative verdict in the Polish case. Yet if the task is to introduce the principles of competition and cost effectiveness, sooner or later every seriously attempted economic reform in the Socialist countries will enter the difficult phase, where not only the bureaucrats in the administration and the old style managers resist, but the workers and their unions as well long to return to the former rule of egalitarianism and start to protest against "unsocial" effects of the reforms. This was visible in the CSSR in 1968, and also in 1972 and again in 1982 in Hungary. If now a comprehensive reform program is introduced in Poland under existing conditions of severe shortages for the consumer, there is ample reason to expect that the insistence on egalitarian social standards<sup>23</sup> from the very outset will enforce many compromises, which will once more water down the concept of reform and ultimately ruin it.

Secondly the policy of reconsolidation and reform is enacted during a period, when the previous opening of the Socialist economies to the West during the seventies now is attacked by the orthodox forces in the COMECON countries as the main cause of the entire misery – even if it is easy to recognize that the real cause rests with the avoidance of re-

23 For a reflection of such demands at the Polish leadership cf. Jaruzelski's speech at a Party conference in Katowice, in: TL, 22, 2, 1983, p. 1/3.

forms, which should have accompanied the opening. Since the beginning of 1982 a sharp debate is taking place in Poland around the question, to which extent a "reorientation" of Polish economy towards COMECON is the adequate and feasible reaction to past experience. Part of the debate occasionally may be lip-service paid to the comrades in Moscow<sup>24</sup>. But the Western policy of sanctions has at least contributed to a situation, where the opponents of such reorientation today face a tougher battle than in earlier years. Definitely the introduction of market-type elements into the Polish economy and a stronger alignment into the COMECON structures are hard to reconcile with each other. This could change only, if those passages on financial relations, concerning for example the goal of national currency convertibility, as adopted as an integral part of the "Complex program" of COMECON in 1971, would cease to be mere letters in a document.

Thirdly it was even before the imposition of martial law evident, that the task of primary urgency for the Polish economy would consist in establishing an effective system to produce and distribute agricultural products. Under specific Polish conditions, where still three quarters of all arable land is farmed by individual peasants, this can only mean to instill the rural family farm finally with a confident perspective, without which the younger generation will refrain from investing money and labour into their parents' homestead. Here, however, again one has to register the attacks from orthodox forces in Poland and abroad, who condemn private farming as the basic deficiency of Polish socialism. Therefore it is not surprising that the policy of the PUWP and of the United Peasant Party (ZSL) – notwithstanding the recent legal guarantee of private farm ownership, which soon may be even amended constitutionally – cannot free itself from ambiguous language. This in turn does not lay to rest the deeply ingrained distrust of private producers against creeping "socialization of the Polish village"<sup>25</sup>.

## 2. The Cultural Scene under Conditions of Martial Law

Compared with all other Socialist countries Poland's cultural life since 1956 has been, despite some setbacks, multifaceted and vivid enough to justify it already before 1980 to speak of a virtual pluralism, which always caused apprehension among the leaderships of Poland's neigh-

24 Cf. for instance the joint communiqué issued after the visit of foreign minister Józef Czyrek in Moscow, in: *Pravda*, 12. 1. 1982, p. 1; the bulletin on the deliberation of the results of Jaruzelski's journey to Moscow by the Politbureau of the PUWP's Central Committee, in: TL, 8. 3. 1982, p. 1. – More references to this debate at Christoph Royen: "Das Ende des 'polnischen Sommers' und die Zukunft des Systemwandels in Osteuropa – Gedanken zu einer friedenspolitischen Strategie", in: *Osteuropa*, Vol. 32, No. 12 (December 1982), p. 1023. See also the discussion between academic specialists and members of the administration, in: *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, No. 10/1982, p. 121–140.

25 More detailed references concerning these ambiguities during the "Polish summer" 1980/81 in my report: "Polens politisches System zwischen Beharrung und Erneuerung – Vor dem 9. Parteitag der PVAP", *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP-AZ 2295)*, Ebenhausen, July 1981, p. 71 f., 75. – Recently again in the Polish newspaper reports on a common plenary session of the PUWP's Central Committee and of the Supreme Executive Committee of the ZSL, where the promise to guarantee individual farm ownership appears overshadowed by a stressed importance of its integration into the planned economy or by Jaruzelski's unspecified remarks castigating tendencies of exploitation and profiteering in the villages, which should be suppressed, cf. TL, 21. 1. 1983, p. 3, and 22./23. 1. 1983, p. 1.

bours. A political threat for the system resulted from this difference, when following the revolt of the workers in Ursus and Radom in June 1976 and the ensuing repression against the participants, Polish intellectuals for the first time since 1956 actively supported the protesting workers. Without this alliance neither the triumph of the striking workers at the Baltic coast in August 1980 nor the birth of the new union "*Solidarność*" can be adequately understood.

As a consequence, in order to suppress "*Solidarność*" and the movement of "renewal" symbolized by it, the regime had to destroy that alliance and to drive a wedge between the workers and the intellectuals. The authorities after December 13, 1981 therefore applied the rules of martial law against the intellectuals and artists less stringently than against the common workers. This differentiation served a subsequent campaign, which aimed at the intellectuals' real and alleged privileges as well as against their abuse. During the first months of martial law workers were constantly told that their justified protest had been cynically exploited by the intellectual advisers of "*Solidarność*" and transformed into a battle against Socialism. On the other hand Polish workers could not fail to notice that the conditions of internment for intellectuals – not only because of their connections with the Western world, which secured them support in the form of material supplies and public calls for release – were in some regards more lenient than in the general camps.

The instigation of anti-intellectual resentment was used again, when during the second half of 1982 it became apparent that many Polish intellectuals and artists insisted – just like the workers boycotted the new substitute union – on boycotting the government's monopoly of financing cultural life in the country. This form of protest was directed especially against the government's television which already before December 13, 1981 had been widely regarded as a bastion of all forces opposing "renewal". The boycott gained particular effectiveness since those, who did not take part in it, exposed themselves to ostracism as strike-breakers or "opportunists" among their colleagues. It was none other than Rakowski, the former favorite of many Polish intellectuals critical of the Party, who in a discussion with actors and stage-directors in autumn 1982 confronted the boycotters with the tough choice, either to offer their talents again to the "toiling masses" via government channels or else they would risk to lose their privileges<sup>26</sup>. To make the threat stick, in October 1982, the well respected minister of culture and arts, Józef Tejchma, was replaced by Kazimierz Zygułski, who dissolved the Polish Actors' Association and removed a number of directors from some of the most famous Polish theaters.

26 Cf. the text of Rakowski's speech in: *Polityka*, No. 39, 13. 11. 1982, p. 8/9, and the report with excerpts from the ensuing discussion, in: *Polityka*, No. 40, 20. 11. 1982, p. 10.

Despite all that it would be incorrect to conclude that the government of General Jaruzelski is carrying out a strictly anti-intellectual policy. How complicated the situation is may be illustrated best by the fact that Primate Glemp himself at the end of November 1982 asked the actors to end their boycott – a step which only fueled the controversy surrounding his own person<sup>27</sup>. The political leadership appears to be quite conscious that it cannot permanently antagonize the intellectual elite of the country and rely instead on the cooperation with docile second or third rank forces in the cultural scene. Thus, similar to PRON, also the “National Council on Culture” (*Narodowa Rada Kultury*), formed in December 1982, includes some names, which until today have in Poland a reputative free from any taint of collaboration (e.g. the stage director Kazimierz Dejmek or the president of the Polish Academy of Science, Aleksander Gieysztor)<sup>28</sup>. As another example of the regime’s existing tolerance the case of Andrzej Wajda (“The Man of Iron”) may be adduced, who returned to Poland and his latest film produced in France is shown to the Polish public. Moreover, the ongoing debates in the press concerning themes of central systemic relevance are surprisingly lively. On the other hand one had to register again early this year the dissolution of the last remaining club of critically minded Party intellectuals, the famous “*Kuźnica*” (“The Forge”) in Kraków<sup>29</sup>.

On the whole, therefore, cultural life in Poland, considering martial law conditions, has remained remarkably intact. It is by no means restricted to the underground. However, it is not yet sufficient to allow – even after a complete abolishing of martial law – the resumption of the full specific Polish standard, maintained for more than a quarter of a century.

### 3. A New Orientation in Foreign Policy

The profile of Poland’s foreign policy until the summer of 1980 was characterized by the attempt to establish – while remaining a reliable ally within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and in the COMECON framework – bridges to the Western half of the continent, in order to contribute to a reduction of East-West-tension in Europe. The beginning of his endeavour can be traced back to the second half of the fifties, when former Polish foreign minister Adam Rapacki proposed a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. But already at that time the dilemma inherent in such a bridge-building concept became manifest: Western willingness to meet the Polish desire of overcoming the split of Europe is diminished, if behind national Polish interests a Soviet goal is recognizable, which the Western alliance has to oppose lest it endangers its own coherence.

27 Cf. FAZ, 1. 12. 1982, p. 5 (J. Bremer); NZZ, 3. 12. 1982, p. 3 (B. Osadczuk).

28 Cf. the list of members, in: TL, 24. 1. 1983, p. 4.

29 Yet the present wave of replacements is partly also directed at representatives of orthodox tendencies, cf. FAZ, 11. 12. 1982, p. 25 (J. Bremer).

Much more favorable conditions were existing for the Polish design of bridge-building during the seventies, when détente and cooperation won a prominent place in the relations between the leading powers in both alliances. However, even during this period it was always clear, that the Polish bridge and mediating function would find its end as soon as the policy of détente would become discredited again on both sides of the dividing line<sup>30</sup>. Less predictable, though, was that Poland's internal development ultimately provided itself an important impulse for the return to heightened confrontation in East-West-relations and thus for the collapse of the bridge.

Gierek's ignominious fall from power in summer 1980 deprived the Western Europeans of a partner, who had personally symbolized Poland's role as a bridge and who had clung to it still until May 1980, when Gierek hosted the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to help to resume the East-West-dialogue, interrupted following the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. During the sixteen months of the "Polish summer" Poland became again a mere object of grand politics: The Western alliance warned the Soviets against "external" intervention; Western governments and banks were considering the chances for a common management of the Polish economic crisis with Soviet participation, while in the Western public discussion speculations about a possible "finlandization" of Poland were mushrooming.

Since December 13, 1981 Poland's political relations with Western governments are almost frozen, following the well-known decision of the Western alliance to make the resumption of the dialogue dependent on three conditions, of which the third, a renewed partnership between the Polish authorities and "*Solidarność*" in the meanwhile has turned out practically impossible to attain. In this situation the Polish leaders are forced even more to seek the consensus and the harmonization of their foreign policy with the neighbours in the own alliance. The Eastern alliance has a high interest in influencing the present discussion in Western Europe, which is gaining momentum with the decision approaching, whether the "dual track"-decision of NATO from December 1979 has to lead to dislocation of the new weapons in Western Europe or whether negotiations allow to forego installation of "Pershing IIs" and cruise-missiles in exchange for Soviet dismantling of the "SS-20".

Therefore the Warsaw Pact leadership in its effort to restrict NATO's freedom of decision seeks to employ whatever is left of Poland's traditional good standing in the West. For this reason Poland's allies will not prevent Jaruzelski from resuming the dialogue with Western governments, once NATO's members are ready for it. However, the framework, under which Poland can engage henceforth in such a

30 This is pointed out in my study "Polens Entwicklung im europäischen Entspannungsprozeß der 70er Jahre", *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (SWP-S 268), Ebenhausen, April 1979.

dialogue, will be different: The main target of the East's concerted campaign is the Federal Republic of Germany as the most important dislocation area for the new Western weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany, in turn, has a vital interest in keeping relations with the German Democratic Republic free from serious deteriorations, because such a development would affect negatively the position of West Berlin and the human ties between Germans in both halves of the divided country. This makes the GDR especially suited to function as a messenger for Eastern concepts designed to influence Western discussion. The recent initiative of Erich Honecker, contained in his letter to West German chancellor Helmut Kohl, in which he urged Bonn to accept the inclusion of Central Europe into a denuclearized zone<sup>31</sup>, is symptomatic of such a shift in roles, compared with the time, when Rapacki made his proposal twenty-five years ago.

Polish foreign policy since July 1982 is guided by Stefan Olszowski, who had not only acted as one of the most hostile – and at the same time the most intelligent – adversaries of “renewal” during the “Polish summer”. In addition he was Polish ambassador in East Berlin until the early autumn of 1980. It can be assumed that he possesses close personal ties with the present East German leadership. This confirms the impression that the revival of Rapacki's proposal leaves little room for a special Polish profile. Rather we witness a growing strength of a Soviet-East German axis, to which Poland has to accommodate its role in Europe.

#### 4. The Future of the “Polish Road” to Socialism

Observations contained in Sections II 1 and II 3 should have indicated already, that an imitation of Kádár's example in Poland in the course of the 1980s would lack the necessary preconditions, unless one would regard the mere Polish admiration for the Hungarian model as a sufficient prerequisite. But even that admiration is by no means a new phenomenon<sup>32</sup>. Moreover, historical traditions as well as the geopolitical situation of Poland are so incomparable with Hungary, that the drawing of parallels between both countries has no fundament at all<sup>33</sup>.

On the other hand it would be an equally unfounded prediction to expect a development to take place in Poland similar to the one connected with the name of Gustáv Husák in neighbouring Czechoslovakia. Here again one has to recall the totally divergent course, shaping the construction of Socialism in both countries. In the CSSR, with the exception of the short “Prague Spring”, political rigidity was the constant hallmark, creating something like an ice-age which never permitted the Czechoslovak leaders to play an autonomous role in European politics. Poland

31 Cf. FAZ, 8. 2. 1983, p. 1.

32 See the references in the quoted (note 28) study, p. 83.

33 Cf. the expectations which draw on this parallel, for instance Richard Spielmann: “Crisis in Poland”, in: *Foreign Policy*, No. 49 (Winter 1982/83), p. 20–36; or Charles Gati: “Polish Futures, Western Options”, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982/83), p. 292–308.



on the contrary, at least since Stalin's death, became in every politically relevant field – economics, culture, foreign and also security policy – the scene, where the Communist system's capacity for evolutionary change was tested continuously. This Polish preformation does neither end with the shattered attempt to bring about systemic change in a quasi-revolutionary way, nor is it obsolete with the subsequent regime's reaction trying to reconstruct the system's principles.

Some elements in the Jaruzelski group's programmatic profile at first glance convey the impression that Poland now is taking the GDR's development during the seventies as an example to learn from. Already in 1972 Gierek and Honecker initiated measures for special bilateral integration. But the idea had to be abandoned little more than a year later, when the complete absence of necessary preparations and preconditions became obvious. The common inclination, prevailing at present among the ruling groups in both countries, to rely on discipline as an instrument to regulate problems in society, should be seen as a superficial similarity. It should not detract from the deeply entrenched historical and from the very recent differences between both neighbours, even if the new leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Yurii Andropov, himself seems to be preferring, for the time being, the stick to the carrot<sup>34</sup>.

Hence the lack of plausible examples to follow leads back to a likely continuity of Poland's uniqueness, to which merely a further specialty: "internal" intervention, has been added. The preservation, though, of Poland's specific features will for the foreseeable future have no other result than the balancing of Poland at the cliff's edge or, at best, a reduction of the crisis to manageable proportions. Nevertheless, the potential as well as the inner pressure for systemic change remain a constant factor, which under another improvement of the external setting in East and West will gain virulence again. Whether it can succeed then, will depend from the degree, to which all relevant internal and external actors will have improved their insight into the necessity of systemic change and into its requirements<sup>35</sup>.

34 Cf. Andropov's article in *Kommunist* No. 3/1983; a German translation appeared in: *Neues Deutschland*, 25. 2. 1983, p. 3/4.

35 The perspectives of future systemic change in Eastern Europe and the pertinent conclusions for the Western alliance's policy are dealt with in the mentioned (note 24) article of the author, loc. cit., p. 1023 ff., 1025 ff. See also Christoph Royen: "Wirtschaftssanktionen als Instrument der Ost-West-Auseinandersetzung", in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (25. 2. 1983), p. 109–118.

KALISZ GOVERNOR BUCZMA INTERVIEWED ON LOCAL SITUATION

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 25 May 83 p 4

[Interview with Col Kazimierz Buczma, Kalisz Voivodship Governor by Lt Roman Przeciszewski: "I Have Not Been a Supporter Here"]

[Text] We set details by phone. It is not easy to have a gap in the tight schedule of work: if not a local tour, there is a meeting, if not a meeting, there is an obligatory visit to a hospital, and hour after hour are taken up. Next Saturday, a work-free Saturday, dozens of minutes, however, will be "carved out." Thus, at 10 am he is in the Voivodship Office. A few days later, by agreement, we sit facing each other. Col Kazimierz Buczma, Kalisz governor, obviously wears an uniform. The word "obviously" he underlines himself: "I say so, for my closest collaborators cannot imagine that a governor would come to work, say, in a suit. It has been this way, since I took over this office..."

[Question] Since that time over a year had elapsed, and I would like to begin our talk by recalling your first days of work as voivodship administrator. What were those days like?

[Answer] First of all a correction: I did not change my profession as I have been and felt to be an officer. I accepted, however, these duties because I understood that the homeland was in need of experienced people capable of leading human teams. I have been fully aware of what I took upon myself, the duties, the responsibility, and the fact that the governor's presence notwithstanding, there will always be an importance attached to the uniform, that society will see me both as an official of the administration and as a soldier, that all setbacks not only will be attributed to Governor Buczma, but to the officer's uniform as well. I could not decline, though. That does not come within the soldier's thinking.

In returning to the question addressed, I acknowledge that the first days were very difficult. I did not doubt that I would manage this new task, but

did not know whether I would be accepted by the milieu, whether there would not be a bad atmosphere, unfavorable tendencies for the work of governor-officer. These doubts turned out to be needless. I went through a complex maze of introductions: the party's Voivodship Executive Board Committee, the party commission and party affiliated organizations, the presidium and session of the Voivodship People's Council [WRN] where the formal vote was cast. With one abstention, WRN confirmed my candidacy.

[Question] Were there no doubts because the governorship was to be taken over by outsider, so to speak?

[Answer] There was no room for such doubts, for I was not here as a supporter, but as a vigilant observer of the voivodship's life and inhabitants. I was deeply rooted in this milieu. For the two terms of office, I was the WRN councillor, worked for the commission of law and public order, as well as in education and culture, and hence I came to know the province well, its problems. I frequently thought over the possibilities of how to eliminate these problems. That is why as soon as I assumed the governorship, I submitted my program of action to the next WRN session. It was, among other things, the result of a change in style of action. At the beginning, I said: We must be loyal to ourselves, everybody who is a cooriginator of the governor's decisions is responsible for them. Also, everybody must feel fully accountable for his work sector. No explanations or elucidations will be accepted later.

[Question] The matter was put like that during the staff briefing? A soldier is given a task and he feels obligated to carry it out...

[Answer] It is true that since 1954 I have been at headquarters, fulfilling a great many functions and that the knowledge acquired has been very helpful. But that does not mean that I created, in the office, even the appearance of military discipline or that everything must work in accordance with adequately adjusted drill principles. From the military I brought and, as a matter of fact, adapted the task-accountability system primarily. It is logical that the system will materialize at every workplace. It proved correct in the voivodship offices, during the past year. The system was accepted by the managers for now they know what falls concretely within their duties, what they have to do and also they have time for work and attention is not diverted from it.

Quite simply, everything is planned and determined precisely, there are no questions, one can quietly and correctly do that which is productive.

[Question] It is hard to believe that every employer managed immediately to change his style of action. It has been frequently said that the administration acts in a stereotyped fashion, and the complaints of citizens can be counted in the thousands.

[Answer] But I do not assert that in the Kalisz Voivodship things went differently or well. Here, also, there was a lot to be changed. In my first

weeks in office, I put the cadre and its work under a strict verification system. It was done by a cadre review, carried out by my initiative, which--as it turned out later--was ahead of the ministry's recommendations. Next, it was necessary to change the work style, to introduce planning in accordance with possibilities and needs. This planning, as I already mentioned, was related to the task-accountability system. Today, office employers cannot imagine how it could be otherwise. This does not mean, however, that everything is fine and nothing ought to be changed in the functioning of the state administration. I strive so that there will be no complaints, but this is a process that cannot be consummated within a year.

[Question] What helps in this work, these endeavors, when one does not have "clerical" or administrative experience?

[Answer] An outside look, from the point of view of a recent petitioner helps frequently. Also of important help were the records of the Armed Forces Inspectorate, which in our voivodship were carefully analyzed and which took the shape of voivodship schedules of action, then turned over to all administrative units. In a great many areas, these schedules alone opened many people's eyes to several shortcomings which until now had gone unnoticed, created the possibility of confronting the practical action in one's own area of activity with what was not appreciated elsewhere. Also of great help were the local operational groups from which even petty faults did not escape attention, particularly as far as agriculture and the office work is concerned.

[Question] What **voivodship** body is the most important and useful, for a governor-officer?

[Answer] It is hard to answer this question unequivocally. I must, however, underline that all important decisions were implemented thanks to the aggressiveness of the Voivodship Defense Committee, of which I am chairman. We invite workers and peasants to the WKO sessions, also organize touring sessions to cities and provincial workplaces, moving closer to the problems of society, and society to the contents of our action. It matters that there be no insinuations, that every doubt be explained on the spot.

[Question] "The WKO aggressiveness" has been mentioned here. What is it based upon? When does it assert itself?

[Answer] We have had negative phenomena, for instance, towards which we could not assume a resolute attitude. It happens sometimes that covering oneself with a screen of statutory regulations, for example a supervisory council or a general cooperative meeting, makes it impossible for a governor, although economic mismanagement has been singled out, to call for the disciplinary consequences. In such cases, the matter used to come up before the WKO and cadre decisions were taken.

[Question] We talk too vaguely and society cares about details and specifics.

[Answer] Here they are: We found a mess, economic mismanagement, negligence in maintaining equipment in the Agricultural Circles Cooperative [SKR] of Chocz Parish. I took a decision to suspend the SKR chairman and remove him from the chairmanship, but I encountered the resistance of the cooperative supervisory council. The WKO upheld my opinion. It came about similarly in the Agricultural Producer Cooperatives [RSP] in Bobrowniki and Szklarka Mysliniecka, where the local operational groups stated many shortcomings closely related to the chairman's failure to fulfill his duties. Now we ask the RSP to decide so we will certainly bring the matter to its completion.

The social interest requires that. A similar situation occurred in the horticulture-apiculture cooperative. We turned over this matter to the Highest Chamber of Control.

[Question] Well, but does not anybody say that this is the authorities' attempt at 3 "S" self-dependence, self-management of economic units? Are these decisions accepted by society properly?

[Answer] Let us return to the Chocz example. The SKR Supervisory Council approved my decision, but it turned out soon that for some people this was inconvenient and those same people brought about changes in the composition of the council; that is, in principle, the formation of a new one, which opposed the governor's decision, making its point by bringing up statutory regulations. I invited the members of the new council to my office in order to resolve the problem together. I asked them from which point of view they looked into the question: from the social perspective, accepting responsibility for what took place in the cooperative, or whether they endorsed waste and caused the governor-supervisory council conflict consciously. We came to an understanding for, after all, who will emphasize negative attitudes today? It stems from this irksome finding: that there are many shortcomings in educational work, that the feeling of duty and social responsibility not always works, that a lot must be done in this field. Someone will say, perhaps, that the governor does not wield any influence on the activity of workplaces and cooperatives because they are self-dependent. Well, but they operate in the voivodship area, which I manage administratively, and when I see disorder I must intervene. I do not go into production or technical matters, I am only interested in the social aspect of this activity, whether everything is in accordance with the interest of citizens, of all of us.

[Question] Then how can you counterattack negative phenomena, how also can you win society over to this action?

[Answer] We declared a resolute struggle against waste, economic mismanagement, and consequently we called to account the appropriate people for manifestations of these phenomena. We take into consideration citizens' opinions. We activate the "green phone," which serves to receive signals about poor management as well as about irrational utilization of housing supplies. The results are that the inhabitants availed themselves of it. Twice, among other things, we inspected empty houses and unoccupied

apartments, resuming possession of 120 dwellings in this way. The heart of the matter, however, is elsewhere: it lies in a change of mentality, in the citizen's attitude towards social property. It is necessary to steer our actions in such a way that a feeling of full corresponsability is finally created, that one could demand, account, punish for bad work and reward for good. It is necessary, during this process, to take opportunity of the broad public opinion. This not only concerns consultations about cadre matters but also all other consultations. I bet on this action from the very beginning.

[Question] But after all, a decision is signed only by the governor himself...

[Answer] In the office we agreed: every director takes himself a decision and is accountable for its realization. The decision cannot be a failure. But if it cannot be a failure, then it must be preceded by consultations, a broad analysis. I bet on collective decisionmaking, as it occurs similarly in a garrison, where I took the opinion of my deputies, party and youth organizations. A decision that is reasoned this way appears to be the result of many people's action and considerations. Nor do I act differently in the Voivodship Office. As a consequence, I am in close collaboration with the Voivodship Party Organization, every decision draft I consult with the appropriate office services, its Workplace Committee, and youth organizations. Also not without reason did I bring into being the village administrators' convention, the governor's advisory council; not without reason do I currently cooperate with the Voivodship People's Council and the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth. In addition, this is not a cooperation for show.

[Question] During our conversation, examples constantly arise from your military experiences. Would you give the most recent example?

[Question] I have analyzed lately the equipment problem of the province's agriculture and I came to the conclusion that it is not quite so bad. The problem is to utilize this equipment. The equipment is frequently neglected, in numerous cases abandoned as was brought out into open by the operational groups. I turned to the Polish Union of Socialist Youth [ZSMP] and Union of Rural Youth [ZMW] and proposed to the members of both organizations the realization of the mechanization initiative in the countryside. The point is to make use, following the example of the military mechanized circles, of the smallest structures, to form agricultural mechanized circles, of the smallest structures, to form agricultural mechanized circles in which young farmers could make overhauls, services, current repairs etc. The idea went down for already in two parishes something has been done in this direction.

[Question] It results from all these replies that it is difficult to forget about the soldier's life.

[Answer] My all personal successes, after all, are tied up with the military. My name is mentioned on the Military Honor Book. Those achievements mobilize

me today. I know that I cannot deceive. The first results are certainly visible. We recently had work supervision at the Voivodship Office and basic units, carried out by the representatives from 12 ministry-related departments. According to the records, we were ranked first in the country among the voivodships that had not been supervised by the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces. But as I mentioned earlier, it does not mean that as governor, Col Buczma is already satisfied with everything.

Thank you for the conversation.

12328

CSO: 2600/903

LUBLIN PZPR FIRST SECRETARY DISCUSSES NEW PARTY TASKS

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 7, 30 Mar 83 pp 3, 4, 11

[Interview with comrade Wieslaw Skrzydla, first secretary of the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Lublin, by Lech Winiarski]

[Text] [Question] For three months now we have been living under the conditions of the suspension of martial law. In place of actions based on enforcement and a leadership style of giving orders, now all-around political activity, a shaping of public opinion, and a dialogue with other social forces is becoming necessary. How do you, Comrade, evaluate the party's readiness to act under these new conditions?

[Answer] I think that in the party and its bodies there is a general need to materialize the idea of understanding and national renewal. It is considered the sine qua non for overcoming the crisis, for mobilizing all patriotic forces for constructive action for Poland's good. This idea is contained in the documents of the 9th Congress.

At the basis of our endeavors there is the old leninist thought that socialism cannot be built by communists alone. Thus we are striving for cooperation not only with the fraternal political parties, the ZSL and SD, but also with the broadest possible representation of nonparty people, the Catholic milieu and their institutions. The Catholic University of Lublin [KUL] has been here for a long time and we are trying to maintain good relations with this scientific institution. The KUL employees, jointly with the employees of the Marie Curie-Sklodowska University and other schools of higher education, productively participate in the Lublin Scientific Society. I personally, as the Voivodship Committee first secretary, meet with representatives of these milieux. Recently I was invited by the local section of the Christian Social Association for a discussion on the state and the role of the party and lay Catholics in social life.

[Question] You are an optimist then in evaluating the possibilities for national understanding?



[Answer] Yes, although I do not close my eyes to the imperilment of this idea. Among the perils, the most serious, in my opinion, is the political underground, which is still active. It has a destructive influence on people's attitudes, creates a climate of intimidation, accusations of collaboration, and so on. It seems to me that it was under the influence of precisely these pressures that one of the KUL professors resigned from participation in the Temporary National Council of the PRON, although he continues to be active in our voivodship organization.

On the same basis "internal emigration," social passivity and animosity against the programs of social action persist in some milieux.

There are also other types of perils to PRON activity. Among these I would include the almost exclusively pragmatic character of some of the PRON bodies which limit their initiatives exclusively to welfare and social issues, or miniscule actions regarding communal or sanitation matters, and so on. In practice this is combined with timidity in undertaking political or social questions. While in fact the sense of the movement of understanding is deeper; its purpose is the drawing of broad masses of people of diverse views and outlooks on life by the party to cogoverning, social control, and authentic enrichment of socialist democracy.

[Question] Does not such a conception of the PRON meet with opposition from the left, namely from within the party itself?

[Answer] Those comrades who call themselves the "party Left," or "real communists," are rather opposed to the excessive scope of our church building, to devoting many financial and material means for new churches when the situation with housing is so difficult. They, for example, reveal incidents in which a church is still in its foundations, but there is always a roof over the presbytery. However, they do not question the need for a dialogue with Catholics. Thus I believe that in the Lublin Voivodship the concept of national understanding is not in danger from them. In the voivodship, over 10,000 people are in the PRON bodies, and over 40 percent of them are PZPR members, thus the majority are nonparty. This is the correct direction of development.

[Question] The suspension of martial law has placed before the party the problem of bringing back to life all organs of representation, and particularly workers self-management. It seems to me that the enlivening of people's councils is also necessary. Although not suspended, they have not been using fully their authoritative and controlling rights for a long time. At the present time a new statute on people's councils is under preparation. Besides legal amendments, however, a change of attitude toward people's councils in the daily practice of the party itself is probably necessary. Let me quote an example: during the PZPR reports conferences, it was always the governors, mayors, and chiefs who took the floor, while representatives of the organs of people's power hardly ever did. It was no different in Lublin.

[Answer] The chairman of the Voivodship People's Council [WRN] put his pronouncement in the protocol. I am saying this as an explanation. Now, the issue itself: I agree that the statutory guarantees alone will not secure a decisive raising of the people's councils' standing. The point is to create an appropriate political climate around them, and this is the party's job. It is true that old habits dominate in practice; administrative-type actions are favored. This approach is expressed by, among other things, direct contact of party bodies with the administrative apparatus while bypassing the representative bodies. This, of course, reduces the constitutional rights of these organs. At the same time the political and outlook-shaping activity, the forming and testing of the attitudes of the working class and other social groups, are harmed. This is the party's work and no one will do it for us. The shortcomings which you have mentioned have a long history. They were born out of the "reports-making" by party committees on the implementation of economic and production tasks, while in fact it is the economic administration which is directly responsible for this implementation.

[Question] So you are aware of those weaknesses...

[Answer] Yes, and we are trying to overcome them. Once again we are making the content of the concept of the party's leading role more precise. We must realize it not by administrative methods but by political ones. Among other things, we must correct the methods of work of the PZPR assemblies in the people's councils. They still often act perfunctorily. They are called an hour before the council's session, thus making it impossible to have a factual discussion, a deep analysis of prepared projects of resolutions, and an evaluation of the work of the administrative apparatus. We have therefore recommended that the party assemblies' sessions be organized separately from the councils' session. The point is to let party councillors form their own point of view on the local issues, to exchange observations from meetings with the voters and the POP meetings, and to make use of opinions critical of the symptoms of bureaucracy, administrative inertia, occurrences of protectionism, nepotism, and so on. After such a meeting in their own circle, the councillors-PZPR members will be able to influence the work of the whole council's and administration's work in a more mature and objective way at the joint session. This will assure the strengthening of the party's leading role.

As far as the Voivodship People's Council and its party assembly, this style of work already is in operation. We are trying to put it into action on lower levels. The point is also to assure the participation of the people's councils' chairmen in the work of party committees. This is important as a source of information about the party's actions and also it raises the prestige of the whole people's council. The WRN chairman, Stanislaw Zgrzywa, participates in the plenary sessions of the Voivodship Committee, as well as of the Executive Board and the KW Secretariat. I would like to emphasize that despite the weaknesses in the people's councils activity, despite the exhaustion of some councillors due to the prolonged term, we should note the increase in the number of meetings with voters, an increase in the number and significance of interpellations, and also an enlivening of the controlling activities of the councils' commissions.

[Question] During the reports campaign at some conferences there were voices in the discussion which showed anxiety concerning the role of the party, and particularly enterprise committees [KZ], in the new system of enterprise management. The issue was to specify the rights of the KZ with regard to self-management, to define concretely the range of the party's influence on the decisions of the self-management organs and so on. The statute on self-management was criticized under this aspect. It seems to me that this is an expression of nostalgia for the former comfort of authority, when the KZ first secretary ex officio became the Workers' Self-Government Conference chairman, and the first secretary of the local party organization--the chairman of the people's council.

[Answer] Such conservative trends exist. They however are not limited only to some KZ. When, for example, in our Medical Academy the school's statute was under elaboration, the representative of the University Committee showed a tendency to focus only on the minute details of the rights of the University Committee. Here in my office a sharp discussion took place on this subject. As a result of which, postulates rooted in the pre-August days were withdrawn. I am of the opinion that here again we are dealing with a lack of skills for political action, arguing, and polemicizing with the political adversary. This is a true problem in the new situation after the suspension of martial law. There is no other solution for the party aktiv but to learn these skills through practice. A return to the old, administrative methods of implementing the party's leading role would again lead us astray to political distortions and would deepen distrust to the party, which we are overcoming with difficulty.

The battle on the workers self-management front has not died down yet. The adversary is using here a different set of tactics than in regard to trade unions, whose rebirth it is simply boycotting. It tries to get its people into self-management. For example, in the Lublin Truck Factory [FSC] nearly all the activists of the Solidarity extremist wing interned after 13 December, were proposed for the workers council. The enterprise committees are sensitized to this danger and try to counteract it. It must at the same time be emphasized that it is the enterprise committees which are the advocates of reactivating self-management despite the resistance that has appeared in some ministries, and even in the head management of some enterprises.

We as a party body believe that the reactivation of self-management is of great political and economic importance. The Voivodship Committee had to remind some ministries that they had applications from factories for reactivation of self-management lying in their drawers and that they cannot be treated with such bureaucratic sluggishness. Finally, by mid March we had self-management set up in 130 enterprises out of the 200 that were entitled to it. Party members make up 10-40 percent of the workers councils.

[Question] Is this a satisfactory situation?

[Answer] Yes, it appears that in general our comrades, if they are well selected, that is if they represent high qualifications and moral values, gain the support of work crews. This is further evidence of the change of climate. We can also observe the same thing during elections to trade union councils. So far there have been about 60 of them. Two-thirds of the elected leaders are PZPR members, and 1/3 are nonparty. Thus, probably, there no longer are antiparty feelings among work crews. It is worth adding that among the members of trade unions which are being formed in the voivodship, workers amount to 40 percent, and to 65 percent in industry.

[Question] So far we have been talking about the party's activity "on the outside," which was a direct result of the situation following the suspension of the martial law. Let us now talk about the situation in the party itself. I would like to begin with a question connected with your professional status. You are a scientist, for a long time you have accupied yourself with the functioning of the state, the institutions of public life, and the party. Before being elected as the first secretary of the KW, you were the rector of the UMCS [Maria Skłodowska-Curie University]. How does the Lublin scientific milieu participate in the work of the party and in the activities of the KW?

[Answer] I am trying to maintain personal, close contacts with the academic milieu. I am still a member of the party organization at the UMCS. Admittedly, it happens that during meetings in factories workers ask me why I meet so frequently with that milieu, or with actors, or education employees. In their questions there is a certain reproach; that the first secretary of the KW is too absorbed by those contacts. I tell them that they are necessary if for no other reason than because much confusion and many political conflicts have occurred in those milieux and they need great attention. And this convinces them.

But to the point. There does not exist in the KW any special group of scientific advisers. On the other hand, many scientific workers who are party members actively participate in the KW commissions, preparing expert appraisements of concrete subjects there. In the economic section scientists actively involve themselves in the process of implementing the economic reform. In the agricultural sphere, for example, a penetrating analysis of agricultural policy assumptions was made, and served as the basis of the pronouncement by Prof Henryk Domzal from the Agricultural Academy, at the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee. Sometimes we call some "ad hoc" assemblies for an analysis of certain phenomena. Among other things, they investigated the question of high wages in enterprises at the end of last year against the background of continuing signs of inflation.

In the first weeks of March of the current year we organized a conference of our KW and the KW from the area of the former Lublin Voivodship that is, Biala Podlaska, Chelm, and Zamosc. We have common problems which require solutions with the help of the scientific cadre concentrated in Lublin. The point is to help those voivodships which do not have their own scientific centers. Among other things, the conceptions of an inter-voivodship party school was on the agenda.

Here it should be emphasized that in the domain of propaganda, party education, and publishing activity, we get the most help from the employees of Lublin schools of higher education. Many comrades who work there act as lecturers at the KW, the WUM [Central Audit Commission] and organizers of scientific sessions; most recently on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Polish workers' movement.

Of great significance are informal contacts with scientists, which I try to maintain continuously.

[Question] However, this base must have been seriously weakened politically and ideologically in the period before 13 December 1981? I understand that there was great confusion at the UMSC and above all in the political science division.

[Answer] Even more so in the philosophy and sociology faculties. A large part of their party members returned their party cards, including two University Committee secretaries. The extremist forces of Solidarity brought about such a climate that the University Committee dissolved itself. But this dramatic situation at the same time brought a reaction from that part of the party aktiv which until then had been pushed onto a side track. Soon after 13 December but still before Christmas, about 100 comrades gathered and on their own accord appointed a temporary University Committee. It was headed by the known philosopher, Prof Zdzislaw Cackowski, who presided over it until the fall of last year. Thus, gradually, the strengthening of party influence has been taking place also at UMSC, although it is a very difficult process.

[Question] I spoke with some comrades in Lublin asking them about the style of work of the Voivodship Committee and its first secretary. I was told that you do not like to sit behind the desk...

[Answer] Today it is unthinkable. People are waiting for personal contacts with party activists, for direct conversations, and exchange of words, and I try to be equal to these needs. I came to the KW on 23 June 1981, already the next day, as the first secretary, I was at the FSC. Last year I had more than 50 meetings with various milieux. Among them were those planned earlier and others suddenly announced. Sometimes on the way to Warsaw I stop in Gmina Committees for a half hour. Before the year's end I dropped in at the Nitrogen Works in Pulawy, and to see the railroad workers in Deblin, to thank them for carrying out their tasks well. At the same time, other KW secretaries maintain continuous ties with enterprises, institutions, and POPs.

I also try to meet with the KW division employees. There are 77 political workers in the KW. Only two of them are of retirement age; the majority are 30-40 years old. From them I also require that they perform their work in the field rather than at the KW offices. Not long ago I spoke with the economic secretary and told him I wanted to meet the next day with his subordinate apparatus. He said: "Impossible, they have not been working outside for 4 days, they must visit the field."

On the other hand, there are insufficient ties with the basic level organization and between the POP and those members of the KW Executive Board who are not full-time employees of the apparatus. That is why the Organizational Division is working on a concrete plan of action in this sphere which also includes KW members. Since these comrades cannot always be qualified in problems brought up in various milieux, we will combine their visits with visits of KW inspectors who have a certain specialization within particular KW divisions. Thus these inspectors are to play the role of experts and to make sure that certain issues are seen to, and so on. In any case, we are talking about auxiliary activity at the service of KW members.

[Question] This is a very important remark. In fact, at a Central Audit Commission Plenum recently, certain trends toward transgressing the authority of the apparatus defined by the PZPR Statute were signaled in one of the voivodships.

[Answer] We do not have this problem. At the first meeting with the KW workers I recalled the clear decisions of the Congress in this matter, that is the principle of the ancillary role of the party apparatus with regard to party bodies and organizations. I have no information that it is being distorted.

[Question] What changes have taken place in the party apparatus in recent years?

[Answer] The fluctuation has been high. In the whole of the voivodship 149 comrades have left: 72 on their own request, 29 for the reason of not being reelected to party leadership, 12 because of negative evaluation, and 36 have retired. The present composition is characterized by good trade skills and mostly college education, but sometimes less political experience.

[Question] In connection with this, aren't you afraid that these comrades may not notice certain dangers to the line of political renewal in the party; something older members have learned on past historical meanders? Here I have in mind such practices as the fixing of meetings and discussions, exposing in the press the "protocol" of the organization's activity, curbing of the publicness of life, and so on?

[Answer] It is simply necessary to train this new cadre and it needs to gain political experiences in daily practice. And in our analyses and evaluations we encounter the tendencies to curb the publicness of life. Once the "Szopka Lubelska" [a satirical show] made fun of such inclinations in the administrative activity. We in the KW Executive Board, on the other hand, have recently been evaluating the enterprise press. It has turned out that in one enterprise, the material to be published was being censored by a member of the management. It is known what effects this has upon criticism. We have become very sensitized by this signal. The KW secretary was asked to carry out conversations with the management of that plant. In a word, we see the dangers for the openness of life and for public criticism, and try to counteract them. The point is, however,

that the editing board is financially dependent on the plant's management, which pays their salaries as well as the costs of publishing the paper. The best solution would be for a publishing house to take the paper over because social control cannot function authentically (and a paper is one of its instruments) if it is dependent on the institution which it should be evaluating.

[Question] These types of dependencies occur also in people's councils, something we were discussing earlier. Particularly in the gmina councils. It frequently happens that the chairman is a farmer who is personally dependent on the mayor with regard to supplies of building materials, fertilizers, and various administrative decisions. This dependency has a hampering influence on the control activity of the whole Gmina People's Council.

[Answer] These are serious problems of social and political significance and they cannot be solved by legal regulation alone. Here we as the party must continuously influence the democratization of the methods of functioning of state organs in conformity with society's interests.

[Question] In concluding our conversation I would like to ask for a characterization of the feelings of the working class milieux, their influence on the work of the party, the KW, and other [party] bodies.

[Answer] According to the numerical data which we presented at the voivodship conference, the party status declined during the term by 18,795 people. Worker participation dropped from 38.3 to 33 percent. It should be recalled that it was in our voivodship where the big strikes of 1980 began. Later such plants as the Swidnik Transportation Equipment Plant, the FSC, Lublin Auto Repair Works, the Rolling Bearings Factory in Krasnik, and Nitrogen Works in Pulawy were taken over by Solidarity extremists. After 13 December, strikes and protests actions took place in them. In order to unblock these plants, force was used. In Swidnik it was necessary to dismiss about 200 people from work. As late as May of last year there were pronouncements against martial law regulations. However, already by the middle of last year things calmed down. Solidarity met with failure in undertaking further actions. Employees got tired and at the same time sobered up. The party started catching its breath. In the reports campaign the voices of party workers began to be heard very clearly. They submitted to criticism the distortions of the economic reform, speculators preying on market difficulties, and enrichment at workers' expense of raising the prices of many articles of daily use. Voices were heard clearly demanding the application by authorities of the principles of class policy and protecting the interests of the working people. In taking these voices into consideration we influenced the improvement of the supply situation of the work crews, organized in factories fairs of goods in demand, and so on. The workers' pronouncements not only concerned the conditions of subsistence. A polemic with opposition activists on the question of rebuilding trade unions began. A stormy polemic took place, for example, at the enterprise conference in the FSC, when one of the invitees, a member of the advisory

council acting in the period of the self-management suspension, attacked the conception of the trade union movement rebirth. He was given such a rebuff that I myself did not have to add anything.

In a word, a gradual regaining of political awareness by worker comrades is taking place. Their combativeness toward enemy forces is growing. At the same time the extreme leftist feelings have been discharged. As the first secretary of the KW, I was visited by representatives of "Rzeczywistosc" voivodship clubs and their central authorities. They demanded a conversation, an explanation to ease their doubts: Are we being threatened by neocapitalism, reprivatization of collective property, burdening the workers with the costs of the economic reform? Is our Church policy correct? The point was a discussion, not a fight against the party line. This is an important difference. Besides, when decisions about dissolving nonstatutory organizational structures were made, the local activists of "Rzeczywistosc" clubs submitted to them and there was no need to ask the Voivodship Party Control Commission to intervene.

Thus I can say that in the Lublin region today there are no serious threats to party unity, that ever better conditions for its strengthening and effective influence upon society are being created.

[Question] Thank you for the conversation.

12270

CSO: 2600/668



## PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON FOREIGN AID CONDUCTED

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 May 83 p 6

[Article: "Results of Public Opinion Investigation Center Poll. Public Opinion of Foreign Gifts. Evaluation of Importance, Scope and Distribution of This Form of Aid"]

[Text] (Own Information). The Public Opinion Investigation Center of the Committee for Radio and Television has conducted in February 1983 a poll on foreign gifts based on a representative nationwide test. In the poll were considered such problems as the opinion on this form of aid, its importance and scope, the distribution of gifts and the evaluation of the institutions dealing with the distribution.

The question if it is good or bad that gifts from abroad are coming to Poland was answered by 51 percent of respondents positively, 37 percent negatively and the rest did not express any opinion. This means that a little bit more than a half of the respondents appreciated this form of aid giving for their opinion such as the increase of the pool of consumption goods, mitigation of the market shortages, alleviation of the fate of the ones in the worst situation.

The opponents to the gifts (37 percent of respondents) see in them a humiliation to the country and society and find that it is not so bad in our country that aid in such a form is necessary and that, although they are bad, Poles should surmount their difficulties by themselves. There appeared also opinions that the gifts are disuniting society and generating envy because they are distributed in an unfair way.

The results of the poll prove that the majority does not assign to the gifts a significant role in mitigating the results of the crisis. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents found that this form of aid has a great or very great significance in our situation of crisis, 60 percent found that it has a negligible one or nearly none (11 percent had no opinion).

During the last 2 years 39 percent of the respondents received, according to their own statements, at least once a parcel from abroad. Parcels from

relatives or friends were received by 14 percent, from unknown donors by 2 percent. Gifts by the agency of various institutions were received by 30 percent of the respondents. The most, because 23 percent of them, received parcels by the agency of the Church, 3 percent through their workplaces and 3 percent from schools. By one percent of the respondents received foreign gifts through the Polish Red Cross, the health service, the social care and mainly the Polish Social Assistance Committee, and other institutions.

The respondents were asked to list the countries from which, according to their knowledge, are coming the gifts for Poland. The most often was mentioned the Federal Republic of Germany (63 percent), the United States (53 percent), France (35 percent) and the USSR (33 percent).

The wording of one of the poll's questions was: "Are the gifts coming to Poland distributed in a fair way?" It was answered with 22 percent positive opinions and 47 percent negative ones. This means that the number of respondents objecting to the rightfulness of the distribution of gifts was twice as large as those who did not have any objections. A very high percentage of respondents, as much as 31 percent, had no opinion on this matter.

Respondents who evaluated critically the distribution of gifts, interposed against the institutions dealing with it such objections as lack of a sufficient knowledge about the financial situation of the persons receiving the gifts, lack of control, relationships of gossip, casualness of the distribution.

The most often mentioned institution known to respondents for the distribution of gifts was the Church, mentioned by 86 percent of them. Much more rarely were mentioned the Polish Red Cross (40 percent), the Polish Social Assistance Committee (19 percent), the education system (12 percent), the administration (8 percent) and the workplaces (7 percent).

The respondents who knew what institutions are dealing with the distribution of gifts in Poland (they constituted 90 percent of the total) were asked to answer the question if they have objections against any of these institutions relating to the performance of this duty. Subject to the most often formulated objections was the Catholic Church (23 percent). Much more rarely respondents directed their objections against the Polish Red Cross (8 percent), Polish Social Assistance Committee (4 percent), health service, education system and administration (by 2 percent each).

12376

CSO: 2600/875

MINISTRY SPOKESMAN EXPLAINS WAJDA DISMISSAL

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 12 May 83 p 4

[Statement by Andrzej Unger, press spokesman of the Ministry of Culture and Art; "The Wajda Affair"]

[Text] The news of the replacement of the director of the "X" Film Company, who was Andrzej Wajda, has become advantageously utilized by a portion of the Western press as an element in their anti-Polish campaign, and it is being adapted to their attack on all the actions, without exception, undertaken by our state authorities. Certain West European newspapers presented the personal decisions in the "X" Film Company as a manifestation of the "threat to the existence of Polish culture." Unfortunately, this campaign has been supported by Andrzej Wajda himself, who announced to the West German DPA [GERMAN PRESS AGENCY] that he regarded his dismissal as an attempt to deprive him of the opportunity to do artistic work in Poland. This assertion was unfounded, contrary to the truth as well as to the intentions of the motion-picture authorities. Andrzej Wajda of his own free will and choice, while still holding the position of director in the Polish motion-picture industry, was working on films for Western producers, though still on good terms with our establishment. We have respected and still do respect the fact that this is a temporary situation. Andrzej Wajda, as an outstanding Polish director and, in the future, a person who will work in the Polish State Motion-Picture Industry, has full opportunities for making films in Poland. He knows this very well.

However, the possibilities for artistic work are quite different from performing the functions of a director of a state cultural institution, which is what a film company is. Directing a company means making decisions regarding its programmatic line, about the work of other creative artists, as well as the right to dispose of considerable state funds. It is an obvious matter that performing the directorial functions in every state structure, including those in film companies, requires a harmony of trends and programmatic concepts corresponding to the state authorities; likewise, a director assigned by them to a post must require confidence and cooperation. Based on an analysis of the films produced by the "X" Film Company, we have determined that this harmony of programmatic line has been defective and that, because of this, there has not been the necessary cooperation. This was the result of the accent placed by A. Wajda on political convictions

which followed a line ill-disposed toward the general policy of the state authorities. From this point of view the appropriate institutional authorities decreed--among other personnel moves--the replacement of the directors of the "X" Film Company. I am not saying that this change is unimportant. The standing of Andrzej Wajda in the Polish and the worldwide motion-picture industry causes this change to arouse interest. It is not, however, the signal of a change in the state's open cultural policy but rather an indication that a practice has now been attained wherein from this day on our personnel and our policy will not be at odds with each other. In this light the dismissal of A. Wajda should not cause any sensation at all. A. Wajda's position in the cultural life of Poland has been defined by his own creative work.

Another cause of the decision to replace the artistic director of the "X" Film Company was the fact that Andrzej Wajda for a lengthy period now has been spending a great deal of time abroad. Also dismissed was production director Barbara Pec-Slesicka, who in a letter she circulated asserted that, to be sure, such an outpost as a film company could be directed even by telephone; a cultural institution is, however, a different kind of task.

I would like to declare that performing the directorial functions in the state hierarchy requires loyalty to subordinates, to the state authorities, and its policies. Attacking this state in public pronouncements abroad, published as part of the campaign of insults conducted in the United States and West Europe is contrary to the principle of loyalty. Andrzej Wajda's position with regard to the change in the directorship of the "X" Film Company and with regard to our cultural policy only confirms the fact that the decision which was undertaken to entrust the conduct of this company to another creative person was necessary.

Regardless of whether Andrzej Wajda turns away from the attempts to take advantage of his dismissal to intensify a political campaign aimed at the interests of Poland, or whether he does not wish to do this, he is assured in Poland in the future of those conditions for creative work which are required for an artist of his scope.

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CSO: 2600/876

## PROVINCIAL TRADE UNION MOVEMENT DEVELOPMENTS NOTED

## Workers' Competence in Union Activities

Bydgoszcz GAZETA POMORSKA in Polish 26 Apr 83 p 3

[Text] Union members in enterprises are confused by the regulations governing administrative leaves for elected union officials and nonpaid leaves for union activists. This problem is important in view of the fact that union activists are independent of the enterprise administration as well as due to the difficult beginnings of the trade unions. The minister of labor, wages and social affairs addressed this problem on 21 March 1983 at the request of the Citizens' Consultative Commission--established by the Council of State--which was inundated by questions and suggestions from the union members. The following information is based on his presentation: (a) An employee who is an officer of the enterprise union organization is eligible for leave to perform union functions in accordance with the Art. 29, Sec. 3 of the bill on trade unions of 8 October 1982 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 32, Sec. 216). If particular needs of the enterprise union organization warrant it, the enterprise director may grant an elected union official temporary leave for a given number of hours at the request of the union organization when such leave is necessary to perform his tasks in a timely manner; (b) during such leave the employee retains his right to emoluments, calculated in accordance with the Sec. 4 of the Executive Order of the minister of labor, wages and social affairs of 18 December 1974 on calculating remunerations for the period of nonworking, compensations, compensatory allowances and some other remunerations related to employment (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 51, Sec. 334, including subsequent changes); (c) the enterprise director must grant an administrative leave in accordance with Art. 32, Sec. 2 of the bill on trade unions to an employee, designated by the union to perform an elective office in the enterprise organization; (d) the emoluments established by the labor contract, discussed in the Art. 32, Sec. 2 of the bill on trade unions, covers elements of remuneration for vacation leave. During unpaid vacation an employee is eligible for benefits and services, which are spelled out in the labor contract and for which he was eligible before taking vacation, but excluding benefits and services related to job performance (e.g. protective and work clothes, regenerative meals, compensatory leaves). In particular, an employee on a leave without pay is eligible for: cost of living adjustments due to food price increases and higher fuel costs; social services; material compensations or monetary equivalents instead of goods, specified in the labor contract or other

renumeration regulations in a given enterprise; anniversary awards; and health care.

#### Problems Among Suwalki Union Members

Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA in Polish 27 Apr 83 p 2

[Text] According to Zofia Witkowska-Mosiewicz, spokesperson for the Voivodship Administration Office, last Tuesday, 26 April 1983, the meeting of the team for trade union affairs, attached to the governor's office, and which convened in Suwalki, was attended by 55 chairmen of the boards and founding committees of enterprise union organizations. Jozef Smarzewski, lt governor and team chairman, reported on the economic situation in the voivodship after the first quarter of the year.

Positive phenomena have been observed in agriculture. Efficient preparations for spring field work offer a good prognosis, particularly with regard to plant crops. Also, good procurement of milk and cattle improved food supplies on the market. Last quarter witnessed complete supply of basic foodstuffs and continuous improvement in this regard has been noticed already.

With regard to the supply of industrial--particularly consumer--goods the situation is still difficult. After the first quarter the voivodship economy showed continued growth with still existing discrepancy between the growth of the average wage and labor efficiency.

Representatives of the trade unions reported on problems experienced by crews in enterprises. They pointed out to the need to improve the supply of enterprises in protective cloth as well as to improve the supplies on the market and the verification of housing construction plans in some cities.

Boguslaw Podhul, board chairman of the trade union at the Municipal and Housing Economy Enterprise in Goldap, emphasized the need to create supraenterprise union structures in some ministries and the need of broader consultation of union problems with city and gmina chiefs.

#### Union Membership Open to Everyone

Szczecin KURIER SZCZECINSKI in Polish 27 Apr 83 p 4

[Article by (tur)]

[Text] The initiative group formed spontaneously through the efforts of a few persons. Among them were Ryszard Grela, Tadeusz Fotymski, Janusz Lesinski and Jan Makowski, among others. Later, at a meeting they established the Founding Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of the Polmo FMS [Compact Car Plant]. The union was registered under that name on 27 January 1983. In February a larger group elected the Temporary Union Board.

They decided then that they were too few in number to decide who will continue in the union leadership. However, they had to elect the Temporary Union Board,

because there were so many problems waiting to be resolved that somebody had to do it. There was no time to wait for the statutory allowances and to decide on disposition of the funds of the former trade unions. That was not an easy decision. It generated many controversial opinions; "our" money, "your" money, more of one than the other. A decision was made to use the fund for the entire crew until it is exhausted, but no longer than until the end of 1983. The fund will be used to pay statutory allowances regardless whether the beneficiary is a union member or not. In 1984, however, the allowances will be paid only to union members, because they will be the only ones who paid the membership dues.

At present the Temporary Union Board acts in accordance with the principle that all employees will be assisted by the union. Such are the needs of the people and the union will act on them as its bylaws require.

It is of no consequence that some come to test the authority and performance of the union because they do not fully trust it as yet. This is not surprising, considering the fact that there are still people in the plant, who want to fret and irritate people and even to threaten those who wish to join the union. The situation has not been "rosy" and continues the same. Naturally, those who have joined the union do not count on a "rosy" situation. They are people who for the most part joined the union in order to do something for the crew, and who are not afraid to tackle all problems the union may face. None of them counts the hours or expects a reward. They work on a volunteer basis in addition to their regular professional duties. They know that it is their performance in the name of the union that will change the numerical status of the union in the near future as well as will be responsible for overcoming the distrust barrier and the waiting attitude of those watching the union now from the sidelines. As to the everyday problems, they abound. For example, a group of employees after a conflict with management asked the union for assistance in securing transfers to other departments. The enterprise administration complied with the union request to accomodate the employees.

Sand cleaners from the Hardening Shop asked the union to secure for them special meals, because the ministry's regulations allow such meals for he hardeners only. However, in Polmo both the sand cleaners and hardeners work in the same room and thus are equally exposed to harmful agents present during the technological process. The union has already secured the meals for the sand cleaners.

The union was also involved in a rather unpleasant situation. The administration discharged two employees. Their violations were so severe that the union was in no position to object. Lesinski, who is the chairman of the Temporary Union Board, as well as Grela and Makowski, both members of the Board, and Tadeusz Fotymski, who was a member of the Founding Committee and now assists the Board, all of them say that in such situations the union will not defend anybody. It will not defend people who do not perform their duties. The case of employees who were disciplined for leaving their work early was different. During investigation it was established that they had attended a meeting and there was little time left until the end of the shift, so the employees left for home. They later agreed to make up that time another day after hours. These employees had high seniority and good performance records,

therefore, after talks with the union the administration agreed to rescind disciplinary actions.

These are the kinds of everyday problems in the field of interpersonal relations and employee welfare which require the union's intervention. Some of them require action outside the enterprise and hence the need for the establishment of supraenterprise union structures.

Janusz Lesinski stated that the union already ponders the question of who will be the best to join with. The union's recommendation was to join with an enterprise with a similar production profile; that means an enterprise in the automotive industry.

He stated: "At the enterprise we are involved in various matters, big and small, all concerning the employee. And that is good. However, we feel a growing need for an opportunity to be involved in a broader discussion and to express our views on such matters as, for example, price increases, which are debated by the crews."

Makowski added: "Talks between enterprises ought to take place as soon as possible. At this point the unions in enterprises feel isolated and they do not have enough power, which they would have acquired after joining the unions in other enterprises. It is important for us to be able to express our own views and be respected.

"The union in Polmo is small. At present it has only 160 members. We are in the process of preparing for the elections to the Union Board which are scheduled for the beginning of May. Slowly but continuously new employees come to us and take application forms to join. Nobody rushes anybody."

#### Creation of Supra-Plant Union Structure

Zielona Gora GAZETA LUBUSKA in Polish 27 Apr 83 p 3

[Article by L.]

[Text] The consumer goods industry in Zielona Gora Voivodship is one of those industry branches nationwide which are ready for a supra-plant union structure.

That this idea is real was exemplified by the meeting of chairpersons of 15 unions, which already function in the plants of the wool, cotton, knitting, leather and cloth industries in almost entire voivodship. The meeting convened in the Polska Welna [Polish Cotton] club.

The meeting was chaired by Maria Smolarczyk, chairperson, Union Board at the Polska Welna, who warmly welcomed participants from nearly all consumer goods industry centers in the voivodship. She stated: "The time has come for the representatives of allied workers unions to acquaint with each other and exchange their first experiences as well as to discuss the possibility of combining their efforts."



Zbigniew Dulski, union chairperson at the Zagan Wool Combing Works, proposed for discussion several current problems such as the character of the relationship between the plant administrations and the unions; union property; legal advisory service, which is so important for the union activities, etc.

Considerable amount of time during the discussion was devoted to the sanatoria permits. It appears that due to insufficient control some persons get to go to the sanatoria twice a year while others have to wait for a permit 2 or more years. Only a numerically strong and well functioning union organization can erradicate such unfavorable phenomena and anomalies. It was also emphasized that the permits for preventive health care have not been properly distributed as well. Likewise, there is a problem with health care permits for the so-called "professional health hazards" situations, which guarantee certain number of permits to employees, working in particularly hard conditions.

Considerable attention was paid to union finances. Many issues require regulation. Otherwise, the union has to deal with such paradoxical situations as the one in which the enterprise administration submitted to the union for approval 12 apartment allocations to employees. Most of them were not members of the union, and therefore not paying union dues. A question arises: Who should cover the expenses of the housing commission's trips to verify the needs of persons selected for new apartments? Certainly not the meager union funds (as some believe). The union practice creates similar doubts on a daily basis.

All participants heard with interest a cable received a few days earlier by a Ziemia Lubuska region union from a group of union officials from the consumer goods industry plants in Lodz. The Lodz union activists requested that a delegation be sent to a national consultation conference of representatives of the entire industry. The aim of the conference is to discuss such problems; it is scheduled for the beginning of May.

The participants passed several resolutions even though not all industry unions were represented.

They decided to hire a legal counsel, knowledgeable in the above matters, in the shortest time possible. Each union present agreed to contribute to the costs of this undertaking. The legal counsel would be obligated to assist the unions and their members in matters concerning conditions of employment as well as represent them in the Labor and Social Welfare Court. To simplify the situation a contract with the legal counsel would be signed by one union only with others equally contributing to a joint fund, established to execute the labor contract with the legal counsel. The participants officially created the temporary voivodship team of representatives of the plant union boards of consumer goods industry employees. Unions not represented at the meeting will be allowed to designate their representatives to this body. Polska Welna was designated as the team's central office.

The participants elected a 7 member voivodship working group for the Affairs of Inter-Plant Consumer Goods Industry Employees. It is composed of representatives from the union organizations in Zielona Gora, Zary, Zagan, Nowa Sol, Gubin, Leszno Gorne and other cities. Its immediate task is to prepare a

delegation of the Ziemia Lubuska region to the national conference scheduled for May in Lodz.

The participants also agreed to submit to the national citizens Consultative Commission in Warsaw and to the speaker of the Sejm a detailed proposal on legal guarantees for and protection of the labor contract of persons performing functions in their capacities as elected union officials.

The participants agreed that the exchange of thoughts and experiences between the union activists of the consumer goods industry in the voivodship will greatly benefit the union cause.

#### Work Release Assignments to Union Activists

Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 28 Apr 83 p 3

[Article by Kazimierz Iwaniec, secretary, Citizens Information-Advisory Commission for Trade Unions Affairs at Presidium of the Voivodship People's Council [WRN] in Lublin]

[Text] Judging from the meetings and discussions with the newly elected union officials as well as from letters received by the Information-Advisory Commission for Trade Union Affairs at the WRN Presidium in Lublin, the regulations contained in the bill on trade union with regard to securing conditions for the enterprise union organizations to execute their authority require additional explanations due to disagreements on interpretation between enterprise administrations and union representatives. Due to the efforts of the Citizens Consultative Commission at the Council of State an explanation no. 4 of the minister of labor, wages, and social affairs of 21 March 1983 was issued with regard to granting work releases to employees, elected to union offices and performing their functions, as well as remuneration for unpaid vacation period.

The first part of that explanation concerns article 29, item 3 of the bill on trade unions, which stated the following: "The enterprise director is obligated to grant a work release to an employee retaining this employee's right to remuneration for the period necessary to perform functions related to his union office if these functions cannot be performed on his own time."

Explanation no. 4 states in this regard that "If it can be justified by special needs of the enterprise union organization with regard to its establishment and development of statutory activities the enterprise director ought at the union's request to grant an employee, who was elected to a union office and performs his functions, a work release for the amount of time necessary to perform a union task."

With regard to remuneration for the period of work release the employee retains the right to pay, calculated in accordance with item 4 of the Executive Order of the minister of labor, wages, and social affairs of 18 December 1974 on calculating remuneration for nonwork time, compensations, pay adjustments and

certain other compensations related to the labor contract [DZIENNIK USTAW No 51, Item 334, as amended].

The second part of the explanation no 4 concerns article 32, item 2 of the bill on trade unions which contains a requirement that "at the request of the enterprise union organization the enterprise director is obligated to grant an unpaid leave to an employee, designated to perform functions of an elective office in the enterprise union organization. Such an employee is eligible for all benefits, contained in his labor contract, with the exception of pay."

In this regard the explanation states that the remuneration specified in the labor contract contains elements of this remuneration to be paid for the vacation leave period based on the following principles: (a) during an unpaid leave an employee is eligible for benefits and services provided for his position by the labor contract before the leave was granted with the exception of those benefits and services he would be eligible for because of the nature of his work or the working conditions (e.g. protective cloth, work cloth, special meals, compensatory leave); (b) in particular, during the unpaid leave the employee is eligible for cost of living adjustments, health care benefits, pay in goods or monetary equivalent of such as defined by the labor contract or other remuneration regulations effective in a given enterprise, anniversary awards and welfare benefits.

The third part of the explanation concerns article 32, item 1 of the bill on trade unions on the basis of which "the enterprise director is obligated to provide the enterprise union organizations with offices and equipment necessary for their proper functioning."

According to the explanation, this requirement specifically covers such things as providing the enterprise union organization with a proper office, necessary office equipment and other materials as well as performing for the union office and administrative functions such as bookkeeping, typing, etc.

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## CONTINUITY THEORY, CLAIMS TO TRANSYLVANIA EXAMINED

Munich SUEDEST EUROPA in German No 2, 1983 pp 77-89

[Article by Dionisie Ghermani: "Rumania's National Self-Appreciation"]

[Text] In the Rumania of today, the interpretation of its history is vastly impressed by the knowledge that the Rumanians come from Romanized Daci (Romanism, resp. Latinism), and that, since the establishment of the first Dacian empire under Burebista (82-44 B.C.), resp. "Dacia Felix" by the Romans in 107 A.D., the descendants of these "forefathers" have lived without interruption (continuity) within the present national boundaries (also including Transylvania) and beyond that in East Moldavia (Bessarabia).

The "Romanism and Continuity Theory" originated in the 17/18th Century in Transylvania and was originally further developed especially by representatives of the presently outlawed Greek-Catholic ("unified") Church and by the "Transylvanian School" (Scoala Ardeleana). Since that time, it has formed the nucleus of the national self-conception of all Rumanians with a brief interruption between 1945-1965. The emphasis with which this theory is continually reaffirmed and defended is related to the actual or presumed claims of Hungary to Transylvania but also to the Russian, resp. Soviet justification for their occupation of East Moldavia. The "Romanism and Continuity Theory," which was placed emphatically at the forefront of the national countenance during the Ceausescu era, has been unassailed dominating not only the historiographic but also the literary circles since 1982. The vehemence with which it is advocated is traced back to the growing unrest among the Transylvanian Magyars and to "revisionist activities" by exiled Hungarians,<sup>1</sup> which, the Rumanians suspect, has the hand of Budapest behind it.

The numerous articles, essays and monographs published within the timespan from the spring of 1982 to February 1983 can be grouped in several categories. The stress is on the ethnogenesis of the Rumanian nation, the occupation of Transylvania by Dacians first within historical time, the continuous occupation of Transylvania by their successors the Protorumanians and Rumanians up to the present, the sad fate of Rumanians in Transylvania under Hungarian control, the ethnically and historically justified annexation of Transylvania to Rumania after WWI, the injustice

done to Rumania by the "Vienna Dictum" in 1940 to incorporate Northern Transylvania into Hungary, the fate of Rumanians remaining in Northern Transylvania, and the problem-free coexistence of Rumanians and Hungarians in communist Rumania.

### On the Ethnogenesis of Rumanians

During the first period of the Ceausescu era, the traditions of the greater part of Rumanian history-writing were followed,<sup>2</sup> stressing especially the Romanism of the Rumanian people, since it was favored to display an "ancestor" which had a more ancient and more glorious history than that of the Slavs, and because Rumania was seeking moral and political support by the Romanic nations of Europe and Latin America against Moscow. After this, for the past few years, the ethnic origin of the Rumanians is increasingly being traced back to the Daci. It can be considered typical of the broad scale of a national-centric way of thinking that a literary journal considered it appropriate to publish a nearly 10-year old text from a well-known Rumanian historian, since deceased, who wrote about "fundamentals" of the history of origin of the Rumanian people.<sup>3</sup> Obviously, the rule was to cite and interpret foreign authors from the antiques up to modern times.

A popular scientific journal quoted Vergil (Georgice II, 497) chiefly to certify that the main ancestors of Rumanians, the "Thraco-Geto-Dacians" were extremely brave. Before they engaged in battle, they "drank from the waters of the Istrum River and swore to return only as victors." In the same article, it is also mentioned that "the Geto-Dacian tribes" formed an alliance and that they "lived on both banks of the Danube." This alliance was referred to by Horatius Flaccus as the "Dacian Peril" (to the Roman Empire--D.G.) which is to indicate the might of these people. Horace is supposed to have asked the anxious question of the Romans: "Numquid de Dacis audisti?" (What else did you hear about the Dacians?). Vergil also wrote about the Dacians and the area where they lived (Georgice III, 349-381) and so did, of course, Ovid who was exiled to Tomis (now Constanta on the Black Sea--D.G.). And finally, the Greek literature of legends also mentions the Dacians in a prominent place.<sup>4</sup>

With a view on the suppression of "peoples of ancient times just as those of modern times" by the great powers, another literary journal refers to the Dacians as belonging among those people of antiquity "who suffered under the great empires." The "glorification of Roman occupation (Dacia's--D.G.) which the archeologists undertook under the impression of findings and monuments in the region of our country" but especially the "false theory according to which (the Romans--D.G.) taught the Dacians the Latin language" is alleged to be "absurd" and to contradict "the conception represented in the Party documents."

"A great people which manifests a presence hundreds of centuries old and which had a high level of economic management--according to comrade Ceausescu--could not be simply Romanized under the influence of the few

legions of the empire (Roman). Rather, (these people) dacianized the Roman legionaries." Apart from the "mutual exchange," the Dacian people allegedly also retained their own language. The Rumanian language is by no means a result of the "temporary occupation" of part of Dacia by the Romans. It is allegedly related to the Thracian-Dacian language "from which classical Latin developed."<sup>5</sup>

An army journal undertook the task to explain the etymological origin of the designation Walach/Walachia. "The Germans of ancient times referred to the neighboring Celts as Welsh. A Celtic tribe, mentioned by Ceasar, was called Volcae. This designation was used especially in Old-German, in the form of Walch, referring to the Romans or to Romanized Gauls. This concept also entered the Slavic world, which had been connected with the German world for a long time, whereby it took the form Vlah, resp. Voloh. It was also adopted by Byzantine and later by the Hungarian language. At the time of its spreading, the concept 'Vlah' referred to the ethno-political belonging to East Romania, to Carpatho-Danubian Land-Pontic Romanism, and also to the successors of Romans in the Balkan lands..."<sup>6</sup>

Another author is oriented more toward the Romans. He describes his reflections in a literary journal. He writes: "Our nation calls itself Rumanian, a notion derived from Romans, and it is thus the only nation of Roman origin which acknowledges its origin by its name." The author supports his assertion through the writings of numerous chroniclers, churchmen and scientists of the Middle Ages, modern times and the present.<sup>7</sup> A political historian refers to a German and a French encyclopedia to confirm that "an apostle of the Dacians," Niketas, bishop of Remesiana,<sup>8</sup> who christened the Dacians North of the Danube, was of Dacian origin. Thereby she makes it understood that the ancestors of the Rumanians needed no foreign help to become Christians. It seems strange that this article appeared precisely in the historical organ of the Central Committee.<sup>9</sup>

#### Claim of Rumania to Transylvania

In the same Party organ, the brother of the leader of the Party and State, who turned out to be a leading military historian, Ilie Andruta Ceausescu, also published an article which is to document the nearly 2000 years of continuous occupation and political articulation by Rumanians within the boundaries of the present state. He uses thereby well-known proofs and arguments which, since the 18th Century, have belonged among the recurring motives of Rumanian history writing and, since the mid 1960s, have been a solid part of nearly all historical writings. The reader learns again from this article that--as repeatedly confirmed by his famous brother, the last time in 1982<sup>10</sup>--"the three Rumanian principalities, Walachia, Moldavia and Transylvania,...in battle against foreign subjugation, were formed with the goal to mold themselves into a mighty, unified state which would be capable to oppose foreign invasions and to provide for its independent development."

Citing the statement of a well-known younger historian,<sup>11</sup> with a glance at Moscow under whose control Bucharest has been for years, Ilie Ceausescu states that Moscow combats its pronounced nationalistic policies also with the help of "the Magyar Revisionism." Furthermore, "the expansionist policies of the great powers presented great dangers to the independence and unity of our nation. Under these circumstances, (also in earlier times--D.G.) the Rumanian principalities<sup>12</sup> had to present a common political, military and diplomatic front against the aggressions plotted for their occupation. The persistent fight for unity, freedom and independence represents a basic trait of our common history." <sup>13</sup>

According to the usual patterns which is true for every socialist state and is derived from the Marxist theory of determinism, Ilie Ceausescu also establishes a lawful continuity from the Dacian state of Burebistas to the present Communist Rumania. In another article, the same author stresses that Transylvania had a history separate from Hungary and was under the Hungarian crown "for only 51 years" between the Ausgleich (Settlement) of 1867 and 1918. During the time after the Ottoman invasion and the incorporation of Hungary into the Turkish union of states, Transylvania, just as Walachia and Moldavia, had the status of a protectorate of the Sublime Porte.<sup>14</sup>

One of the monographs on the Walachian prince, Michael the Brave (Mihai Vitiazul), who around 1600 succeeded in uniting the Danube principalities with Transylvania for a short time, stresses the prestige enjoyed by this prince among his contemporaries.<sup>15</sup> A review of this volume, published by the historical organ of the Central Committee, points out that some Hungarian noblemen, who served Emperor Rudolf II at the time, also expressed an extreme appreciation of the qualities of the Walachian prince. On the other hand, others have stressed that they considered it "impossible, unbelievable and unbearable that this (Michael the Brave--D.G.) or his son with his Bojars could be appropriate for political control of this land" and that "the neighbors and natives would not tolerate or suffer him."<sup>16</sup> This attitude led to the murder of the Walachian prince "and to a three-fold military intervention from the Poles and also from the Habsburg and Ottoman troops which was decisive in the dissolution of the political unity of the three principalities."<sup>16</sup>

#### The Battle of Transylvanian Rumanians for Freedom

A rather large number of articles is devoted to the fight for freedom by the Rumanians in Transylvania during the 18th and 19th Centuries. The central figure is the legendary freedom fighter, Avram Iancu (1824-72). Until the defeat of the revolutionary army, composed mostly of Magyars, in battle with the overwhelming combined troops of Austria and Russia in 1848-49, Iancu repeatedly intervened in consideration of the Rumanians who had almost no rights. In 1852, a Transylvanian periodical published a previously unknown written petition, sent by Iancu to Emperor Franz Josef in 1852, in which he urged Vienna to grant more rights to the Rumanians in Transylvania with respect to the use of their mother tongue. There was also mention about the misuse of power by the Hungarian authorities.<sup>17</sup>

Another article contains, supplied with a commentary, the funeral sermon of a contemporary and companion in arms of Iancu, Nicolae Mihalteanu.<sup>18</sup> As in the previous article, here also, reference is made to the bad treatment of the Rumanians on the part of the Hungarian authorities. An essay published by the most important historical journal of the country deals with the considerable contributions by the Transylvanian Rumanians to the 1848-49 uprising, which indeed ran largely parallel with the Hungarian one and had its own goals.<sup>19</sup> It is asserted here also that the Transylvanian Rumanians had fought not so much against Austria or Russia, at the time, but rather against "their tormentors," the Hungarian nobility.

In one article, the writing of the history of the postwar period--before the Ceausescu era--is strongly criticized, especially with respect to the description of the relationship between the Transylvanian Rumanians and Magyars during the 19th Century. The author takes aim, above all, at the chief historian at the time, Milhai Roller, who prescribed compulsory guidelines for Rumanian historiography, for 15 years, in agreement with the Soviet occupational force and the Stalinists of Rumania.

For instance, he objected to Volume IV of the handbook, "Istoria Romaniei," published in 1964, because of the historical "falsifications" and "inaccuracies" it contains. Roller consciously misinterpreted a speech by the Transylvanian scholar and freedom fighter, Simion Barnutiu, who in 1848 pledged himself in speech and writing to better the situation of his Rumanian-Transylvanian compatriots. Roller wrote: "The talk (Barnutiu) delivered in the cathedral also indicates the nationalistic narrow-mindedness of the speaker [...] By identifying an entire people, the Magyars, with the ruling class and landowner nobility, Barnutiu has sown mistrust and animosity between the Rumanians and the Magyars whereby a brake was applied to the revolutionary battle of the Rumanians and Magyars." The commentary of the author: "This is black on white! There, in the realm of darkness, where he has found eternal sleep, should Mr Roller snore."<sup>20</sup>

The champions of the unification of Transylvania with Rumania were honored by the present cultural elite of the nation completely differently. On the 110th anniversary of the death of Avram Iancu, the many thousands of youths from the entire (West Carpathian) region who marched to the grave of the freedom fighter were also accompanied by several well-known Rumanian intellectuals.<sup>21</sup>

Finally, an essay based on archive material documents the "justified will be fight" of the Rumanians from Maramures.<sup>22</sup> A glorifying article is dedicated also to Blaj (Blasendorf), in times past, the spiritual center of Transylvanian Rumanians, the origin of the Rumanian nationalistic awakening, and the site of many patriotic events and arrangements. It lists the many monuments and institutions this town has and in part still honors. The Greek-Catholic (Unified) Church which, more than all the other institutions, has made Blaj the center of Rumanian nationalist self-appreciation, is naturally overlooked.<sup>23</sup>



## Transylvania up to Its Division in 1940

The "Hungarian revisionism" of the period between the world wars is criticized in a family magazine, among others. The author disputes the three-volume documentation (1664 pages) presented by the Hungarian delegation to the peace treaty deliberations of Trianon (near Paris) towards the end of 1918. As chief witness for the legitimacy of the Rumanian position in the Transylvanian problem, he presents the French prime minister at the time, Alexandre Millerand (1920-1924) who, on 6 May 1920, as chairman of the peace conference, presented to the participating victor nations a reply to the observations, objections and proposals by the chief of the Hungarian delegation, Count Albert Apponyi. In conjunction with the introductory comments, the reply by Millerand is extensively quoted.<sup>24</sup>

The minority policy of Rumania between the two world wars is presented extensively and in detail by the historical organ of the Central Committee. First of all, the relations between Rumania and Hungary are summarized, naturally, from a Rumanian point of view. To quote:

"With respect to the Rumanian-Hungarian relations, (one has to state) that the direction of certain events in Hungary, the rigid behavior of the leading forces in that country in relationship to Rumania and some of the positions taken by the Rumanian Government at the time, with respect to relations between the two countries, provoked an atmosphere of mistrust and tensions. In view of the fact that, after WWI, the state borders were not yet finally determined, came the well-known military incidents which led to the occupation of Budapest and part of the Hungarian territory by Rumanian troops. These incidents were the result of continued and relentlessly violent action, which reached the dimensions of a massacre, against the Rumanians living outside the provisional demarcation line set by the armistice commission.

[An additional cause of these incidents allegedly was] the threats by the revolutionary regime (Bala Kun's--D.G.) against Rumania which followed the offensives by the Hungarian Red Army against the Rumanian Army on 10-20 July 1919....The Rumanian military government in Hungary, which was installed after the end of the military squirmishes, did not have a repressive or marauding character similar to that of the temporary occupation of part of Rumania by the central powers of WWI, or even the occupation of North-Western Rumania by Horthy's Hungary after the Vienna Dictate. (The Rumanian) General Holban, governor of Budapest, had solved the particularly acute problem of supplying food to the population, he reintroduced the civilian rights and freedoms suspended during the revolution, guaranteed the freedom of the press....The Hungarian Social Democrats, Erno Garamy and Karoly Peyer, expressed their appreciation for the regime installed by the Rumanian army."

Rumania supported Hungary even in foreign policy:

Together with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, Rumania supported Hungary in the League of Nations in order to receive credit for overcoming its economic difficulties, under the expressed condition, that this loan would not be used for rearmament or for irredentist propaganda."

Subsequently, the author lists a number of Rumanian politicians who, in accordance with the general attitude in Rumania, pleaded for a humanitarian regulation of and legislation for minorities. Already in 1919, Grigore Antipa represented the view that "in our future state...every nationality must find its home and not its enemy." Sextil Puscariu stressed: "We must not forget that we have a large number of Magyar compatriots with whom we have to live a shared life without conflicts. The healthy political instinct of our nation had determined our goal with respect to national minorities in Alba Julia. Those who had fully tasted the bitter bread of suppression, declared absolute tolerance the moment they became rulers."

Gala Galaction stresses for his part: "It is in our interest to no longer scratch out the eyes of those of different origin, but to enable them to set spiritual roots with us. Only in this manner will be able to consolidate Rumania." Ion Nistor represented the view: "We must bring the problem of language to a just and happy solution." And D. Xenopol advocated: "The citizens of Hungarian, German, Ruthenian and other origins who live in enclosed groups in various regions of the country are naturally allowed to elect their own representatives in the voting and administrative districts where they live, and must be listened to by the Parliament." According to the author of this essay, the constitution adopted on 27 March 1923 had considered all of these recommendations.<sup>25</sup> It is repeatedly pointed out in the present work that Communist Rumania not only continued the tradition but even advanced it further, to perfection.

#### The Trauma of the Partition of Transylvania

The tone of numerous articles which deal with the partition of Transylvania after the Vienna arbitration on 30 August 1940 is that Rumania has not put up with or has not even forgotten this "outrage," and that this must never repeat itself in view of the brutal treatment of the Rumanians remaining in Northern Transylvania which was awarded to Hungary. This trauma, in addition to the suspicion in Bucharest, that Moscow is repeatedly attempting to exert pressure on the Rumanian Communist Party by the actualization of the Transylvanian minority or nationality problems, could be the reason for the present campaign involving the historical, ethnic and legal claims of Rumania to Transylvania. Rumanian politicians, historians and literary figures have repeatedly pointed out in form of hints that Moscow and Budapest are playing together.

An author from Kalusenburg impressively describes how his Transylvanian compatriots received the news about the "Vienna Dictate:" "It hit us like lightning. The newspaper headlines of 30 August 1940 announced Hitler's judgement with letters the size of a hand. We were robbed of Northern Transylvania without having shot one bullet (for its defense). More than 22,000 square kilometers (of Rumanian soil) with 2.6 million Rumanian citizens was torn from the body of the country. Nearly 2 million Rumanians were presented to Miklos Horthy on a platter. King Carol II behaved like a dishrag. [...] The entire land rose up. A wave of protests, like an electric charge, went forth from Rumania against the abominable Vienna Dictate..."<sup>26</sup> This picture of the mood, which is not an isolated one, corresponds to many published reports from involved eyewitnesses.

Several articles and reports deal with the discriminations practiced against the Rumanian inhabitants of Northern Transylvania after the partition and the genocidelike mass murders. It is reported, for instance, that in Moisei, a village in Maramures, where a dozen Rumanians were condemned to death and were executed on 14 October 1944 by Hungary because of their refusal "to fight against their own brothers," a house was set up as a memorial. Many citizens of the village were allegedly sent to forced labor in a concentration camp, were shot as deserters "of a somnambulant army" or were "deported to Germany." The author compares Moisei with Oradour in France, Lidice in the CSSR and Guernica in Spain, villages in which the Third Reich became guilty of genocide. The memorial erected in Moisei has allegedly become a place of pilgrimage to the Rumanians.<sup>27</sup>

A case of deportation is reported by the victim. On 16 September 1940 (that is, immediately after the incorporation of Northern Transylvania into Hungary--D.G.), a large mass of citizens of Rumanian origin protested in the streets of the town Nasaud against the annexation of their country to Hungary. They sang old Rumanian freedom songs and carried posters with the picture of Rumanian freedom fighters of the 18th and 19th Century. About 20 youths, among them the author of this eyewitness report, were ordered to the town hall on 18 September, were questioned by a "Horthy officer" and also by the Magyar priest, Gherghey, and were badly insulted. Already two days later, 81 demonstrators were forcefully repatriated "into the mourning homeland."<sup>28</sup>

#### On Regaining Northern Transylvania

A Northern Transylvanian author, who also could not forget the "injustice done to Rumanians" after the forced repatriation into the "free homeland," reports in a memorial volume of the "inhumanity of the Horthy regime in the occupied territory" and on the activities of the expatriated and of all other Rumanians to regain their lost homeland. Excerpts of this memoir were published in a periodical. One learns here that by the autumn of 1943, 217,738 Rumanians were expelled from Northern Transylvania. Allegedly, all their goal was "to free Northern Transylvania."<sup>29</sup> Alongside their compatriots who hid themselves in the forests and gorges, many of these expatriated Rumanians participated in "freeing Transylvania from the Horthy and German occupation" after 23 August 1944, when Rumania, which had been allied with the Axis Powers, changed sides.

The same periodical which published the reports of the exiled Rumanians, also let some North Transylvanians tell their experiences who, in their old homeland, in the framework of Rumanian troop units, have marched against Hungary and Germany. Much is said there about the sacrificing spirit of their compatriots and especially also about those Northern Transylvanians who gave up their life in the battle. "We Rumanians--reports noncommissioned officer Ioan-Marcu Suciu--possessed a power which could not be subjugated to any other power on earth: The love of country and home of our forefathers which we have inherited for many generations... We were all sustained by hate against the Horthy and German invaders. And all of us wanted to battle the Fascists in order to liberate our parents, brothers and villages which some among us have not seen for four years." And another former Northern Transylvanian soldier, Vasile Cimpian, gave a deposition that he allegedly "was hit in the Horthy army because he had no command of the Hungarian language." Many Rumanian soldiers had been volunteers in the campaign against Hungary and Germany, just as the former soldier Gheorghe Chirtes-Toader. Emil Seulean, retired lieutenant colonel, reports in conclusion that "the Horthy units have shot many inhabitants of his village." These testimonies fill many pages. They are followed by a long list of fallen Rumanian soldiers who died in the battlefield of Oarba de Mures and are buried in the surrounding villages. Of course, the periodical notes that many of the hero graves are partly or totally neglected.<sup>30</sup>

#### How did Rumania Take Its Revenge?

A panel discussion, in which a string of well-known Rumanian and Transylvanian-Magyar scientists participated, with the theme: "Contribution of the Rumanian Communist Party and its General Secretary, Nicolae Ceausescu, to the Enrichment of the Theory of the Nation and of the National Relationships in the Contemporary World" point out, already at the end of February, that Rumania succeeded "in forming an indestructible unity of the entire peoples, all of the workers, irrespective of nationality, under the leadership of the Rumanian Communist Party."<sup>31</sup> There is no mention of a minority problem or of tensions between Rumania and Hungary.

On the contrary, the Rumanian people are vouched for not to harbor any "racial hatred" whenever or wherever. A Rumanian author asserts: "It has never happened to me that I would have discovered racial hatred or tendencies toward racial animosity in the Rumanian soul."<sup>32</sup> Present Rumania even provides for the undertaking of an intensive scientific investigation of the many centuries of coexistence by several nationalities within the Rumanian borders. A well-known Transylvanian-Saxonian historian, member of the Academy for Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Rumania stresses: "The research activity of the Center for Social Sciences in Sibiu (Hermannstadt) is oriented in this noble direction whereby new and totally convincing arguments came to light especially about the question of what unified the Rumanians with their brothers from the common homeland."<sup>33</sup> A Rumanian author also came to similar conclusions; based on memorials from the historical section of the Covasna district museum, he detected numerous evidences of brotherly cooperation between Rumanians and Szeklers.<sup>34</sup>

Another Rumanian author reports from the "Cultural House-Petofi" in Bucharest, named after the Hungarian nationalist hero and poet who was killed in the battle against the "enemies of the revolution" near Sigisoara, Transylvania, in 1849. The author stresses particularly that the many "Magyar scholars who fled from the Habsburg police" to Walachia were received with open arms by the Rumanians. The cultural house was built in 1883 by a Szekler manufacturer, 25 years after the establishment of a Magyar literary association "which has existed without interruption until the present." For reasons of "dogmatic management," the cultural house had been closed for a while after it had been visited by the then minister president, Petru Gorza, in 1954. A "certain negligence and confusion contributed" to this closure. Even in this case, it had been "to the credit of Comrade Ceausescu to reestablish the rights of the cultural house and to order its renovation in 1969."<sup>35</sup> As a consequence of the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 by troops of Warsaw Pact units, an occupation sharply condemned by Ceausescu and resulting in a considerably deteriorated relationship between Rumania and the Soviet Union, Rumania showed particular consideration toward the minorities for a while.

The Rumanian press makes increasing efforts to provide proof that the demonstrative partiality of the regime toward the national minorities is met by an unlimited love-in-return on their part. In addition to declarations by official representatives of the "coexisting nationalities" and by personalities from among them who accept such assertions and expositions by the Party leadership without a grain of salt, the Rumanian media also rely on individual guests of Hungarian "creative artists" in order to stress the high degree of "national fraternization." An example would be the allusion that the "enormous success" of "Flacara" by artistic circles of Bucharest, the performances of which "draw thousands and tens of thousands of mostly young males" is due to a considerable part to a Szekler, Erzsebet Adam, from the Tirgu Mures National Theater, who sings folksongs and "monodramas" in her mother-tongue. The artist is dressed in her folk costume.<sup>36</sup> In the past, such reports in the Rumanian-language central press had a curiosity value. They also cannot cash in on the fact that, at this time, things are not the best around the Rumanian-Hungarian relations.

#### FOOTNOTES

\*In issue No 1, 1983, of our journal, the editor reported the position of renowned Transylvanian-Hungarian functionaries and scholars on the nationality problems in Rumania. The present article represents the current national self-appraisal of Rumanians based on the statements of individuals of Rumanian origin. This self-appraisal is allegedly supported by the greater part of the population, even those who otherwise disagree with the regime.

1. Allusions to these activities are made in numerous writings which will be referred to later.
2. See D. Ghermani: "The Communist Reinterpretation of Rumanian History With Special Reference to the Middle Ages" Munich, 1967, especially pp 124-136, and by the same author: "Theory and Practice of Rumanian Historiography of the Postwar Period (1948-1978);" SUEDOSTDEUTSCHES ARCHIV Vol 21, 1978 pp 105-117.
3. See D. Ghermani: "On the Continuity and Romanism of Transylvanian Rumanians. From the Rumanian View" (Documentation), SUEDOSTEUROPA No 11/12, 1982 pp 692-696. The then nestor of Rumanian historiography pointed out in a brief article in 1973 that the Roman "colonists" assimilated the "native element" thereby creating "new ethnic syntheses;" "Formation of the Rumanian Nation" RAMURI 15 Aug 1982.
4. I. Micu: "Vergil on the Thraco-Geto-Dacians" MAGAZIN ISTORIC No 12, Dec 1982 pp 30-31.
5. N. Copoiu: "The History of Rumanians and the Fate of (World) Empires" LUCEAFARUL 16 Oct 1982.
6. S. Iosifescu: "The Significance of a Relationship" VIATA MILITARA No 11, Nov 1982.
7. N. Stoicescu: "The History of the Pronounced Consciousness Governing the Rumanians" CONTEMPORANUL 12 Dec 1982.
8. Bishop born in Moesia near Naissus (Nisch) who probably lived between 341-414.
9. The article by Ana-Maria Coman: "Gesta Sancti Niceta Vetris Daciae Episcopi" is a commentary on a writing published in Cluj (Klausenburg) in 1750. The author refers to the Grosse Brockhaus, Vol 8, 1952-63, to Grand Larousse Encyclopedique, Vol 7, 1960-64 and to Italian encyclopedias and several monographs. ANALE DE ISTORIE is an organ of the Central Committee of the RCP.
10. Nicolae Ceausescu: "Statement on the Current Stage of Socialist Development in Our Country, on the Theoretical and Ideological Problems and Also on the Political and Educational Activity of the Party" presented to the extended plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP 1-2 June 1982, Bucharest 1982 p 12.
11. M. Musat: "State Unity and National Independence, Basic Goals of the Struggle by the Rumanian People in the Course of Their Historical Development" ANALE DE ISTORIE No 4, 1980 p 48.

12. The concept of "Rumanian principalities" or "Danube principalities" is used by historical science to jointly refer to the Moldau and Walachia. Transylvania, the Rumanian population of which had outweighed the other nationalities settled there for centuries, was not included in this concept because of the sovereignty conditions existing until the end of WWI. In this respect--since 1965--Rumanian historiography is presenting a partly justified exception at least with respect to the last 50 years.
13. Ilie Ceausescu: "From the Centralized and Independent Dacian State of Burebista to the Rumanian Socialist State--Unity and Continuity" ANALE DE ISTORIE No 5, 1982 pp 35-38 and No 6, 1982 pp 22-23.
14. Ilie Ceausescu: "Transylvania, Ancient Rumanian Turf" MAGAZINE ISTORIC No 12, Dec 1982 pp 4-9.
15. I. Ardeleanu, V. Arimia and G. Bondoc (collectors) "Michael the Brave in the European Consciousness, External Documents" Bucharest, 1982.
16. C.D. Giurescu: same title as above (Review); ANALE DE ISTORIE May 1982.
17. V.V. Grecu: "Transylvanian Constants. An Unknown Petition by Avram Iancu" TRANSILVANIA No 12, 1982.
18. G. Ploesteanu: "The Hero and Martyr Avram Iancu. Testimonies From Foreign Archives" VATRA Oct 1982.
19. A. Iordache: "The Efforts of Rumanians Belonging to the Habsburg Empire, During the 1848-49 Revolution, to Attain National Unity" REVISTA DE ISTORIE Vol 35 No 5/6 1982 pp 686-706.
20. Corneliu Vadim Tudor: "The Year 1848" VATRA 15 Oct 1982.
21. S. Postolache: "In Tebea" LUCEAFARUL 25 Sep 1982.
22. Lucua Tafta: "The Population of Maramures in Battle for Freedom and National Unity (1848-1918) Documents" REVISTA DE ISTORIE Sep 1982 pp 1055-1056.
23. I. Margineanu: "Blasendorf--a Town the Shape of a Heart" TRIBUNA 19 Aug 1982.
24. S. Sofronie: "An Anti-Revisionistic Document: the Millerand Paper" FAMILIA Nov 1982.
25. M. Musat and F. Tanasescu: "The Coexisting Nationalities in the Rumanian State Completed in 1918" ANALE DE ISTORIE No 5 Sep/Oct 1982 pp 49-65.

26. V. Copilu Cheatra: "Author on the Barricades" VATRA No 5, 1982.
27. A. Dohotaru: "Moisei, January 1983--The House of Martyrs" FLACARA 14 Jan 1983.
28. C. Moldovan: "The Banishment" RAMURI No 6, 1982.
29. V. Netea: "Memoirs" VATRA No 5, 8 etc. 1982.
30. Ibidem: No 5, 1982.
31. [The Rumanian title of the speech is given] The discussion was organized by the Party Academy "Stefan Gheorghiu" in collaboration with the theoretical organ of the Central Committee ERA SOCIALISTA No 2, 25 Jan 1983 pp 31-43.
32. I. Ariesanu: "The Soul of the People" ORIZONT 3 Dec 1982.
33. C. Gollner: "Hundreds of Years of Coexistence and Hundreds of Years of Fraternization" TRANSILVANIA No 12, Dec 1982.
34. S. Achim: "The Broad Mural on Brotherly History and the Brotherly Struggle of the Workers of Our Land" SCINTEIA 3 Oct 1982.
35. A. Andritoiu: "In the Petofi-Culture House" ROMANIA LITERARA 16 Dec 1982.
36. C. Sova: "The Syllables of a Long Poem" ROMANIA LIBERA 6 Nov 1982.

2473

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